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Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 5869 ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 6347 (Obsoleted by RFC 9147) Summary: 2 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 1 warning (==), 1 comment (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 INTERNET-DRAFT D. Eastlake 2 Intended status: Proposed Standard Futurewei Technologies 3 D. Zhang 4 Huawei Technologies 5 Expires: May 22, 2022 November 28, 2021 7 Simple Group Keying Protocol TRILL Use Profiles 8 10 Abstract 12 This document specifies use profiles for the application of the 13 simple group keying protocol (SGKP) to multi-destination TRILL 14 Extended RBridge Channel message security (RFC 7978) and TRILL over 15 IP packet security (draft-ietf-trill-over-ip). 17 Status of This Memo 19 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 20 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 22 Distribution of this document is unlimited. Comments should be sent 23 to the authors or the TRILL working group mailing list: 24 trill@ietf.org. 26 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 27 Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that 28 other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- 29 Drafts. 31 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 32 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 33 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 34 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 36 The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at 37 https://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html. The list of Internet-Draft 38 Shadow Directories can be accessed at 39 https://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. 41 Table of Contents 43 1. Introduction............................................3 44 1.1 Terminology and Acronyms..............................3 46 2. DTLS: Extended RBridge Channel Group Keyed Security.....5 47 2.1 Transmission of Group Keying Messages..................5 48 2.2 Transmission of Protected Multi-destination Data.......6 50 3. TRILL Over IP Group Keyed Security......................7 51 3.1 Transmission of Group Keying Messages..................7 52 3.2 Transmission of Protected Multi-destination Data.......8 54 4. Security Considerations.................................9 56 5. IANA Considerations....................................10 57 5.1 Group Keying RBridge Channel Protocol Numbers.........10 58 5.2 Group Secured Extended RBridge Channel SType..........10 60 Normative References......................................11 61 Informative References....................................12 63 Acknowledgements..........................................13 65 1. Introduction 67 This document specifies use profiles for the application of the 68 simple group keying protocol (SGKP) [SGKP] to the use of DTLS 69 [RFC6347] formatted TRILL [RFC6325] [RFC7780] Extended RBridge 70 Channel message security [RFC7178] [RFC7978] and to the use of IPsec 71 formatted TRILL over IP [TRILLoverIP]. It is anticipated that there 72 will be other uses for the group keying protocol. 74 1.1 Terminology and Acronyms 76 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 77 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 78 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] [RFC8174] 79 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. 81 This document uses terminology and acronyms defined in [RFC6325] and 82 [RFC7178]. Some of these are repeated below for convenience along 83 with additional new terms and acronyms. 85 Data Label - VLAN or FGL. 87 DTLS - Datagram Transport Level Security [RFC6347]. 89 FGL - Fine Grained Label [RFC7172]. 91 GKd - A distinguished station in a group that is in charge of 92 which group keying (Section 2) is in use [SGKP]. 94 GKs - Stations in a group other than GKd (Section 2) [SGKP]. 96 HKDF - Hash based Key Derivation Function [RFC5869]. 98 IS-IS - Intermediate System to Intermediate System [RFC7176]. 100 keying material - The set of a Key ID, a secret key, and a cypher 101 suite. 103 PDU - Protocol Data Unit. 105 QoS - Quality of Service. 107 RBridge - An alternative term for a TRILL switch. 109 SHA - Secure Hash Algorithm [RFC6234]. 111 TRILL - Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links or Tunneled 112 Routing in the Link Layer. 114 TRILL switch - A device that implements the TRILL protocol 115 [RFC6325] [RFC7780], sometimes referred to as an RBridge. 117 2. DTLS: Extended RBridge Channel Group Keyed Security 119 This section specifies a profile of the simple group keying protocol 120 (SGKP) specified in [SGKP]. This profile provides shared secret 121 keying to secure multi-destination Extended RBridge Channel messages 122 [RFC7978] as described in Setction 2.2. 124 For this SKGP use profile, a group is identified by TRILL Data Label 125 (VLAN or FGL [RFC7172]) and consists of the data reachable [RFC7780] 126 RBridges with interest in that Data Label. GKd is the RBridge in the 127 group that, of those group members supporting the Group Keying 128 Protocol, is the highest priority to be a TRILL distribution tree 129 root as specified in Section 4.5 of [RFC6325]. If not all members of 130 the group support the Group Keying Protocol, then there are two cases 131 of destinations for multi-destination Channel Tunnel RBridge Channel 132 messages: 134 (1) If the sender and at least two other group members support the 135 Group Keying Protocol, it SHOULD, for efficiency, send a secured 136 multi-destination RBridge Channel message to cover the group and 137 serially unicast to the group members not supporting the Group 138 Keying Protocol. 