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'I-D.ietf-weirds-using-http' ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 2818 (Obsoleted by RFC 9110) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 7231 (Obsoleted by RFC 9110) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 7235 (Obsoleted by RFC 9110) == Outdated reference: A later version (-11) exists of draft-ietf-uta-tls-bcp-07 -- Obsolete informational reference (is this intentional?): RFC 5246 (Obsoleted by RFC 8446) Summary: 3 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 5 warnings (==), 3 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Internet Engineering Task Force S. Hollenbeck 3 Internet-Draft Verisign Labs 4 Intended status: Standards Track N. Kong 5 Expires: May 22, 2015 CNNIC 6 November 18, 2014 8 Security Services for the Registration Data Access Protocol 9 draft-ietf-weirds-rdap-sec-11 11 Abstract 13 The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) provides "RESTful" web 14 services to retrieve registration metadata from domain name and 15 regional internet registries. This document describes information 16 security services including authentication, authorization, 17 availability, data confidentiality, and data integrity for RDAP. 19 Status of This Memo 21 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 22 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 24 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 25 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 26 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 27 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 29 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 30 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 31 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 32 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 34 This Internet-Draft will expire on May 22, 2015. 36 Copyright Notice 38 Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 39 document authors. All rights reserved. 41 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 42 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 43 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 44 publication of this document. Please review these documents 45 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 46 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 47 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 48 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 49 described in the Simplified BSD License. 51 Table of Contents 53 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 54 2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 55 2.1. Acronyms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 56 3. Information Security Services and RDAP . . . . . . . . . . . 3 57 3.1. Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 58 3.2. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 59 3.2.1. Federated Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 60 3.3. Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 61 3.4. Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 62 3.5. Data Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 63 3.6. Data Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 64 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 65 5. Privacy Threats Associated with Registration Data . . . . . . 8 66 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 67 7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 68 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 69 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 70 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 71 Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 72 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 74 1. Introduction 76 The Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) is specified in multiple 77 documents, including "Registration Data Access Protocol Lookup 78 Format" [I-D.ietf-weirds-rdap-query], "JSON Responses for the 79 Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)" 80 [I-D.ietf-weirds-json-response], and "HTTP usage in the Registration 81 Data Access Protocol (RDAP)" [I-D.ietf-weirds-using-http]. 83 One goal of RDAP is to provide security services that do not exist in 84 the WHOIS [RFC3912] protocol, including authentication, 85 authorization, availability, data confidentiality, and data 86 integrity. This document describes how each of these services is 87 achieved by RDAP using features that are available in other protocol 88 layers. Additional or alternative mechanisms can be added in the 89 future. Where applicable, informational references to requirements 90 for a WHOIS replacement service [RFC3707] are noted. 92 2. Conventions Used in This Document 94 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 95 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 96 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. 