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Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 WEBSEC D. Ross 3 Internet-Draft Microsoft 4 Intended status: Standards Track T. Gondrom 5 Expires: January 7, 2013 July 6, 2012 7 HTTP Header Frame Options 8 draft-ietf-websec-frame-options-00 10 Abstract 12 To improve the protection of web applications against Clickjacking 13 this standards defines a http response header that declares a policy 14 communicated from a host to the client browser whether the 15 transmitted content MUST NOT be displayed in frames of other pages 16 from different origins which are allowed to frame the content. 18 Status of this Memo 20 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 21 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 23 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 24 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 25 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 26 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 28 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 29 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 30 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 31 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 33 This Internet-Draft will expire on January 7, 2013. 35 Copyright Notice 37 Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 38 document authors. All rights reserved. 40 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 41 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 42 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 43 publication of this document. Please review these documents 44 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 45 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 46 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 47 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 48 described in the Simplified BSD License. 50 Table of Contents 52 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 53 1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 54 2. Frame-Options Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 55 2.1. Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 56 2.2. Backus-Naur Form (BNF) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 57 2.3. Design Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 58 2.3.1. Enable HTML content from other domains . . . . . . . . 5 59 2.3.2. Browser Behaviour and Processing . . . . . . . . . . . 5 60 2.4. Examples of Frame-Options Headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 61 2.4.1. Example scenario for the ALLOW-FROM parameter . . . . . 6 62 3. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 63 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 64 4.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 65 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 66 6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 67 6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 68 6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 69 Appendix A. Description of a Clickjacking attack . . . . . . . . . 8 70 A.1. Shop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 71 A.2. Confirm Purchase Page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 72 A.3. Flash Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 73 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 75 1. Introduction 77 In 2009 and 2010 many browser vendors introduced the use of a non- 78 standard http header RFC 2616 [RFC2616] "X-Frame-Options" to protect 79 against Clickjacking [Clickjacking]. This standard is to replace the 80 non-standard header. 82 Existing anti-ClickJacking measures, e.g. Frame-breaking Javascript, 83 have weaknesses so that their protection can be circumvented as a 84 study [FRAME-BUSTING] demonstrated. 86 Short of configuring the browser to disable frames and script 87 entirely, which massively impairs browser utility, browser users are 88 vulnerable to this type of attack. 90 "Frame-Options" allows a secure web page from host B to declare that 91 its content (for example a button, links, text, etc.) must not be 92 displayed in a frame of another page (e.g. from host A). In 93 principle this is done by a policy declared in the HTTP header and 94 obeyed by conform browser implementations. 96 1.1. Requirements Language 98 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 99 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 100 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. 102 2. Frame-Options Header 104 The Frame-Options HTTP response header indicates a policy whether a 105 browser MUST NOT allow to render a page in a or