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2 Human Rights Protocol Considerations Research GroupN. ten Oever (editor)
3 Internet-Draft University of Amsterdam
4 Intended status: Informational September 07, 2018
5 Expires: March 11, 2019
7 Guidelines for Human Rights Protocol Considerations
8 draft-irtf-hrpc-guidelines-01
10 Abstract
12 This document sets guidelines for human rights considerations in
13 networking protocols, similar to the work done on the guidelines for
14 privacy considerations [RFC6973]. This is an updated version of the
15 guidelines for human rights considerations in [RFC8280].
17 Status of This Memo
19 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
20 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
22 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
23 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
24 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
25 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
27 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
28 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
29 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
30 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
32 This Internet-Draft will expire on March 11, 2019.
34 Copyright Notice
36 Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
37 document authors. All rights reserved.
39 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
40 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
41 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
42 publication of this document. Please review these documents
43 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
44 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
45 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
46 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
47 described in the Simplified BSD License.
49 Table of Contents
51 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
52 2. Vocabulary used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
53 3. Model for developing human rights protocol considerations . . 3
54 3.1. Human rights threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
55 3.2. Conducting human rights reviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
56 3.2.1. Analyzing drafts based on guidelines for human rights
57 considerations model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
58 3.2.2. Analyzing drafts based on their perceived or
59 speculated impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
60 3.2.3. Expert interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
61 3.2.4. Interviews with impacted persons and communities . . 5
62 3.2.5. Tracing impacts of implementations . . . . . . . . . 6
63 3.3. Guidelines for human rights considerations . . . . . . . 6
64 3.3.1. Connectivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
65 3.3.2. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
66 3.3.3. Content agnosticism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
67 3.3.4. Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
68 3.3.5. Internationalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
69 3.3.6. Censorship resistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
70 3.3.7. Open Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
71 3.3.8. Heterogeneity Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
72 3.3.9. Pseudonymity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
73 3.3.10. Accessibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
74 3.3.11. Localization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
75 3.3.12. Decentralization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
76 3.3.13. Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
77 3.3.14. Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
78 3.3.15. Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
79 3.3.16. Authenticity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
80 3.3.17. Adaptability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
81 3.3.18. Outcome Transparency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
82 3.3.19. Anonymity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
83 4. Document Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
84 5. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
85 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
86 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
87 8. Research Group Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
88 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
89 9.1. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
90 9.2. URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
91 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
93 1. Introduction
95 2. Vocabulary used
97 3. Model for developing human rights protocol considerations
99 This section outlines a set of human rights protocol considerations
100 for protocol developers. It provides questions engineers should ask
101 themselves when developing or improving protocols if they want to
102 understand their human rights impact. It should however be noted
103 that the impact of a protocol cannot solely be deduced from its
104 design, but its usage and implementation should also be studied to
105 form a full protocol human rights impact assessment.
107 The questions are based on the research performed by the hrpc
108 research group which has been documented before these considerations.
109 The research establishes that human rights relate to standards and
110 protocols and offers a common vocabulary of technical concepts that
111 impact human rights and how these technical concept can be combined
112 to ensure that the Internet remains an enabling environment for human
113 rights. With this the contours of a model for developing human
114 rights protocol considerations has taken shape.
116 3.1. Human rights threats
118 Human rights threats on the Internet come in a myriad of forms.
119 Protocols and standards can harm or enable the right to freedom of
120 expression, right to non-discrimination, right to equal protection,
121 right to participate in cultural life, arts and science, right to
122 freedom of assembly and association, and the right to security. An
123 end-user who is denied access to certain services, data or websites
124 may be unable to disclose vital information about the malpractices of
125 a government or other authority. A person whose communications are
126 monitored may be prevented from exercising their right to freedom of
127 association or participate in political processes [Penney]. In a
128 worst-case scenario, protocols that leak information can lead to
129 physical danger. A realistic example to consider is when individuals
130 perceived as threats to the state are subjected to torture or
131 extrajudicial killing or detention on the basis of information
132 gathered by state agencies through information leakage in protocols.
134 This section details several 'common' threats to human rights,
135 indicating how each of these can lead to human rights violations/
136 harms and present several examples of how these threats to human
137 rights materialize on the Internet. This threat modeling is inspired
138 by [RFC6973] Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols, which is
139 based on the security threat analysis. This method is by no means a
140 perfect solution for assessing human rights risks in Internet
141 protocols and systems; it is however the best approach currently
142 available. Certain specific human rights threats are indirectly
143 considered in Internet protocols as part of the security
144 considerations [BCP72], but privacy guidelines [RFC6973] or reviews,
145 let alone human rights impact assessments of protocols are not
146 standardized or implemented.
148 Many threats, enablers and risks are linked to different rights.
149 This is not unsurprising if one takes into account that human rights
150 are interrelated, interdependent and indivisible. Here however we're
151 not discussing all human rights because not all human rights are
152 relevant to ICTs in general and protocols and standards in particular
153 [Bless]: "The main source of the values of human rights is the
154 International Bill of Human Rights that is composed of the Universal
155 Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR] along with the International
156 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR] and the International
157 Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [ICESCR]. In the
158 light of several cases of Internet censorship, the Human Rights
159 Council Resolution 20/8 was adopted in 2012 [UNHRC2016], affirming ".
160 . . that the same rights that people have offline must also be
161 protected online. . . " . In 2015, the Charter of Human Rights and
162 Principles for the Internet [IRP] was developed and released.
163 According to these documents, some examples of human rights relevant
164 for ICT systems are human dignity (Art. 1 UDHR), non-discrimination
165 (Art. 2), rights to life, liberty and security (Art. 3), freedom of
166 opinion and expression (Art. 19), freedom of assembly and association
167 (Art. 20), rights to equal protection, legal remedy, fair trial, due
168 process, presumed innocent (Art. 7-11), appropriate social and
169 international order (Art. 28), participation in public affairs (Art.