98 2.1. Acronyms and Abbreviations 100 DNR: Domain Name Registry 102 HTTP: Hypertext Transfer Protocol 104 JSON: JavaScript Object Notation 106 RDAP: Registration Data Access Protocol 108 RIR: Regional Internet Registry 110 TLS: Transport Layer Security 112 3. Information Security Services and RDAP 114 RDAP itself does not include native security services. Instead, RDAP 115 relies on features that are available in other protocol layers to 116 provide needed security services including access control, 117 authentication, authorization, availability, data confidentiality, 118 and data integrity. A description of each of these security services 119 can be found in "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2" [RFC4949]. 120 No requirements have been identified for other security services. 122 3.1. Access Control 124 WHOIS does not include specific features to control access to 125 registration information. As described in the following sections, 126 RDAP includes features to identify, authenticate, and authorize 127 clients, allowing server operators to control access to information 128 based on a client's identity and associated authorizations. 129 Information returned to a client can be clearly marked with a status 130 value (see Section 10.2.2 of [I-D.ietf-weirds-json-response]) that 131 identifies the access granted to the client. 133 3.2. Authentication 135 This section describes security authentication mechanisms and the 136 need for authorization policies to include them. It describes 137 requirements for the implementations of clients and servers, but does 138 not dictate the policies of server operators. For example, a server 139 operator with no policy regarding differentiated or tiered access to 140 data will have no authorization mechanisms and will have no need for 141 any type of authentication. A server operator with policies on 142 differentiated access will have to construct an authorization scheme 143 and will need to follow the specified authentication requirements. 145 WHOIS does not provide features to identify and authenticate clients. 146 As noted in section 3.1.4.2 of "Cross Registry Internet Service 147 Protocol (CRISP) Requirements" [RFC3707], there is utility in 148 allowing server operators to offer "varying degrees of access 149 depending on policy and need". Clients have to be identified and 150 authenticated to provide that utility. 152 RDAP's authentication framework needs to accommodate anonymous access 153 as well as verification of identities using a range of authentication 154 methods and credential services. To that end, RDAP clients and 155 servers MUST implement the authentication framework specified in 156 "HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication" 157 [RFC7235]. The "basic" scheme can be used to send a client's user 158 name and password to a server in plaintext, based64-encoded form. 159 The "digest" scheme can be used to authenticate a client without 160 exposing the client's plaintext password. If the "basic" scheme is 161 used, HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818] MUST be used to protect the client's 162 credentials from disclosure while in transit (see Section 3.5). 164 Servers MUST support either Basic or Digest authentication; they are 165 not required to support both. Clients MUST support both to 166 interoperate with servers that support one or the other. Servers may 167 provide a login page that triggers HTTP authentication. Clients 168 should continue sending the HTTP authentication header once they 169 receive an initial 401 (Unauthorized) response from the HTTP server 170 as long as the scheme portion of the URL doesn't change. 172 The Transport Layer Security Protocol [RFC5246] includes an optional 173 feature to identify and authenticate clients who possess and present 174 a valid X.509 digital certificate [RFC5280]. Support for this 175 feature is OPTIONAL. 177 RDAP does not impose any unique server authentication requirements. 178 The server authentication provided by TLS fully addresses the needs 179 of RDAP. In general, transports for RDAP must either provide a TLS- 180 protected transport (e.g., HTTPS) or a mechanism that provides an 181 equivalent level of server authentication. 183 Work on HTTP authentication methods continues. RDAP is designed to 184 be agile enough to support additional methods as they are defined. 186 3.2.1. Federated Authentication 188 The traditional client-server authentication model requires clients 189 to maintain distinct credentials for every RDAP server. This 190 situation can become unwieldy as the number of RDAP servers 191 increases. Federated authentication mechanisms allow clients to use 192 one credential to access multiple RDAP servers and reduce client 193 credential management complexity. RDAP MAY include a federated 194 authentication mechanism that permits a client to access multiple 195 RDAP servers in the same federation with one credential. 