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Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 5869 ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 6347 (Obsoleted by RFC 9147) Summary: 2 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 1 warning (==), 1 comment (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 INTERNET-DRAFT D. Eastlake 2 Intended status: Proposed Standard Futurewei Technologies 3 D. Zhang 4 Huawei Technologies 5 Expires: December 5, 2021 June 6, 2021 7 Simple Group Keying Protocol TRILL Use Profiles 8 10 Abstract 12 This document specifies use profiles for the application of the 13 simple group keying protocol (SGKP) to multi-destination TRILL 14 Extended RBridge Channel message security (RFC 7978) and TRILL over 15 IP packet security (draft-ietf-trill-over-ip). 17 Status of This Memo 19 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 20 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 22 Distribution of this document is unlimited. Comments should be sent 23 to the authors or the TRILL working group mailing list: 24 trill@ietf.org. 26 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 27 Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that 28 other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- 29 Drafts. 31 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 32 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 33 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 34 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 36 The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at 37 https://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html. The list of Internet-Draft 38 Shadow Directories can be accessed at 39 https://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. 41 Table of Contents 43 1. Introduction............................................3 44 1.1 Terminology and Acronyms..............................3 46 2. DTLS: Extended RBridge Channel Group Keyed Security.....5 47 2.1 Transmission of Group Keying Messages..................5 48 2.2 Transmission of Protected Multi-destination Data.......6 50 3. TRILL Over IP Group Keyed Security......................7 51 3.1 Transmission of Group Keying Messages..................7 52 3.2 Transmission of Protected Multi-destination Data.......8 54 4. Security Considerations.................................9 56 5. IANA Considerations....................................10 57 5.1 Group Keying RBridge Channel Protocol Numbers.........10 58 5.2 Group Secured Extended RBridge Channel SType..........10 60 Normative References......................................11 61 Informative References....................................12 63 Acknowledgements..........................................13 65 Authors' Addresses........................................14 67 1. Introduction 69 This document specifies use profiles for the application of the 70 simple group keying protocol (SGKP) [SGKPrfc] to the use of DTLS 71 [RFC6347] formatted TRILL [RFC6325] [RFC7780] Extended RBridge 72 Channel message security [RFC7178] [RFC7978] and to the use of IPsec 73 formatted TRILL over IP [TRILLoverIP]. It is anticipated that there 74 will be other uses for the group keying protocol. 76 1.1 Terminology and Acronyms 78 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 79 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 80 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] [RFC8174] 81 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. 83 This document uses terminology and acronyms defined in [RFC6325] and 84 [RFC7178]. Some of these are repeated below for convenience along 85 with additional new terms and acronyms. 87 Data Label - VLAN or FGL. 89 DTLS - Datagram Transport Level Security [RFC6347]. 91 FGL - Fine Grained Label [RFC7172]. 93 GKd - A distinguished station in a group that is in charge of 94 which group keying (Section 2) is in use. 96 GKs - Stations in a group other than GKd (Section 2). 98 HKDF - Hash based Key Derivation Function [RFC5869]. 100 IS-IS - Intermediate System to Intermediate System [RFC7176]. 102 keying material - The set of a Key ID, a secret key, and a cypher 103 suite. 105 PDU - Protocol Data Unit. 107 QoS - Quality of Service. 109 RBridge - An alternative term for a TRILL switch. 111 SHA - Secure Hash Algorithm [RFC6234]. 113 TRILL - Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links or Tunneled 114 Routing in the Link Layer. 116 TRILL switch - A device that implements the TRILL protocol 117 [RFC6325] [RFC7780], sometimes referred to as an RBridge. 119 2. DTLS: Extended RBridge Channel Group Keyed Security 121 This section specifies a profile of the simple group keying protocol 122 (SGKP) defined in [SGKPrfc]. This profile provides shared secret 123 keying to secure multi-destination Extended RBridge Channel messages 124 [RFC7978] as described in Setction 2.2. 126 For this SKGP use profile, a group is identified by TRILL Data Label 127 (VLAN or FGL [RFC7172]) and consists of the data reachable [RFC7780] 128 RBridges with interest in that Data Label. GKd is the RBridge in the 129 group that, of those group members supporting the Group Keying 130 Protocol, is the highest priority to be a TRILL distribution tree 131 root as specified in Section 4.5 of [RFC6325]. If not all members of 132 the group support the Group Keying Protocol, then there are two cases 133 of destinations for multi-destination Channel Tunnel RBridge Channel 134 messages: 136 (1) If the sender and at least two other group members support the 137 Group Keying Protocol, it SHOULD, for efficiency, send a secured 138 multi-destination RBridge Channel message to cover the group and 139 serially unicast to the group members not supporting the Group 140 Keying Protocol. 