170 21), participation in cultural life, protection of the moral and
171 material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or
172 artistic production of which [they are] the author (Art. 27), and
173 privacy (Art. 12)." A partial catalog of human rights related to
174 Information and Communications technologies, including economic
175 rights, can be found in [Hill2014].
177 This is by no means an attempt to exclude specific rights or
178 prioritize some rights over others. If other rights seem relevant,
179 please contact the authors.
181 3.2. Conducting human rights reviews
183 Human rights reviews can take place in different parts of the
184 development process of an Internet Draft. However generally speaking
185 it is easier to influence the development of a technology at earlier
186 stages than at later stages. This does not mean that reviews at
187 last-call are not relevant, but they are less likely to result in
188 significant changes in the reviewed document.
190 Methods for analyzing technology for specific human rights impacts
191 are still quite nascent. Currently three five methods have been
192 explored by the Human Rights Review Team, often in conjunction with
193 each other:
195 3.2.1. Analyzing drafts based on guidelines for human rights
196 considerations model
198 This analysis of Internet-Drafts uses the model as described below.
199 The outlined categories and questions are used to review an Internet
200 Draft an generally the review is also presented in that order. The
201 advatange of this is that it provides a known overview, and document
202 authors can go back to this document as well as [RFC8280] to
203 understand the background and the context.
205 3.2.2. Analyzing drafts based on their perceived or speculated impact
207 When reviewing an Internet-Draft specific human rights impacts might
208 become apparent by doing a close reading of the draft and seeking to
209 understand how it might provide a different ordering of the network
210 or society. While less structured than the straight use of the human
211 rights considerations model, this analysis might lead to new
212 speculative understandings between human rights and protocols.
214 3.2.3. Expert interviews
216 Interviews with document authors, active members of the Working
217 Group, or experts in the field can help explore the characteristics
218 of the protocol and their effects. There are two main advtanges to
219 this approach; one the one hand it allows the reviewer to gain a
220 deeper understanding of the (intended) workings of the protocol, on
221 the other hand it also allows for the reviewer to start a discussion
222 with an expert or even document author about certain aspects, which
223 might help gain the review gain traction when it is published.
225 3.2.4. Interviews with impacted persons and communities
227 Protcols impact users of the Internet. There it might help the
228 review to understand how it impacts the people that use the protocol,
229 and the people whose lives are impacted by the protocol. Since human
230 rights should always be understood from the rightsholder, this
231 approach will improve the understanding of the real world effects of
232 the technology. At the same time it can be hard to attribute
233 specific changes to a particular protocol, this is of course even
234 harder when a protocol has not been (widely) deployed.
236 3.2.5. Tracing impacts of implementations
238 When an Internet Draft is describing running code thas has already
239 been implemented, the code could be analyzed either in an
240 expirimental setting or on the Internet where its impact can be
241 observed. Other than reviewing a draft, this allows the reviewer to
242 understand how the document works in practice and potentially also
243 what unknown or unexpected effects the technology might have.
245 3.3. Guidelines for human rights considerations
247 This section provides guidance for document authors in the form of a
248 questionnaire about protocols and their (potential) impact. The
249 questionnaire may be useful at any point in the design process,
250 particularly after document authors have developed a high-level
251 protocol model as described in [RFC4101]. These guidelines do not
252 seek to replace any existing referenced specifications, but rather
253 contribute to them and look at the design process from a human rights
254 perspective.
256 Protocols and Internet Standard might benefit from a documented
257 discussion of potential human rights risks arising from potential
258 misapplications of the protocol or technology described in the RFC.
259 This might be coupled with an Applicability Statement for that RFC.
261 Note that the guidance provided in this section does not recommend
262 specific practices. The range of protocols developed in the IETF is
263 too broad to make recommendations about particular uses of data or
264 how human rights might be balanced against other design goals.
265 However, by carefully considering the answers to the following
266 questions, document authors should be able to produce a comprehensive
267 analysis that can serve as the basis for discussion on whether the
268 protocol adequately takes specific human rights threats into account.
269 This guidance is meant to help the thought process of a human rights
270 analysis; it does not provide specific directions for how to write a
271 human rights protocol considerations section (following the example
272 set in [RFC6973]), and the addition of a human rights protocol
273 considerations section has also not yet been proposed. In
274 considering these questions, authors will need to be aware of the
275 potential of technical advances or the passage of time to undermine
276 protections. In general, considerations of rights are likely to be
277 more effective if they are considered given a purpose and specific
278 use cases, rather than as abstract absolute goals.
280 3.3.1. Connectivity
282 Question(s): Does your protocol add application-specific functions to
283 intermediary nodes? Could this functionality be added to end nodes
284 instead of intermediary nodes? Is your protocol optimized for low
285 bandwidth and high latency connections? Could your protocol also be
286 developed in a stateless manner?
288 Explanation: The end-to-end principle [Saltzer] holds that 'the
289 intelligence is end to end rather than hidden in the network'
290 [RFC1958]. The end-to-end principle is important for the robustness
291 of the network and innovation. Such robustness of the network is
292 crucial to enabling human rights like freedom of expression.