139 (2) In other cases the sender serially transmits the data to the 140 group members using pairwise security. 142 2.1 Transmission of Group Keying Messages 144 Keying messages themselves are sent as unicast Extended RBridge 145 Channel messages carrying a Group Keying protocol (see Section 5.1) 146 RBridge Channel message. Such messages MUST use DTLS Pairwise or 147 Composite (STypes 2 or 3) security [RFC7978]. 149 The Group Keying profile for this Group Keying Use Type is as 150 follows: 152 Priority of Group Keying messages for this SHOULD be 6 unless the 153 network manager chooses to use a lower priority after 154 determining that such lower priority group keying messages 155 will yield acceptable performance. Priority 7 SHOULD NOT be 156 used as it may cause interference with the establishment and 157 maintenance of adjacency. 159 Use Type = 1 161 KeyID1 Length = 2, KeyID1 is an [RFC5310] key ID. 163 CypherSuiteLng = 2, CypherSuite is the cypher suite used in 164 groupcast extended RBridge Channel data messages for the 165 corresponding KeyID2. This is a DTLS [RFC6347] cypher suite. 167 KeyID2 Length = 1, KeyID2 is the index under which a group key is 168 set. Group keys are, in effect, indexed by this KeyID2 and 169 the nickname of the GKd as used in the Ingress Nickname 170 field of the TRILL Header of Group Keying messages. 172 2.2 Transmission of Protected Multi-destination Data 174 Protected Extended RBridge Channel [RFC7978] messages are multicast 175 (M bit set to one in the TRILL Header) and set the SType field to a 176 new value TBD2 for "Group Secured" (see Section 5.2). Since there 177 could be multiple group keys distribued and enabled for use, data is 178 formatted as two bytes of Key ID followed by data formatted as TLS 179 1.3 [RFC8446] application_data using the cyphersuite and keying 180 material stored under the Key ID. Such a message on the wire looks 181 like the following: 183 +---------------------------+ 184 | Link Header | 185 +---------------------------+ 186 | TRILL Header | 187 +---------------------------+ 188 | RBridge Channel Header | 189 | snd Extension | 190 +---------------------------+ 191 | RBridge Channel Payload | 192 | +----------------------+ | 193 | | 2-byte Key ID | | 194 | +----------------------+ | 195 | | DTLS formatted | | 196 | | application data | | 197 | +----------------------+ | 198 +---------------------------+ 199 | Link Trailer | 200 +---------------------------+ 202 3. TRILL Over IP Group Keyed Security 204 The SGKP usage profile specified in this section provides shared 205 secret keying to secure TRILL over IP messages [TRILLoverIP]. The 206 keys put in place by the group keying protocol are available for use 207 as IPSEC keys. 209 For this use profile, a group is identified by an IP multicast 210 address and consists of the RBridges adjacent [RFC7177] to the sender 211 reachable with that multicast address over a TRILL over IP link. GKd 212 is the RBridge in the group that, of those group members supporting 213 the Group Keying Protocol, has the highest priority to be a TRILL 214 distribution tree root as specified in Section 4.5 of [RFC6325]. If 215 not all members of the group support the Group Keying Protocol, then 216 there are two cases for multi-destination TRILL over IP messages: 218 (1) If the sender and at least two other group members support SGKP, 219 it SHOULD, for efficiency, send a secured IPSEC message to cover 220 the group and serially unicast to the group members not 221 supporting the Group Keying Protocol. 222 (2) In other cases the sender serially transmits the data to the 223 group members using pairwise security. 225 3.1 Transmission of Group Keying Messages 227 Keying messages themselves are sent as unicast Extended RBridge 228 Channel messages carrying a Group Keying protocol (see Section 5.1) 229 RBridge Channel message. Such messages MUST use DTLS Pairwise or 230 Composite (STypes 2 or 3) security [RFC7978]. 232 The Group Keying profile for this Group Keying Use Type is as 233 follows: 235 Priority of Group Keying messages for this SHOULD be 6 unless the 236 network manager chooses to use a lower priority after 237 determining that such lower priority group keying messages 238 will yield acceptable performance. Priority 7 SHOULD NOT be 239 used as it may cause interference with the establishment and 240 maintenance of adjacency. 242 Use Type = 2 244 KeyID1 Length = 2, KeyID1 is an [RFC5310] key ID. 246 CypherSuiteLng = variable, CypherSuite is an IKEv2 crypto 247 algorithm "proposal" [RFC7296]. 249 KeyID2 Length = 4, KeyID2 is the IPsec multicast SA. It is the 250 index under which a group key is set. Group keys are indexed 251 by this KeyID2 and the nickname of the GKd as used in the 252 Ingress Nickname field of the TRILL Header of Group Keying 253 messages. 255 3.2 Transmission of Protected Multi-destination Data 257 Multi-destination TRILL over IP data packets are formatted as 258 multicast IPsec ESP tunnel mode [RFC4303] packets. The key and crpto 259 algorithms in use are indicated by the multicast SA. 261 4. Security Considerations 263 See [SGKP] for Simple Group Keying Protocol security considerations. 