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'OpenID' ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 2616 (Obsoleted by RFC 7230, RFC 7231, RFC 7232, RFC 7233, RFC 7234, RFC 7235) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 2617 (Obsoleted by RFC 7235, RFC 7615, RFC 7616, RFC 7617) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 2818 (Obsoleted by RFC 9110) ** Downref: Normative reference to an Informational RFC: RFC 4732 ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 5246 (Obsoleted by RFC 8446) Summary: 5 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 4 warnings (==), 3 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Internet Engineering Task Force S. Hollenbeck 3 Internet-Draft Verisign Labs 4 Intended status: Standards Track N. Kong 5 Expires: October 31, 2013 CNNIC 6 April 29, 2013 8 Security Services for the Registration Data Access Protocol 9 draft-ietf-weirds-rdap-sec-03 11 Abstract 13 The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) provides "RESTful" web 14 services to retrieve registration metadata from domain name and 15 regional internet registries. This document describes information 16 security services including authentication, authorization, 17 availability, data confidentiality, and data integrity for RDAP. 19 Status of This Memo 21 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 22 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 24 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 25 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 26 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 27 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 29 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 30 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 31 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 32 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 34 This Internet-Draft will expire on October 31, 2013. 36 Copyright Notice 38 Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 39 document authors. All rights reserved. 41 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 42 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 43 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 44 publication of this document. Please review these documents 45 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 46 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 47 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 48 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 49 described in the Simplified BSD License. 51 Table of Contents 53 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 54 2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 55 2.1. Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 56 3. Information Security Services and RDAP . . . . . . . . . . . 3 57 3.1. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 58 3.1.1. Federated Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 59 3.2. Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 60 3.3. Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 61 3.4. Data Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 62 3.5. Data Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 63 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 64 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 65 6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 66 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 67 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 68 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 69 Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 70 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 72 1. Introduction 74 The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) is specified in multiple 75 documents, including "Registration Data Access Protocol Lookup 76 Format" [I-D.ietf-weirds-rdap-query], "JSON Responses for the 77 Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)" 78 [I-D.ietf-weirds-json-response], and "HTTP usage in the Registration 79 Data Access Protocol (RDAP)" [I-D.ietf-weirds-using-http]. 81 One goal of RDAP is to provide security services that do not exist in 82 the WHOIS [RFC3912] protocol, including authentication, 83 authorization, availability, data confidentiality, and data 84 integrity. This document describes how each of these services is 85 achieved by RDAP. Where applicable, informational references to 86 requirements for a WHOIS replacement service [RFC3707] are noted. 88 2. Conventions Used in This Document 90 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 91 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 92 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. 94 2.1. Acronyms and Abbreviations 96 DNR: Domain Name Registry 98 RDAP: Registration Data Access Protocol 100 RIR: Regional Internet Registry 102 3. Information Security Services and RDAP 104 RDAP itself does not include native security services. Instead, RDAP 105 relies on features that are available in other protocol layers to 106 provide needed security services including authentication, 107 authorization, availability, data confidentiality, and data 108 integrity. A description of each of these security services can be 109 found in "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2" [RFC4949]. No 110 requirements have been identified for other security services. 112 3.1. Authentication 114 WHOIS does not provide features to identify and authenticate clients. 115 As noted in section 3.1.4.2 of "Cross Registry Internet Service 116 Protocol (CRISP) Requirements" [RFC3707], there is utility in 117 allowing server operators to offer "varying degrees of access 118 depending on policy and need". Clients have to be identified and 119 authenticated to provide that utility. 121 RDAP MUST include an authentication framework that can accommodate 122 anonymous access as well as verification of identities using a range 123 of authentication methods and credential services. To that end, RDAP 124 clients and servers MUST implement the authentication framework 125 specified in "HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access 126 Authentication" [RFC2617]. The "basic" scheme can be used to send a 127 client's user name and password to a server in plaintext, 128 based64-encoded form. The "digest" scheme can be used to 129 authenticate a client without exposing the client's plaintext 130 password. If the "basic" scheme is used, HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818] 131 MUST be used to protect the client's credentials from disclosure 132 while in transit (see Section 3.4). 