197 Federated authentication mechanisms used by RDAP MUST be fully 198 supported by HTTP. OAuth, OpenID, Security Assertion Markup Language 199 (SAML), and CA-based mechanisms are all possible approaches to 200 provide federated authentication. At the time of this document's 201 publication, negotiation or advertisement of federated authentication 202 services is still an undefined mechanism by the noted federated 203 authentication protocols. Developing this mechanism is beyond the 204 scope of this document. 206 The OAuth authorization framework [RFC6749] describes a method for 207 users to access protected web resources without having to hand out 208 their credentials. Instead, clients are issued access tokens by 209 authorization servers with the permission of the resource owners. 210 Using OAuth, multiple RDAP servers can form a federation and the 211 clients can access any server in the same federation by providing one 212 credential registered in any server in that federation. The OAuth 213 authorization framework is designed for use with HTTP and thus can be 214 used with RDAP. 216 OpenID [OpenID] is a decentralized single sign-on authentication 217 system that allows users to log in at multiple web sites with one ID 218 instead of having to create multiple unique accounts. An end user 219 can freely choose which OpenID provider to use, and can preserve 220 their Identifier if they switch OpenID providers. 222 Note that OAuth and OpenID do not consistently require data 223 confidentiality services to protect interactions between providers 224 and consumers. HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818] can be used as needed to 225 provide protection against man-in-the-middle attacks. 227 SAML 2.0 [SAML] is an XML-based protocol that can be used to 228 implement web-based authentication and authorization services, 229 including single sign-on. It uses security tokens containing 230 assertions to exchange information about an end user between an 231 identity provider and a service provider. 233 The Transport Layer Security Protocol [RFC5246], Section 7.4.6, 234 describes the specification of a client certificate. Clients who 235 possess and present a valid X.509 digital certificate, issued by an 236 entity called a "Certification Authority" (CA), could be identified 237 and authenticated by a server who trusts the corresponding CA. A 238 certificate authentication method can be used to achieve federated 239 authentication in which multiple RDAP servers all trust the same CAs 240 and then any client with a certificate issued by a trusted CA can 241 access any RDAP server in the federation. This certificate-based 242 mechanism is supported by HTTPS and can be used with RDAP. 244 3.3. Authorization 246 WHOIS does not provide services to grant different levels of access 247 to clients based on a client's authenticated identity. As noted in 248 section 3.1.4.2 of "Cross Registry Internet Service Protocol (CRISP) 249 Requirements" [RFC3707], there is utility in allowing server 250 operators to offer "varying degrees of access depending on policy and 251 need". Access control decisions can be made once a client's identity 252 has been established and authenticated (see Section 3.2). 254 Server operators MAY offer varying degrees of access depending on 255 policy and need in conjunction with the authentication methods 256 described in Section 3.2. If such varying degrees of access are 257 supported, an RDAP server MUST provide granular access controls (that 258 is, on a per registration data object basis) in order to implement 259 authorization policies. Some examples: 261 - Clients will be allowed access only to data for which they have a 262 relationship. 264 - Unauthenticated or anonymous access status may not yield any 265 contact information. 267 - Full access may be granted to a special group of authenticated 268 clients. 270 The type of access allowed by a server will most likely vary from one 271 operator to the next. A description of the response privacy 272 considerations associated with different levels of authorization can 273 be found in Section 13 of [I-D.ietf-weirds-json-response]. 275 3.4. Availability 277 An RDAP service has to be available to be useful. There are no RDAP- 278 unique requirements to provide availability, but as a general 279 security consideration a service operator needs to be aware of the 280 issues associated with denial of service. A thorough reading of 281 "Internet Denial-of-Service Considerations" [RFC4732] is advised. 283 An RDAP service MAY use an HTTP throttling mechanism to limit the 284 number of queries that a single client can send in a given period of 285 time. If used, the server SHOULD return an HTTP 429 (Too Many 286 Requests) response code as described in "Additional HTTP Status 287 Codes" [RFC6585]. A client that receives a 429 response SHOULD 288 decrease its query rate, and honor the Retry-After header field if 289 one is present. Note that this is not a defense against denial-of- 290 service attacks, since a malicious client could ignore the code and 291 continue to send queries at a high rate. A server might use another 292 response code if it did not wish to reveal to a client that rate 293 limiting is the reason for the denial of a reply. 