294 Example: Middleboxes (which can be Content Delivery Networks,
295 Firewalls, NATs or other intermediary nodes that provide other
296 'services' than routing) serve many legitimate purposes. But the
297 protocols guiding them, can influence individuals' ability to
298 communicate online freely and privately. The potential for abuse and
299 intentional and unintentional censoring and limiting permissionless
300 innovation, and thus ultimately the impact of middleboxes on the
301 Internet as a place of unfiltered, unmonitored freedom of speech, is
302 real.
304 Impacts:
306 - Right to freedom of expression
308 - Right to freedom of assembly and association
310 3.3.2. Privacy
312 Question(s): Did you have a look at the Guidelines in the Privacy
313 Considerations for Internet Protocols [RFC6973] section 7? Could
314 your protocol in any way impact the confidentiality of protocol
315 metadata? Could your protocol counter traffic analysis? Could your
316 protocol improve data minimization? Does your document identify
317 potentially sensitive logged data by your protocol and/or for how
318 long that needs to be retained for technical reasons?
320 Explanation: Privacy refers to the right of an entity (normally a
321 person), acting in its own behalf, to determine the degree to which
322 it will interact with its environment, including the degree to which
323 the entity is willing to share its personal information with others.
324 [RFC4949]. If a protocol provides insufficient privacy protection it
325 may have a negative impact on freedom of expression as users self-
326 censor for fear of surveillance, or find themselves unable to express
327 themselves freely.
329 Example: See [RFC6973]
331 Impacts:
333 - Right to freedom of expression
335 - Right to non-discrimination
337 3.3.3. Content agnosticism
339 Question(s): If your protocol impacts packet handling, does it use
340 user data (packet data that is not included in the header)? Is it
341 making decisions based on the payload of the packet? Does your
342 protocol prioritize certain content or services over others in the
343 routing process ? Is the protocol transparent about the
344 prioritization that is made (if any)?
346 Explanation: Content agnosticism refers to the notion that network
347 traffic is treated identically regardless of payload, with some
348 exception where it comes to effective traffic handling, for instance
349 where it comes to delay tolerant or delay sensitive packets, based on
350 the header.
352 Example: Content agnosticism prevents payload-based discrimination
353 against packets. This is important because changes to this principle
354 can lead to a two-tiered Internet, where certain packets are
355 prioritized over others on the basis of their content. Effectively
356 this would mean that although all users are entitled to receive their
357 packets at a certain speed, some users become more equal than others.
359 Impacts:
361 - Right to freedom of expression
363 - Right to non-discrimination
365 - Right to equal protection
367 3.3.4. Security
369 Question(s): Did you have a look at Guidelines for Writing RFC Text
370 on Security Considerations [BCP72]? Have you found any "attacks that
371 are somewhat related to your protocol yet considered out of scope of
372 your document? Would these attacks be pertinent to the human rights
373 enabling features of the Internet (as described throughout this
374 document)?
375 Explanation: Most people speak of security as if it were a single
376 monolithic property of a protocol or system, however, upon reflection
377 one realizes that it is clearly not true. Rather, security is a
378 series of related but somewhat independent properties. Not all of
379 these properties are required for every application. Since
380 communications are carried out by systems and access to systems is
381 through communications channels, these goals obviously interlock, but
382 they can also be independently provided [BCP72].
384 Example: See [BCP72].
386 Impacts:
388 - Right to freedom of expression
390 - Right to freedom of assembly and association
392 - Right to non-discrimination
394 - Right to security
396 3.3.5. Internationalization
398 Question(s): Does your protocol have text strings that have to be
399 understood or entered by humans? Does your protocol allow Unicode?
400 If so, do you accept texts in one charset (which must be UTF-8), or
401 several (which is dangerous for interoperability)? If character sets
402 or encodings other than UTF-8 are allowed, does your protocol mandate
403 a proper tagging of the charset? Did you have a look at [RFC6365]?
405 Explanation: Internationalization refers to the practice of making
406 protocols, standards, and implementations usable in different
407 languages and scripts (see Localization). In the IETF,
408 internationalization means to add or improve the handling of non-
409 ASCII text in a protocol. [RFC6365] A different perspective, more
410 appropriate to protocols that are designed for global use from the
411 beginning, is the definition used by W3C:
413 "Internationalization is the design and development of a
414 product, application or document content that enables easy
415 localization for target audiences that vary in culture, region,
416 or language." {{W3Ci18nDef}}
418 Many protocols that handle text only handle one charset (US-ASCII),
419 or leave the question of what CCS and encoding are used up to local
420 guesswork (which leads, of course, to interoperability problems). If
421 multiple charsets are permitted, they must be explicitly identified
422 [RFC2277]. Adding non-ASCII text to a protocol allows the protocol
423 to handle more scripts, hopefully representing users across the
424 world. In today's world, that is normally best accomplished by
425 allowing Unicode encoded in UTF-8 only.
427 In the current IETF policy [RFC2277], internationalization is aimed
428 at user-facing strings, not protocol elements, such as the verbs used
429 by some text-based protocols. (Do note that some strings are both
430 content and protocol elements, such as the identifiers.) If the
431 Internet wants to be a global network of networks, the protocols
432 should work with other languages than English and other character
433 sets than latin characters. It is therefore crucial that at least
434 the content carried by the protocol can be in any script, and that
435 all scripts are treated equally.