134 The Transport Layer Security Protocol [RFC5246] includes an optional 135 feature to identify and authenticate clients who possess and present 136 a valid X.509 digital certificate [RFC5280]. Support for this 137 feature is OPTIONAL. 139 RDAP SHOULD be capable of supporting future authentication methods 140 defined for use with HTTP. 142 3.1.1. Federated Authentication 144 The traditional client-server authentication model requires clients 145 to maintain distinct credentials for every RDAP server. This 146 situation can become unwieldy as the number of RDAP servers 147 increases. Federated authentication mechanisms allow clients to use 148 one credential to access multiple RDAP servers and reduce client 149 credential management complexity. RDAP MAY include a federated 150 authentication mechanism that permits a client to access multiple 151 RDAP servers in the same federation with one credential. 153 Federated authentication mechanisms used by RDAP are OPTIONAL. If 154 used, they MUST be fully supported by HTTP. OAuth, OpenID, and CA- 155 based mechanisms are three possible approaches to provide federated 156 authentication. 158 The OAuth authorization framework [RFC6749] describes a method for 159 users to access protected web resources without having to hand out 160 their credentials. Instead, clients supply access tokens issued by 161 an authorization server with the permission of the resource owner. 162 Using OAuth, multiple RDAP servers can form a federation and the 163 clients can access any server in the same federation by providing one 164 credential registered in any server in that federation. The OAuth 165 authorization framework is designed for use with HTTP and thus can be 166 used with RDAP. 168 OpenID [OpenID] is a decentralized single sign-on authentication 169 system that allows users to log in at web sites with one ID instead 170 of having to create multiple unique accounts. An end user can freely 171 choose which OpenID provider to use, and can preserve their 172 Identifier if they switch OpenID providers. 174 Section 7.4.6 of the Transport Layer Security Protocol [RFC5246] 175 describes the specification of a client certificate. Clients who 176 possess and present a valid X.509 digital certificate, issued by an 177 entity called "Certification Authority" (CA), could be identified and 178 authenticated by a server who trusts the corresponding CA. A 179 certificate authentication method can be used to achieve federated 180 authentication in which multiple RDAP servers all trust the same CAs 181 and then any client with a certificate issued by a trusted CA can 182 access any RDAP server in the federation. This certificate-based 183 mechanism is supported by HTTPS and can be introduced into RDAP. 185 3.2. Authorization 187 WHOIS does not provide services to grant different levels of access 188 to clients based on a client's authenticated identity. As noted in 189 section 3.1.4.2 of "Cross Registry Internet Service Protocol (CRISP) 190 Requirements" [RFC3707], there is utility in allowing server 191 operators to offer "varying degrees of access depending on policy and 192 need". Access control decisions can be made once a client's identity 193 has been established and authenticated (see Section 3.1). 195 RDAP MUST include an authorization framework that is capable of 196 providing granular (per registration data object) access controls 197 according to the policies of the operator. Server operators will 198 offer varying degrees of access depending on policy and need in 199 conjunction with the authentication methods described in Section 3.1. 200 Some examples: 202 - Clients will be allowed access only to data for which they have a 203 relationship. 205 - Unauthenticated or anonymous access status may not yield any 206 contact information. 208 - Full access may be granted to a special group of authenticated 209 clients. 211 The type of access allowed by a server will most likely vary from one 212 operator to the next. 214 3.3. Availability 216 An RDAP service has to be available to be useful. There are no RDAP- 217 unique requirements to provide availability, but as a general 218 security consideration a service operator needs to be aware of the 219 issues associated with denial of service. A thorough reading of 220 "Internet Denial-of-Service Considerations" [RFC4732] is advised. 222 An RDAP service MAY use a throttling mechanism to limit the number of 223 queries that a single client can send in a given period of time. If 224 used, the server SHOULD return a 429 response code as described in 225 "Additional HTTP Status Codes" [RFC6585]. A client that receives a 226 429 response SHOULD decrease its query rate, and honor the Retry- 227 After header field if one is present. 229 3.4. Data Confidentiality 231 WHOIS does not provide the ability to protect data from inadvertent 232 disclosure while in transit. Web services such as RDAP commonly use 233 HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818] to provide that protection by encrypting all 234 traffic sent on the connection between client and server. It is also 235 possible to encrypt discrete objects (such as command path segments 236 and JSON-encoded response objects) at one endpoint, send them to the 237 other endpoint via an unprotected transport protocol, and decrypt the 238 object on receipt. Encryption algorithms as described in "Internet 239 Security Glossary, Version 2" [RFC4949] are commonly used to provide 240 data confidentiality at the object level. 242 There are no current requirements for object-level data 243 confidentiality using encryption. Support for this feature could be 244 added to RDAP in the future. 246 As noted in Section 3.1, the HTTP "basic" authentication scheme can 247 be used to authenticate a client. When this scheme is used, HTTP 248 Over TLS MUST be used to protect the client's credentials from 249 disclosure while in transit. If the policy of the server operator 250 requires encryption to protect client-server data exchanges (such as 251 to protect non-public data that can not be accessed without client 252 identification and authentication), HTTP Over TLS MUST be used to 253 protect those exchanges. 255 3.5. Data Integrity 257 WHOIS does not provide the ability to protect data from modification 258 while in transit. Web services such as RDAP commonly use HTTP Over 259 TLS [RFC2818] to provide that protection by using a keyed Message 260 Authentication Code (MAC) to detect modifications. It is also 261 possible to sign discrete objects (such as command path segments and 262 JSON-encoded response objects) at one endpoint, send them to the 263 other endpoint via a transport protocol, and validate the signature 264 of the object on receipt. Digital signature algorithms as described 265 in "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2" [RFC4949] are commonly 266 used to provide data integrity at the object level. 