295 3.5. Data Confidentiality 297 WHOIS does not provide the ability to protect data from inadvertent 298 disclosure while in transit. RDAP uses HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818] to 299 provide that protection by encrypting all traffic sent on the 300 connection between client and server. HTTP Over TLS MUST be used to 301 protect all client-server exchanges unless operational constraints 302 make it impossible to meet this requirement. It is also possible to 303 encrypt discrete objects (such as command path segments and JSON- 304 encoded response objects) at one endpoint, send them to the other 305 endpoint via an unprotected transport protocol, and decrypt the 306 object on receipt. Encryption algorithms as described in "Internet 307 Security Glossary, Version 2" [RFC4949] are commonly used to provide 308 data confidentiality at the object level. 310 There are no current requirements for object-level data 311 confidentiality using encryption. Support for this feature could be 312 added to RDAP in the future. 314 As noted in Section 3.2, the HTTP "basic" authentication scheme can 315 be used to authenticate a client. When this scheme is used, HTTP 316 Over TLS MUST be used to protect the client's credentials from 317 disclosure while in transit. If the policy of the server operator 318 requires encryption to protect client-server data exchanges (such as 319 to protect non-public data that can not be accessed without client 320 identification and authentication), HTTP Over TLS MUST be used to 321 protect those exchanges. 323 A description of privacy threats that can be addressed with 324 confidentiality services can be found in Section 5. Section 10.2.2 325 of [I-D.ietf-weirds-json-response] describes status values that can 326 be used to describe operator actions used to protect response data 327 from disclosure to unauthorized clients. 329 3.6. Data Integrity 331 WHOIS does not provide the ability to protect data from modification 332 while in transit. Web services such as RDAP commonly use HTTP Over 333 TLS [RFC2818] to provide that protection by using a keyed Message 334 Authentication Code (MAC) to detect modifications. It is also 335 possible to sign discrete objects (such as command path segments and 336 JSON-encoded response objects) at one endpoint, send them to the 337 other endpoint via a transport protocol, and validate the signature 338 of the object on receipt. Digital signature algorithms as described 339 in "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2" [RFC4949] are commonly 340 used to provide data integrity at the object level. 342 There are no current requirements for object-level data integrity 343 using digital signatures. Support for this feature could be added to 344 RDAP in the future. 346 The most specific need for this service is to provide assurance that 347 HTTP 30x redirection hints [RFC7231] and response elements returned 348 from the server are not modified while in transit. If the policy of 349 the server operator requires message integrity for client-server data 350 exchanges, HTTP Over TLS MUST be used to protect those exchanges. 352 4. IANA Considerations 354 This document does not specify any IANA actions. This section can be 355 removed if this document is published as an RFC. 357 5. Privacy Threats Associated with Registration Data 359 Registration data has historically included personal data about 360 registrants. WHOIS services have historically made this information 361 available to the public, creating a privacy risk by revealing the 362 personal details of registrants. WHOIS services have not had the 363 benefit of authentication or access control mechanisms to gate access 364 to registration data. As a result of this, proxy and privacy 365 services have arisen to shield the identities of registrants. 367 The standardization of RDAP does not change or impact the data that 368 operators may require to be collected from registrants, but it 369 provides support for a number of mechanisms that may be used to 370 mitigate privacy threats to registrants should operators choose to 371 use them. 373 RDAP includes mechanisms that can be used to authenticate clients, 374 allowing servers to support tiered access based on local policy. 375 This means that all registration data need no longer be public, and 376 personal data or data that may be considered more sensitive can have 377 its access restricted to specifically privileged clients. 