437 Example: See localization
439 Impacts:
441 - Right to freedom of expression
443 - Right to political participation
445 - Right to participate in cultural life, arts and science
447 3.3.6. Censorship resistance
449 Question(s): Does this protocol introduce new identifiers or reuse
450 existing identifiers (e.g. MAC addresses) that might be associated
451 with persons or content? Does your protocol make it apparent or
452 transparent when access to a resource it restricted? Can your
453 protocol contribute to filtering in a way it could be implemented to
454 censor data or services? Could this be designed to ensure this
455 doesn't happen?
457 Explanation: Censorship resistance refers to the methods and measures
458 to prevent Internet censorship.
460 Example: In the development of the IPv6 protocol it was discussed to
461 embed a Media Access Control (MAC) address into unique IP addresses.
462 This would make it possible for 'eavesdroppers and other information
463 collectors to identify when different addresses used in different
464 transactions actually correspond to the same node. [RFC4941] This is
465 why Privacy Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in
466 IPv6 have been introduced. [RFC4941]
468 Identifiers of content exposed within a protocol might be used to
469 facilitate censorship, as in the case of Application Layer based
470 censorship, which affects protocols like HTTP. Denial or restriction
471 of access can be made apparent by the use of status code 451 - which
472 allows server operators to operate with greater transparency in
473 circumstances where issues of law or public policy affect their
474 operation [RFC7725].
476 Impacts:
478 - Right to freedom of expression
480 - Right to political participation
482 - Right to participate in cultural life, arts and science
484 - Right to freedom of assembly and association
486 3.3.7. Open Standards
488 Question(s): Is your protocol fully documented in a way that it could
489 be easily implemented, improved, built upon and/or further developed?
490 Do you depend on proprietary code for the implementation, running or
491 further development of your protocol? Does your protocol favor a
492 particular proprietary specification over technically equivalent and
493 competing specification(s), for instance by making any incorporated
494 vendor specification "required" or "recommended" [RFC2026]? Do you
495 normatively reference another standard that is not available without
496 cost (and could it possible be done without)? Are you aware of any
497 patents that would prevent your standard from being fully implemented
498 [RFC3979] [RFC6701]?
500 Explanation: The Internet was able to be developed into the global
501 network of networks because of the existence of open, non-proprietary
502 standards [Zittrain]. They are crucial for enabling
503 interoperability. Yet, open standards are not explicitly defined
504 within the IETF. On the subject, [RFC2026] states: Various national
505 and international standards bodies, such as ANSI, ISO, IEEE, and ITU-
506 T, develop a variety of protocol and service specifications that are
507 similar to Technical Specifications defined at the IETF. National
508 and international groups also publish "implementors' agreements" that
509 are analogous to Applicability Statements, capturing a body of
510 implementation-specific detail concerned with the practical
511 application of their standards. All of these are considered to be
512 "open external standards" for the purposes of the Internet Standards
513 Process. Similarly, [RFC3935] does not define open standards but
514 does emphasize the importance of 'open process': any interested
515 person can participate in the work, know what is being decided, and
516 make his or her voice heard on the issue. Part of this principle is
517 the IETF's commitment to making its documents, WG mailing lists,
518 attendance lists, and meeting minutes publicly available on the
519 Internet.
521 Open standards are important as they allow for permissionless
522 innovation, which is important to maintain the freedom and ability to
523 freely create and deploy new protocols on top of the communications
524 constructs that currently exist. It is at the heart of the Internet
525 as we know it, and to maintain its fundamentally open nature, we need
526 to be mindful of the need for developing open standards.
528 All standards that need to be normatively implemented should be
529 freely available and with reasonable protection for patent
530 infringement claims, so it can also be implemented in open source or
531 free software. Patents have often held back open standardization or
532 been used against those deploying open standards, particularly in the
533 domain of cryptography [newegg]. An exemption of this is sometimes
534 made when a protocol is standardized that normatively relies on
535 speficiations produced by others SDOs that are not freely available.
536 Patents in open standards or in normative references to other
537 standards should have a patent disclosure [notewell], royalty-free
538 licensing [patentpolicy], or some other form of reasonable
539 protection. Reasonable patent protection should include but is not
540 limited to cryptographic primitives.
542 Example: [RFC6108] describes a system for providing critical end-user
543 notifications to web browsers, which has been deployed by Comcast, an
544 Internet Service Provider (ISP). Such a notification system is being
545 used to provide near-immediate notifications to customers, such as to
546 warn them that their traffic exhibits patterns that are indicative of
547 malware or virus infection. There are other proprietary systems that
548 can perform such notifications, but those systems utilize Deep Packet
549 Inspection (DPI) technology. In contrast to DPI, this document
550 describes a system that does not rely upon DPI, and is instead based
551 in open IETF standards and open source applications.
553 Impacts:
555 - Right to freedom of expression
557 - Right to participate in cultural life, arts and science
559 3.3.8. Heterogeneity Support
561 Question(s): Does your protocol support heterogeneity by design?
562 Does your protocol allow for multiple types of hardware? Does your
563 protocol allow for multiple types of application protocols? Is your
564 protocol liberal in what it receives and handles? Will it remain
565 usable and open if the context changes? Does your protocol allow
566 there to be well-defined extension points? Do these extension points
567 allow for open innovation?