141 (2) In other cases the sender serially transmits the data to the 142 group members using pairwise security. 144 2.1 Transmission of Group Keying Messages 146 Keying messages themselves are sent as unicast Extended RBridge 147 Channel messages carrying a Group Keying protocol (see Section 5.1) 148 RBridge Channel message. Such messages MUST use DTLS Pairwise or 149 Composite (STypes 2 or 3) security [RFC7978]. 151 The Group Keying profile for this Group Keying Use Type is as 152 follows: 154 Priority of Group Keying messages for this SHOULD be 6 unless the 155 network manager chooses to use a lower priority after 156 determining that such lower priority group keying messages 157 will yield acceptable performance. Priority 7 SHOULD NOT be 158 used as it may cause interference with the establishment and 159 maintenance of adjacency. 161 Use Type = 1 163 KeyID1 Length = 2, KeyID1 is an [RFC5310] key ID. 165 CypherSuiteLng = 2, CypherSuite is the cypher suite used in 166 groupcast extended RBridge Channel data messages for the 167 corresponding KeyID2. This is a DTLS [RFC6347] cypher suite. 169 KeyID2 Length = 1, KeyID2 is the index under which a group key is 170 set. Group keys are, in effect, indexed by this KeyID2 and 171 the nickname of the GKd as used in the Ingress Nickname 172 field of the TRILL Header of Group Keying messages. 174 2.2 Transmission of Protected Multi-destination Data 176 Protected Extended RBridge Channel [RFC7978] messages are multicast 177 (M bit set to one in the TRILL Header) and set the SType field to a 178 new value TBD2 for "Group Secured" (see Section 5.2). Since there 179 could be multiple group keys distribued and enabled for use, data is 180 formatted as two bytes of Key ID followed by data formatted as TLS 181 1.3 [RFC8446] application_data using the cyphersuite and keying 182 material stored under the Key ID. Such a message on the wire looks 183 like the following: 185 +---------------------------+ 186 | Link Header | 187 +---------------------------+ 188 | TRILL Header | 189 +---------------------------+ 190 | RBridge Channel Header | 191 | snd Extension | 192 +---------------------------+ 193 | RBridge Channel Payload | 194 | +----------------------+ | 195 | | 2-byte Key ID | | 196 | +----------------------+ | 197 | | DTLS formatted | | 198 | | application data | | 199 | +----------------------+ | 200 +---------------------------+ 201 | Link Trailer | 202 +---------------------------+ 204 3. TRILL Over IP Group Keyed Security 206 The SGKP usage profile specified in this section provides shared 207 secret keying to secure TRILL over IP messages [TRILLoverIP]. The 208 keys put in place by the group keying protocol are available for use 209 as IPSEC keys. 211 For this use profile, a group is identified by an IP multicast 212 address and consists of the RBridges adjacent [RFC7177] to the sender 213 reachable with that multicast address over a TRILL over IP link. GKd 214 is the RBridge in the group that, of those group members supporting 215 the Group Keying Protocol, has the highest priority to be a TRILL 216 distribution tree root as specified in Section 4.5 of [RFC6325]. If 217 not all members of the group support the Group Keying Protocol, then 218 there are two cases for multi-destination TRILL over IP messages: 220 (1) If the sender and at least two other group members support SGKP, 221 it SHOULD, for efficiency, send a secured IPSEC message to cover 222 the group and serially unicast to the group members not 223 supporting the Group Keying Protocol. 224 (2) In other cases the sender serially transmits the data to the 225 group members using pairwise security. 227 3.1 Transmission of Group Keying Messages 229 Keying messages themselves are sent as unicast Extended RBridge 230 Channel messages carrying a Group Keying protocol (see Section 5.1) 231 RBridge Channel message. Such messages MUST use DTLS Pairwise or 232 Composite (STypes 2 or 3) security [RFC7978]. 234 The Group Keying profile for this Group Keying Use Type is as 235 follows: 237 Priority of Group Keying messages for this SHOULD be 6 unless the 238 network manager chooses to use a lower priority after 239 determining that such lower priority group keying messages 240 will yield acceptable performance. Priority 7 SHOULD NOT be 241 used as it may cause interference with the establishment and 242 maintenance of adjacency. 244 Use Type = 2 246 KeyID1 Length = 2, KeyID1 is an [RFC5310] key ID. 248 CypherSuiteLng = variable, CypherSuite is an IKEv2 crypto 249 algorithm "proposal" [RFC7296]. 251 KeyID2 Length = 4, KeyID2 is the IPsec multicast SA. It is the 252 index under which a group key is set. Group keys are indexed 253 by this KeyID2 and the nickname of the GKd as used in the 254 Ingress Nickname field of the TRILL Header of Group Keying 255 messages. 257 3.2 Transmission of Protected Multi-destination Data 259 Multi-destination TRILL over IP data packets are formatted as 260 multicast IPsec ESP tunnel mode [RFC4303] packets. The key and crpto 261 algorithms in use are indicated by the multicast SA. 263 4. Security Considerations 265 See [SGKPrfc] for Simple Group Keying Protocol security 266 considerations. 