265 See [RFC7978] for Extended RBridge Channel security considerations. 267 See [RFC7457] in connection with TLS and DTLS security 268 considerations. 270 See [TRILLoverIP] for TRILL over IP secrity considerations. 272 See [RFC4303] for IPsec ESP security considerations. 274 5. IANA Considerations 276 This section gives IANA Considerations. 278 5.1 Group Keying RBridge Channel Protocol Numbers 280 IANA is requested to assign, from the range assigned by Standards 281 Action, TBD1 as the TRILL RBridge Channel protocol number for use 282 when the "Group Keying" protocol is transmitted over Extended RBridge 283 Channel messages. 285 The added RBridge Channel protocols registry entry on the TRILL 286 Parameters web page is as follows: 288 Protocol Description Reference 289 -------- -------------- ------------------ 290 TBD1 Group Keying Section 2 of [this document] 292 5.2 Group Secured Extended RBridge Channel SType 294 IANA is requested to assign TBD2 as the Group Secured SType in the 295 "Extended RBridge Channel Security Types Subregistry" on the TRILL 296 Parameters web page as follows: 298 SType Description Reference 299 ----- ------------- ---------- 300 TBD2 Group Secured Section 2.2 of [this document] 302 Normative References 304 [RFC2119] - BBradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 305 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, 306 March 1997, . 308 [RFC4303] - Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", RFC 309 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005, . 312 [RFC5310] - Bhatia, M., Manral, V., Li, T., Atkinson, R., White, R., 313 and M. Fanto, "IS-IS Generic Cryptographic Authentication", RFC 314 5310, DOI 10.17487/RFC5310, February 2009, . 317 [RFC5869] - Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and- 318 Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869, May 2010, 319 . 321 [RFC6325] - Perlman, R., Eastlake 3rd, D., Dutt, D., Gai, S., and A. 322 Ghanwani, "Routing Bridges (RBridges): Base Protocol 323 Specification", RFC 6325, DOI 10.17487/RFC6325, July 2011, 324 . 326 [RFC6347] - Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer 327 Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, January 2012, . 330 [RFC7172] - Eastlake 3rd, D., Zhang, M., Agarwal, P., Perlman, R., 331 and D. Dutt, "Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links 332 (TRILL): Fine-Grained Labeling", RFC 7172, DOI 333 10.17487/RFC7172, May 2014, . 336 [RFC7176] - Eastlake 3rd, D., Senevirathne, T., Ghanwani, A., Dutt, 337 D., and A. Banerjee, "Transparent Interconnection of Lots of 338 Links (TRILL) Use of IS-IS", RFC 7176, May 2014, 339 . 341 [RFC7177] - Eastlake 3rd, D., Perlman, R., Ghanwani, A., Yang, H., 342 and V. Manral, "Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links 343 (TRILL): Adjacency", RFC 7177, DOI 10.17487/RFC7177, May 2014, 344 . 346 [RFC7178] - Eastlake 3rd, D., Manral, V., Li, Y., Aldrin, S., and D. 347 Ward, "Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links (TRILL): 348 RBridge Channel Support", RFC 7178, DOI 10.17487/RFC7178, May 349 2014, . 351 [RFC7296] - Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T. 353 Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", 354 STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October 2014, 355 . 357 [RFC7780] - Eastlake 3rd, D., Zhang, M., Perlman, R., Banerjee, A., 358 Ghanwani, A., and S. Gupta, "Transparent Interconnection of 359 Lots of Links (TRILL): Clarifications, Corrections, and 360 Updates", RFC 7780, DOI 10.17487/RFC7780, February 2016, 361 . 363 [RFC7978] - Eastlake 3rd, D., Umair, M., and Y. Li, "Transparent 364 Interconnection of Lots of Links (TRILL): RBridge Channel 365 Header Extension", RFC 7978, DOI 10.17487/RFC7978, September 366 2016, . 368 [RFC8174] - Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 369 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 370 2017, . 372 [RFC8446] - Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) 373 Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 374 2018, . 376 [TRILLoverIP] - M. Cullen, D. Eastlake, M. Zhang, D. Zhang, 377 "Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links (TRILL) over IP", 378 draft-ietf-trill-over-ip, work in progress. 380 [SGKP] - D. Eastlake, D. Zhang, "Simple Group Keying Protocol 381 (SGKP)", draft-ietf-trill-group-keying, work in progress. 383 Informative References 385 [RFC6234] - Eastlake 3rd, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash 386 Algorithms (SHA and SHA-based HMAC and HKDF)", RFC 6234, DOI 387 10.17487/RFC6234, May 2011, . 390 [RFC7457] - Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, "Summarizing 391 Known Attacks on Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram 392 TLS (DTLS)", RFC 7457, February 2015, . 395 Acknowledgements 397 The contributions of the following are hereby gratefully 398 acknowledged: 400 TBD 402 Authors' Addresses 404 Donald E. Eastlake, 3rd 405 Futurewei Technologies 406 2386 Panoramic Circle 407 Apopka, FL 32703 USA 409 Phone: +1-508-333-2270 410 EMail: d3e3e3@gmail.com 412 Dacheng Zhang 413 Huawei Technologies 415 Email: dacheng.zhang@huawei.com 417 Copyright, Disclaimer, and Additional IPR Provisions 419 Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 420 document authors. 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