569 Explanation: The Internet is characterized by heterogeneity on many
570 levels: devices and nodes, router scheduling algorithms and queue
571 management mechanisms, routing protocols, levels of multiplexing,
572 protocol versions and implementations, underlying link layers (e.g.,
573 point-to-point, multi-access links, wireless, FDDI, etc.), in the
574 traffic mix and in the levels of congestion at different times and
575 places. Moreover, as the Internet is composed of autonomous
576 organizations and Internet service providers, each with their own
577 separate policy concerns, there is a large heterogeneity of
578 administrative domains and pricing structures. As a result, the
579 heterogeneity principle proposed in [RFC1958] needs to be supported
580 by design [FIArch].
582 Example: Heterogeneity is inevitable and needs be supported by
583 design. Multiple types of hardware must be allowed for, e.g.
584 transmission speeds differing by at least 7 orders of magnitude,
585 various computer word lengths, and hosts ranging from memory-starved
586 microprocessors up to massively parallel supercomputers. Multiple
587 types of application protocol must be allowed for, ranging from the
588 simplest such as remote login up to the most complex such as
589 distributed databases [RFC1958].
591 Impacts:
593 - Right to freedom of expression
595 - Right to political participtation
597 3.3.9. Pseudonymity
599 Question(s): Have you considered the Privacy Considerations for
600 Internet Protocols [RFC6973], especially section 6.1.2 ? Does the
601 protocol collect personally derived data? Does the protocol generate
602 or process anything that can be, or be tightly correlated with,
603 personally identifiable information? Does the protocol utilize data
604 that is personally-derived, i.e. derived from the interaction of a
605 single person, or their device or address? Does this protocol
606 generate personally derived data, and if so how will that data be
607 handled?
609 Explanation: Pseudonymity - the ability to use a persistent
610 identifier not linked to one's offline identity" straight away - is
611 an important feature for many end-users, as it allows them different
612 degrees of disguised identity and privacy online.
614 Example: Designing a standard that exposes personal data, it is
615 important to consider ways to mitigate the obvious impacts. While
616 pseudonyms cannot be simply reverse engineered - some early
617 approaches simply took approaches such as simple hashing of IP
618 addresses, these could then be simply reversed by generating a hash
619 for each potential IP address and comparing it to the pseudonym -
620 limiting the exposure of personal data remains important.
622 Pseudonymity means using a pseudonym instead of one's "real" name.
623 There are many reasons for users to use pseudoyms, for instance to:
624 hide their gender, protect themselves against harassment, protect
625 their families' privacy, frankly discuss sexuality, or develop a
626 artistic or journalistic persona without retribution from an
627 employer, (potential) customers, or social surrounding.
628 [geekfeminism] The difference between anonymity and pseudonymity is
629 that a pseudonym often is persistent. "Pseudonymity is strengthened
630 when less personal data can be linked to the pseudonym; when the same
631 pseudonym is used less often and across fewer contexts; and when
632 independently chosen pseudonyms are more frequently used for new
633 actions (making them, from an observer's or attacker's perspective,
634 unlinkable)." [RFC6973]
636 Impacts:
638 - Right to non-discrimination
640 - Right to freedom of assembly and association
642 3.3.10. Accessibility
644 Question(s): Is your protocol designed to provide an enabling
645 environment for people who are not able-bodied? Have you looked at
646 the W3C Web Accessibility Initiative for examples and guidance?
648 Explanation: The Internet is fundamentally designed to work for all
649 people, whatever their hardware, software, language, culture,
650 location, or physical or mental ability. When the Internet meets
651 this goal, it is accessible to people with a diverse range of
652 hearing, movement, sight, and cognitive ability [W3CAccessibility].
653 Sometimes in the design of protocols, websites, web technologies, or
654 web tools, barriers are created that exclude people from using the
655 Web.
657 Example: The HTML protocol as defined in [HTML5] specifically
658 requires that every image must have an alt attribute (with a few
659 exceptions) to ensure images are accessible for people that cannot
660 themselves decipher non-text content in web pages.
662 Impacts:
664 - Right to non-discrimination
666 - Right to freedom of assembly and association
668 - Right to education
670 - Right to political participation
672 3.3.11. Localization
674 Question(s): Does your protocol uphold the standards of
675 internationalization? Have made any concrete steps towards
676 localizing your protocol for relevant audiences?
678 Explanation: Localization refers to the adaptation of a product,
679 application or document content to meet the language, cultural and
680 other requirements of a specific target market (a locale)
681 [W3Ci18nDef]. It is also described as the practice of translating an
682 implementation to make it functional in a specific language or for
683 users in a specific locale (see Internationalization).
685 Example: The Internet is a global medium, but many of its protocols
686 and products are developed with a certain audience in mind, that
687 often share particular characteristics like knowing how to read and
688 write in ASCII and knowing English. This limits the ability of a
689 large part of the world's online population from using the Internet
690 in a way that is culturally and linguistically accessible. An
691 example of a protocol that has taken into account the view that
692 individuals like to have access to data in their native language can
693 be found in [RFC5646]. This protocol labels the information content
694 with an identifier for the language in which it is written. And this
695 allows information to be presented in more than one language.
697 Impacts:
699 - Right to non-discrimination
701 - Right to participate in cultural life, arts and science
703 - Right to freedom of expression
705 3.3.12. Decentralization
707 Question(s): Can your protocol be implemented without one single
708 point of control? If applicable, can your protocol be deployed in a
709 federated manner? What is the potential for discrimination against
710 users of your protocol? How can the use of your protocol be used to
711 implicate users? Does your protocol create additional centralized
712 points of control?