268 See [RFC7978] for Extended RBridge Channel security considerations. 270 See [RFC7457] in connection with TLS and DTLS security 271 considerations. 273 See [TRILLoverIP] for TRILL over IP secrity considerations. 275 See [RFC4303] for IPsec ESP security considerations. 277 5. IANA Considerations 279 This section gives IANA Considerations. 281 5.1 Group Keying RBridge Channel Protocol Numbers 283 IANA is requested to assign, from the range assigned by Standards 284 Action, TBD1 as the TRILL RBridge Channel protocol number for use 285 when the "Group Keying" protocol is transmitted over Extended RBridge 286 Channel messages. 288 The added RBridge Channel protocols registry entry on the TRILL 289 Parameters web page is as follows: 291 Protocol Description Reference 292 -------- -------------- ------------------ 293 TBD1 Group Keying Section 2 of [this document] 295 5.2 Group Secured Extended RBridge Channel SType 297 IANA is requested to assign TBD2 as the Group Secured SType in the 298 "Extended RBridge Channel Security Types Subregistry" on the TRILL 299 Parameters web page as follows: 301 SType Description Reference 302 ----- ------------- ---------- 303 TBD2 Group Secured Section 2.2 of [this document] 305 Normative References 307 [RFC2119] - BBradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 308 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, 309 March 1997, . 311 [RFC4303] - Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC 312 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005, . 315 [RFC5310] - Bhatia, M., Manral, V., Li, T., Atkinson, R., White, R., 316 and M. Fanto, "IS-IS Generic Cryptographic Authentication", RFC 317 5310, DOI 10.17487/RFC5310, February 2009, . 320 [RFC5869] - Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and- 321 Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869, May 2010, 322 . 324 [RFC6325] - Perlman, R., Eastlake 3rd, D., Dutt, D., Gai, S., and A. 325 Ghanwani, "Routing Bridges (RBridges): Base Protocol 326 Specification", RFC 6325, DOI 10.17487/RFC6325, July 2011, 327 . 329 [RFC6347] - Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer 330 Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, January 2012, . 333 [RFC7172] - Eastlake 3rd, D., Zhang, M., Agarwal, P., Perlman, R., 334 and D. Dutt, "Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links 335 (TRILL): Fine-Grained Labeling", RFC 7172, DOI 336 10.17487/RFC7172, May 2014, . 339 [RFC7176] - Eastlake 3rd, D., Senevirathne, T., Ghanwani, A., Dutt, 340 D., and A. Banerjee, "Transparent Interconnection of Lots of 341 Links (TRILL) Use of IS-IS", RFC 7176, May 2014, 342 . 344 [RFC7177] - Eastlake 3rd, D., Perlman, R., Ghanwani, A., Yang, H., 345 and V. Manral, "Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links 346 (TRILL): Adjacency", RFC 7177, DOI 10.17487/RFC7177, May 2014, 347 . 349 [RFC7178] - Eastlake 3rd, D., Manral, V., Li, Y., Aldrin, S., and D. 350 Ward, "Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links (TRILL): 351 RBridge Channel Support", RFC 7178, DOI 10.17487/RFC7178, May 352 2014, . 354 [RFC7296] - Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T. 356 Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", 357 STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October 2014, 358 . 360 [RFC7780] - Eastlake 3rd, D., Zhang, M., Perlman, R., Banerjee, A., 361 Ghanwani, A., and S. Gupta, "Transparent Interconnection of 362 Lots of Links (TRILL): Clarifications, Corrections, and 363 Updates", RFC 7780, DOI 10.17487/RFC7780, February 2016, 364 . 366 [RFC7978] - Eastlake 3rd, D., Umair, M., and Y. Li, "Transparent 367 Interconnection of Lots of Links (TRILL): RBridge Channel 368 Header Extension", RFC 7978, DOI 10.17487/RFC7978, September 369 2016, . 371 [RFC8174] - Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 372 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 373 2017, . 375 [RFC8446] - Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) 376 Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 377 2018, . 379 [TRILLoverIP] - M. Cullen, D. Eastlake, M. Zhang, D. Zhang, 380 "Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links (TRILL) over IP", 381 draft-ietf-trill-over-ip, work in progress. 383 [SGKPrfc] - D. Eastlake, D. Zhang, "Simple Group Keying Protocol 384 (SGKP)", draft-ietf-trill-group-keying, work in progress. 386 Informative References 388 [RFC6234] - Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash 389 Algorithms (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234, DOI 390 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011, . 393 [RFC7457] - Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, "Summarizing 394 Known Attacks on Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram 395 TLS (DTLS)", RFC 7457, February 2015, . 398 Acknowledgements 400 The contributions of the following are hereby gratefully 401 acknowledged: 403 TBD 405 Authors' Addresses 407 Donald E. Eastlake, 3rd 408 Futurewei Technologies 409 2386 Panoramic Circle 410 Apopka, FL 32703 USA 412 Phone: +1-508-333-2270 413 EMail: d3e3e3@gmail.com 415 Dacheng Zhang 416 Huawei Technologies 418 Email: dacheng.zhang@huawei.com 420 Copyright, Disclaimer, and Additional IPR Provisions 422 Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 423 document authors. 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