379 RDAP data structures allow servers to indicate via status values when 380 data returned to clients has been made private, redacted, obscured, 381 or registered by a proxy. "Private" means that the data is not 382 designated for public consumption. "Redacted" means that some 383 registration data fields are not being made available. "Obscured" 384 means that data has been altered for the purposes of not readily 385 revealing the actual registration information. One option that 386 operators have available to them to reduce privacy risks to 387 registrants is to adopt policies that make use of these status values 388 to restrict the registrant data shared with any or all clients 389 according to the sensitivity of the data, the privileges of the 390 clients, or some other heuristics. 392 RDAP uses the jCard [RFC7095] standard format for entity 393 representation. Operators may find that many of the jCard fields are 394 irrelevant for registry operation purposes or that they have no 395 reason to collect information from registrants that would correspond 396 to certain fields. Operators wishing to reduce privacy risks for 397 registrants may restrict which information they collect and/or which 398 fields they populate in responses. 400 In addition to privacy risks to registrants, there are also potential 401 privacy risks for those who query registration data. For example, 402 the fact that a law enforcement officer performs a particular query 403 may reveal information about the officer's activities that he or she 404 would have preferred to keep private. RDAP supports the use of HTTP 405 over TLS to provide privacy protection for those querying registrant 406 data as well as registrants. 408 6. Security Considerations 410 One of the goals of RDAP is to provide security services that do not 411 exist in the WHOIS protocol. This document describes the security 412 services provided by RDAP and associated protocol layers, including 413 authentication, authorization, availability, data confidentiality, 414 and data integrity. Non-repudiation services were also considered 415 and ultimately rejected due to a lack of requirements. There are, 416 however, currently-deployed WHOIS servers that can return signed 417 responses that provide non-repudiation with proof of origin. RDAP 418 might need to be extended to provide this service in the future. 420 As an HTTP-based protocol RDAP is susceptible to code injection 421 attacks. Code injection refers to adding code into a computer system 422 or program to alter the course of execution. There are many types of 423 code injection, including SQL injection, dynamic variable or function 424 injection, include file injection, shell injection, and HTML-script 425 injection among others. Data confidentiality and integrity services 426 provide a measure of defense against man-in-the-middle injection 427 attacks, but vulnerabilities in both client-side and server-side 428 software make it possible for injection attacks to succeed. 429 Consistently checking and validating server credentials can help 430 detect man-in-the-middle attacks. 432 As noted in Section 3.2.1, digital certificates can be used to 433 implement federated authentication. There is a risk of too- 434 promiscuous, or even rogue, CAs being included in the list of 435 acceptable CAs that the TLS server sends the client as part of the 436 TLS client-authentication handshake and lending the appearance of 437 trust to certificates signed by those CAs. Periodic monitoring of 438 the list of CAs that RDAP servers trust for client authentication can 439 help reduce this risk. 441 The Transport Layer Security Protocol [RFC5246] includes a null 442 cipher suite that does not encrypt data and thus does not provide 443 data confidentiality. This option must not be used when data 444 confidentiality services are needed. Additional considerations for 445 secure use of TLS are described in [I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp]. 447 Data integrity services are sometimes mistakenly associated with 448 directory service operational policy requirements focused on data 449 accuracy. "Accuracy" refers to the truthful association of data 450 elements (such as names, addresses, and telephone numbers) in the 451 context of a particular directory object (such as a domain name). 452 Accuracy requirements are out of scope for this protocol. 454 Additional security considerations are described in the 455 specifications for HTTP [RFC7231], HTTP basic and digest access 456 authentication [RFC7235], HTTP Over TLS [RFC2818], and additional 457 HTTP status codes [RFC6585]. Security considerations for federated 458 authentication systems can be found in the OAuth [RFC6749] and OpenID 459 [OpenID] specifications. 461 7. Acknowledgements 463 The authors would like to acknowledge the following individuals for 464 their contributions to this document: Richard Barnes, Marc Blanchet, 465 Alissa Cooper, Ernie Dainow, Spencer Dawkins, Jean-Philippe Dionne, 466 Byron Ellacott, Stephen Farrell, Tony Hansen, Peter Koch, Murray 467 Kucherawy, Barry Leiba, Andrew Newton, and Linlin Zhou. 469 8. References 471 8.1. Normative References 473 [I-D.ietf-weirds-json-response] 474 Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "JSON Responses for the 475 Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", draft-ietf- 476 weirds-json-response-11 (work in progress), October 2014. 