714 Explanation: Decentralization is one of the central technical
715 concepts of the architecture of the networks, and embraced as such by
716 the IETF [RFC3935]. It refers to the absence or minimization of
717 centralized points of control; a feature that is assumed to make it
718 easy for new users to join and new uses to unfold [Brown]. It also
719 reduces issues surrounding single points of failure, and distributes
720 the network such that it continues to function if one or several
721 nodes are disabled. With the commercialization of the Internet in
722 the early 1990's there has been a slow move to move away from
723 decentralization, to the detriment of the technical benefits of
724 having a decentralized Internet.
726 Example: The bits traveling the Internet are increasingly susceptible
727 to monitoring and censorship, from both governments and Internet
728 service providers, as well as third (malicious) parties. The ability
729 to monitor and censor is further enabled by the increased
730 centralization of the network that creates central infrastructure
731 points that can be tapped in to. The creation of peer-to-peer
732 networks and the development of voice-over-IP protocols using peer-
733 to-peer technology in combination with distributed hash table (DHT)
734 for scalability are examples of how protocols can preserve
735 decentralization [Pouwelse].
737 Impacts:
739 - Right to freedom of expression
741 - Right to freedom of assembly and association
743 3.3.13. Reliability
745 Question(s): Is your protocol fault tolerant? Does it degrade
746 gracefully? Can your protocol resist malicious degradation attempts?
747 Do you have a documented way to announce degradation? Do you have
748 measures in place for recovery or partial healing from failure? Can
749 your protocol maintain dependability and performance in the face of
750 unanticipated changes or circumstances?
752 Explanation: Reliability ensures that a protocol will execute its
753 function consistently and error resistant as described, and function
754 without unexpected result. A system that is reliable degenerates
755 gracefully and will have a documented way to announce degradation.
756 It also has mechanisms to recover from failure gracefully, and if
757 applicable, allow for partial healing. It is important here to draw
758 a distinction between random degradation and malicious degradation.
759 Many current attacks against TLS, for example, exploit TLS's ability
760 to gracefully degrade to older cipher suites - from a functional
761 perspective, this is good. From a security perspective, this can be
762 very bad. As with confidentiality, the growth of the Internet and
763 fostering innovation in services depends on users having confidence
764 and trust [RFC3724] in the network. For reliability it is necessary
765 that services notify the users if a delivery fails. In the case of
766 real-time systems in addition to the reliable delivery the protocol
767 needs to safeguard timeliness.
769 Example: In the modern IP stack structure, a reliable transport layer
770 requires an indication that transport processing has successfully
771 completed, such as given by TCP's ACK message [RFC0793], and not
772 simply an indication from the IP layer that the packet arrived.
773 Similarly, an application layer protocol may require an application-
774 specific acknowledgement that contains, among other things, a status
775 code indicating the disposition of the request (See [RFC3724]).
777 Impacts:
779 - Right to freedom of expression
781 - Right to security
783 3.3.14. Confidentiality
785 Question(s): Does this protocol expose information related to
786 identifiers or data? If so, does it do so to each other protocol
787 entity (i.e., recipients, intermediaries, and enablers) [RFC6973]?
788 What options exist for protocol implementers to choose to limit the
789 information shared with each entity? What operational controls are
790 available to limit the information shared with each entity?
792 What controls or consent mechanisms does the protocol define or
793 require before personal data or identifiers are shared or exposed via
794 the protocol? If no such mechanisms or controls are specified, is it
795 expected that control and consent will be handled outside of the
796 protocol?
798 Does the protocol provide ways for initiators to share different
799 pieces of information with different recipients? If not, are there
800 mechanisms that exist outside of the protocol to provide initiators
801 with such control?
803 Does the protocol provide ways for initiators to limit the sharing or
804 express individuals' preferences to recipients or intermediaries with
805 regard to the collection, use, or disclosure of their personal data?
806 If not, are there mechanisms that exist outside of the protocol to
807 provide users with such control? Is it expected that users will have
808 relationships that govern the use of the information (contractual or
809 otherwise) with those who operate these intermediaries? Does the
810 protocol prefer encryption over clear text operation?
812 Explanation: Confidentiality refers to keeping your data secret from
813 unintended listeners [BCP72]. The growth of the Internet depends on
814 users having confidence that the network protects their personal data
815 [RFC1984].
817 Example: Protocols that do not encrypt their payload make the entire
818 content of the communication available to the idealized attacker
819 along their path. Following the advice in [RFC3365], most such
820 protocols have a secure variant that encrypts the payload for
821 confidentiality, and these secure variants are seeing ever-wider
822 deployment. A noteworthy exception is DNS [RFC1035], as DNSSEC
823 [RFC4033]does not have confidentiality as a requirement. This
824 implies that, in the absence of changes to the protocol as presently
825 under development in the IETF's DNS Private Exchange (DPRIVE) working
826 group, all DNS queries and answers generated by the activities of any
827 protocol are available to the attacker. When store-and-forward
828 protocols are used (e.g., SMTP [RFC5321]), intermediaries leave this
829 data subject to observation by an attacker that has compromised these
830 intermediaries, unless the data is encrypted end-to-end by the
831 application-layer protocol or the implementation uses an encrypted
832 store for this data [RFC7624].
834 Impacts:
836 - Right to privacy
838 - Right to security
840 3.3.15. Integrity
842 Question(s): Does your protocol maintain, assure and/or verify the
843 accuracy of payload data? Does your protocol maintain and assure the
844 consistency of data? Does your protocol in any way allow for the
845 data to be (intentionally or unintentionally) altered?