268 There are no current requirements for object-level data integrity 269 using digital signatures. Support for this feature could be added to 270 RDAP in the future. 272 The most specific need for this service is to provide assurance that 273 HTTP 30x redirection hints [RFC2616] and response elements returned 274 from the server are not modified while in transit. If the policy of 275 the server operator requires message integrity for client-server data 276 exchanges, HTTP Over TLS MUST be used to protect those exchanges. 278 4. IANA Considerations 279 This document does not specify any IANA actions. This section can be 280 removed if this document is published as an RFC. 282 5. Security Considerations 284 One of the goals of RDAP is to provide security services that do not 285 exist in the WHOIS protocol. This document describes the security 286 services provided by RDAP and associated protocol layers, including 287 authentication, authorization, availability, data confidentiality, 288 and data integrity. Non-repudiation services were also considered 289 and ultimately rejected due to a lack of requirements. There are, 290 however, currently-deployed WHOIS servers that can return signed 291 responses that provide non-repudiation with proof of origin. RDAP 292 might need to be extended to provide this service in the future. 294 As an HTTP-based protocol RDAP is susceptible to code injection 295 attacks. Code injection refers to adding code into a computer system 296 or program to alter the course of execution. There are many types of 297 code injection, including SQL injection, dynamic variable or function 298 injection, include file injection, shell injection, and html-script 299 injection among others. Data confidentiality and integrity services 300 provide a measure of defense against man-in-the-middle injection 301 attacks, but vulnerabilities in both client-side and server-side 302 software make it possible for injection attacks to succeed. 304 Data integrity services are sometimes mistakenly associated with 305 directory service operational policy requirements focused on data 306 accuracy. "Accuracy" refers to the truthful association of data 307 elements (such as names, addresses, and telephone numbers) in the 308 context of a particular directory object (such as a domain name). 309 Accuracy requirements are out of scope for this protocol. 311 6. Acknowledgements 313 The authors would like to acknowledge the following individuals for 314 their contributions to this document: Marc Blanchet, Ernie Dainow, 315 Jean-Philippe Dionne, Byron Ellacott, Peter Koch, Murray Kucherawy, 316 Andrew Newton, and Linlin Zhou. 318 7. References 320 7.1. Normative References 322 [I-D.ietf-weirds-json-response] 323 Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "JSON Responses for the 324 Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", draft-ietf- 325 weirds-json-response-03 (work in progress), April 2013. 327 [I-D.ietf-weirds-rdap-query] 328 Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "Registration Data Access 329 Protocol Lookup Format", draft-ietf-weirds-rdap-query-04 330 (work in progress), April 2013. 332 [I-D.ietf-weirds-using-http] 333 Newton, A., Ellacott, B., and N. Kong, "HTTP usage in the 334 Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", draft-ietf- 335 weirds-using-http-04 (work in progress), April 2013. 337 [OpenID] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Authentication 2.0 - Final ", 338 December 2007, . 340 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 341 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 343 [RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H., 344 Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext 345 Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999. 347 [RFC2617] Franks, J., Hallam-Baker, P.M., Hostetler, J.L., Lawrence, 348 S.D., Leach, P.J., Luotonen, A., and L. Stewart, "HTTP 349 Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication", 350 RFC 2617, June 1999. 352 [RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000. 354 [RFC4732] Handley, M., Rescorla, E., IAB, "Internet Denial-of- 355 Service Considerations", RFC 4732, December 2006. 357 [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security 358 (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008. 360 [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., 361 Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key 362 Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List 363 (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. 365 [RFC6585] Nottingham, M. and R. Fielding, "Additional HTTP Status 366 Codes", RFC 6585, April 2012. 368 [RFC6749] Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC 369 6749, October 2012. 371 7.2. Informative References 373 [RFC3707] Newton, A., "Cross Registry Internet Service Protocol 374 (CRISP) Requirements", RFC 3707, February 2004. 376 [RFC3912] Daigle, L., "WHOIS Protocol Specification", RFC 3912, 377 September 2004. 379 [RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", RFC 380 4949, August 2007. 382 Appendix A. Change Log 384 Initial -00: Adopted as working group document. 385 -01: Extensive text additions and revisions based on in-room 386 discussion at IETF-85. Sections for data integrity and non- 387 repudiation have been removed due to a lack of requirements, but 388 both topics are now addressed in the Security Considerations 389 section. 390 -02: Fixed document names in the Introduction. Modified text in 391 Section 3.1.1 to clarify requirement. Added text to Section 3.3 392 to describe rate limiting. Added new data integrity section. 393 Updated security considerations to describe injection attacks. 394 -03: Extensive updates to address WG last call comments: rewrote 395 introduction, removed references to draft documents, changed 396 "HTML" to "HTTP" in Section 5, eliminated upper case words that 397 could be misunderstood to be normative guidance, rewrote 398 Section 3.4 and Section 3.5. 400 Authors' Addresses 402 Scott Hollenbeck 403 Verisign Labs 404 12061 Bluemont Way 405 Reston, VA 20190 406 US 408 Email: shollenbeck@verisign.com 409 URI: http://www.verisignlabs.com/ 411 Ning Kong 412 China Internet Network Information Center 413 4 South 4th Street, Zhongguancun, Haidian District 414 Beijing 100190 415 China 417 Phone: +86 10 5881 3147 418 Email: nkong@cnnic.cn