478 [I-D.ietf-weirds-rdap-query] 479 Newton, A. and S. Hollenbeck, "Registration Data Access 480 Protocol Query Format", draft-ietf-weirds-rdap-query-16 481 (work in progress), October 2014. 483 [I-D.ietf-weirds-using-http] 484 Newton, A., Ellacott, B., and N. Kong, "HTTP usage in the 485 Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", draft-ietf- 486 weirds-using-http-14 (work in progress), October 2014. 488 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 489 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 491 [RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000. 493 [RFC6585] Nottingham, M. and R. Fielding, "Additional HTTP Status 494 Codes", RFC 6585, April 2012. 496 [RFC7231] Fielding, R. and J. Reschke, "Hypertext Transfer Protocol 497 (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231, June 2014. 499 [RFC7235] Fielding, R. and J. Reschke, "Hypertext Transfer Protocol 500 (HTTP/1.1): Authentication", RFC 7235, June 2014. 502 8.2. Informative References 504 [I-D.ietf-uta-tls-bcp] 505 Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre, 506 "Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS", draft- 507 ietf-uta-tls-bcp-07 (work in progress), November 2014. 509 [OpenID] OpenID Foundation, "OpenID Authentication 2.0 - Final", 510 December 2007, . 512 [RFC3707] Newton, A., "Cross Registry Internet Service Protocol 513 (CRISP) Requirements", RFC 3707, February 2004. 515 [RFC3912] Daigle, L., "WHOIS Protocol Specification", RFC 3912, 516 September 2004. 518 [RFC4732] Handley, M., Rescorla, E., and IAB, "Internet Denial-of- 519 Service Considerations", RFC 4732, December 2006. 521 [RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", RFC 522 4949, August 2007. 524 [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security 525 (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008. 527 [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., 528 Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key 529 Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List 530 (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. 532 [RFC6749] Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC 533 6749, October 2012. 535 [RFC7095] Kewisch, P., "jCard: The JSON Format for vCard", RFC 7095, 536 January 2014. 538 [SAML] OASIS, "Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) v2.0", 539 March 2005, . 542 Appendix A. Change Log 544 Initial -00: Adopted as working group document. 545 -01: Extensive text additions and revisions based on in-room 546 discussion at IETF-85. Sections for data integrity and non- 547 repudiation have been removed due to a lack of requirements, but 548 both topics are now addressed in the Security Considerations 549 section. 550 -02: Fixed document names in the Introduction. Modified text in 551 Section 3.2.1 to clarify requirement. Added text to Section 3.4 552 to describe rate limiting. Added new data integrity section. 553 Updated security considerations to describe injection attacks. 554 -03: Extensive updates to address WG last call comments: rewrote 555 introduction, removed references to draft documents, changed 556 "HTML" to "HTTP" in Section 6, eliminated upper case words that 557 could be misunderstood to be normative guidance, rewrote 558 Section 3.5 and Section 3.6. 559 -04: Address AD evaluation comments: In Section 3.2 change "RDAP 560 MUST include an authentication framework that can accommodate" to 561 "RDAP's authentication framework needs to accommodate"; in 562 Section 3.3 change "RDAP MUST include an authorization framework 563 that is capable of providing granular (per registration data 564 object) access controls according to the policies of the operator" 565 to "An RDAP server MUST provide granular access controls (that is, 566 on a per registration data object basis) in order to implement 567 authorization policies"; move RFCs 4732, 5280, and 6749 from 568 normative to informative subsection. 569 -05: Address IETF last call comments: Added text to Section 3.2.1 to 570 recommend the use of HTTP over TLS. Modified Section 3.3 to 571 clarify granular access control text. Added additional Security 572 Considerations. Made references to RFC 5246 and OpenID 573 informative. Minor typo fixes. 574 -06: Keepalive refresh. No content updates. 575 -07: Keepalive refresh. No content updates. 576 -08: Updated HTTP references. 2616 -> 7231, 2617 -> 7235. 577 -09: Address WG last call comments. 578 -10: Address IETF last call comments. 579 -11: Address IESG review comments. 581 Authors' Addresses 583 Scott Hollenbeck 584 Verisign Labs 585 12061 Bluemont Way 586 Reston, VA 20190 587 US 589 Email: shollenbeck@verisign.com 590 URI: http://www.verisignlabs.com/ 592 Ning Kong 593 China Internet Network Information Center 594 4 South 4th Street, Zhongguancun, Haidian District 595 Beijing 100190 596 China 598 Phone: +86 10 5881 3147 599 Email: nkong@cnnic.cn