847 Explanation: Integrity refers to the maintenance and assurance of the
848 accuracy and consistency of data to ensure it has not been
849 (intentionally or unintentionally) altered.
851 Example: Integrity verification of data is important to prevent
852 vulnerabilities and attacks, like man-in-the-middle-attacks. These
853 attacks happen when a third party (often for malicious reasons)
854 intercepts a communication between two parties, inserting themselves
855 in the middle changing the content of the data. In practice this
856 looks as follows:
858 Alice wants to communicate with Bob.
859 Corinne forges and sends a message to Bob, impersonating Alice. Bob
860 cannot see the data from Alice was altered by Corinne.
861 Corinne intercepts and alters the communication as it is sent between
862 Alice and Bob.
863 Corinne is able to control the communication content.
865 Impacts:
867 - Right to freedom of expression
869 - Right to security
871 3.3.16. Authenticity
873 Question(s): Do you have sufficient measures to confirm the truth of
874 an attribute of a single piece of data or entity? Can the attributes
875 get garbled along the way (see security)? If relevant have you
876 implemented IPsec, DNSsec, HTTPS and other Standard Security Best
877 Practices?
879 Explanation: Authenticity ensures that data does indeed come from the
880 source it claims to come from. This is important to prevent certain
881 attacks or unauthorized access and use of data.
883 Example: Authentication of data is important to prevent
884 vulnerabilities and attacks, like man-in-the-middle-attacks. These
885 attacks happen when a third party (often for malicious reasons)
886 intercepts a communication between two parties, inserting themselves
887 in the middle and posing as both parties. In practice this looks as
888 follows:
890 Alice wants to communicate with Bob.
891 Alice sends data to Bob.
892 Corinne intercepts the data sent to Bob.
893 Corinne reads (and potentially alters) the message to Bob.
894 Bob cannot see the data did not come from Alice but from Corinne.
896 When there is proper authentication the scenario would be as follows:
898 Alice wants to communicate with Bob.
899 Alice sends data to Bob.
900 Corinne intercepts the data sent to Bob.
901 Corinne reads and alters the message to Bob.
903 Bob can see the data did not come from Alice but from Corinne.
905 Impacts:
907 - Right to privacy
909 - Right to freedom of expression
911 - Right to security
913 3.3.17. Adaptability
915 Question(s): Is your protocol written in such a way that is would be
916 easy for other protocols to be developed on top of it, or to interact
917 with it? Does your protocol impact permissionless innovation? See
918 'Connectivity' above.
920 Explanation: Adaptability is closely interrelated with permissionless
921 innovation, both maintain the freedom and ability to freely create
922 and deploy new protocols on top of the communications constructs that
923 currently exist. It is at the heart of the Internet as we know it,
924 and to maintain its fundamentally open nature, we need to be mindful
925 of the impact of protocols on maintaining or reducing permissionless
926 innovation to ensure the Internet can continue to develop.
928 Example: WebRTC generates audio and/or video data. In order to
929 ensure that WebRTC can be used in different locations by different
930 parties it is important that standard Javascript APIs are developed
931 to support applications from different voice service providers.
932 Multiple parties will have similar capabilities, in order to ensure
933 that all parties can build upon existing standards these need to be
934 adaptable, and allow for permissionless innovation.
936 Impacts:
938 - Right to education
940 - Freedom of expression
942 - Freedom of assembly and association
944 3.3.18. Outcome Transparency
946 Question(s): Are the effects of your protocol fully and easily
947 comprehensible, including with respect to unintended consequences of
948 protocol choices?
949 Explanation: certain technical choice may have unintended
950 consequences.
952 Example: lack of authenticity may lead to lack of integrity and
953 negative externalities, of which spam is an example. Lack of data
954 that could be used for billing and accounting can lead to so-called
955 "free" arrangements which obscure the actual costs and distribution
956 of the costs, for example the barter arrangements that are commonly
957 used for Internet interconnection; and the commercial exploitation of
958 personal data for targeted advertising which is the most common
959 funding model for the so-called "free" services such as search
960 engines and social networks.
962 Impacts: - Freedom of expression - Privacy - Freedom of assembly and
963 association - Access to information
965 3.3.19. Anonymity
967 Example: Often protocols expose personal data, it is important to
968 consider ways to mitigate the obvious privacy impacts. A protocol
969 that uses data that could help identify a sender (items of interest)
970 should be protected from third parties. For instance if one wants to
971 hide the source/destination IP addresses of a packet, the use of
972 IPsec in tunneling mode (e.g., inside a virtual private network) can
973 be helpful to protect from third parties likely to eavesdrop packets
974 exchanged between the tunnel endpoints.
976 Question(s): Does you protocol make use of persistent identifiers?
977 Can it be done without them? If your protocol collects data and
978 distributes it (see [RFC6235]), you should anonymize the data, but
979 keep in mind that "anonymizing" data is notoriously hard. Do not
980 think that just dropping the last byte of an IP address "anonymizes"
981 data. If your protocol allows for identity management, there should
982 be a clear barrier between the identities to ensure that they cannot
983 (easily) be associated with each other. Did you have a look at the
984 Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols [RFC6973], especially
985 section 6.1.1 ?
987 Explanation: Anonymity refers to the condition of an identity being
988 unknown or concealed [RFC4949]. Even though full anonymity is hard
989 to achieve, it is a non-binary concept. Making pervasive monitoring
990 and tracking harder is important for many users as well as for the
991 IETF [RFC7258]. Achieving a higher level of anonymity is an
992 important feature for many end-users, as it allows them different
993 degrees of privacy online. Anonymity is an inherent part of the
994 right to freedom of opinion and expression and the right to privacy.
995 Avoid adding identifiers, options or configurations that create or
996 might lead to patterns or regularities that are not explicitely
997 required by the protocol.
999 Example: An example is DHCP where sending a persistent identifier as
1000 the client name was not mandatory but, in practice, done by many
1001 implementations, before [RFC7844].
1003 Impacts:
1005 - Right to non-discrimination
1007 - Right to political participation
1009 - Right to freedom of assembly and association
1011 - Right to security
1013 4. Document Status
1015 This RG document is currently documenting best practices and
1016 guidelines for human rights reviews of networking protocols and other
1017 Internet-Drafts and RFCs
1019 5. Acknowledgements
1021 Thanks to: - Corinne Cath for work on [RFC8280]. - Theresa Engelhard
1022 and the hrpc list for suggestions. - The Human Rights Review Team
1023 for implementing the guidelines and helping them improve.
1025 6. Security Considerations
1027 As this document concerns a research document, there are no security
1028 considerations.
1030 7. IANA Considerations
1032 This document has no actions for IANA.
1034 8. Research Group Information
1036 The discussion list for the IRTF Human Rights Protocol Considerations
1037 Research Group is located at the e-mail address hrpc@ietf.org [1].
1038 Information on the group and information on how to subscribe to the
1039 list is at https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc [2]
1041 Archives of the list can be found at: https://www.irtf.org/mail-
1042 archive/web/hrpc/current/index.html [3]
1044 9. References
1046 9.1. Informative References
1048 [BCP72] IETF, "Guidelines for Writing RFC Text on Security
1049 Considerations", 2003,
1050 .
1052 [Bless] Bless, R. and C. Orwat, "Values and Networks", 2015.
1054 [Brown] Brown, I. and M. Ziewitz, "A Prehistory of Internet
1055 Governance", Research Handbook on Governance of the
1056 Internet. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar. , 2013.
1058 [FIArch] "Future Internet Design Principles", January 2012,
1059 .
1062 [geekfeminism]
1063 Geek Feminism Wiki, "Pseudonymity", 2015,
1064 .
1066 [Hill2014]
1067 Hill, R., "Partial Catalog of Human Rights Related to ICT
1068 Activities", 2014,
1069 .
1071 [HTML5] W3C, "HTML5", 2014, .
1073 [ICCPR] United Nations General Assembly, "International Covenant
1074 on Civil and Political Rights", 1976,
1075 .
1078 [ICESCR] United Nations General Assembly, "International Covenant
1079 on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights", 1966,
1080 .
1083 [IRP] Internet Rights and Principles Dynamic Coalition, "10
1084 Internet Rights & Principles", 2014,
1085 .
1089 [newegg] Mullin, J., "Newegg on trial: Mystery company TQP rewrites
1090 the history of encryption", 2013, .
1094 [notewell]
1095 IETF, "Note Well", 2015,
1096 .
1098 [patentpolicy]
1099 W3C, "W3C Patent Policy", 2004,
1100 .
1102 [Penney] Penney, J., "Chilling Effects: Online Surveillance and
1103 Wikipedia Use", 2016, .
1106 [Pouwelse]
1107 Pouwelse, Ed, J., "Media without censorship", 2012,
1108 .
1111 [RFC0793] Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7,
1112 RFC 793, DOI 10.17487/RFC0793, September 1981,
1113 .
1115 [RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
1116 specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
1117 November 1987, .
1119 [RFC1958] Carpenter, B., Ed., "Architectural Principles of the
1120 Internet", RFC 1958, DOI 10.17487/RFC1958, June 1996,
1121 .
1123 [RFC1984] IAB and IESG, "IAB and IESG Statement on Cryptographic
1124 Technology and the Internet", BCP 200, RFC 1984,
1125 DOI 10.17487/RFC1984, August 1996,
1126 .
1128 [RFC2026] Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision
1129 3", BCP 9, RFC 2026, DOI 10.17487/RFC2026, October 1996,
1130 .
1132 [RFC2277] Alvestrand, H., "IETF Policy on Character Sets and
1133 Languages", BCP 18, RFC 2277, DOI 10.17487/RFC2277,
1134 January 1998, .
1136 [RFC3365] Schiller, J., "Strong Security Requirements for Internet
1137 Engineering Task Force Standard Protocols", BCP 61,
1138 RFC 3365, DOI 10.17487/RFC3365, August 2002,
1139 .
1141 [RFC3724] Kempf, J., Ed., Austein, R., Ed., and IAB, "The Rise of
1142 the Middle and the Future of End-to-End: Reflections on
1143 the Evolution of the Internet Architecture", RFC 3724,
1144 DOI 10.17487/RFC3724, March 2004,
1145 .
1147 [RFC3935] Alvestrand, H., "A Mission Statement for the IETF",
1148 BCP 95, RFC 3935, DOI 10.17487/RFC3935, October 2004,
1149 .
1151 [RFC3979] Bradner, S., Ed., "Intellectual Property Rights in IETF
1152 Technology", RFC 3979, DOI 10.17487/RFC3979, March 2005,
1153 .
1155 [RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
1156 Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
1157 RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005,
1158 .
1160 [RFC4101] Rescorla, E. and IAB, "Writing Protocol Models", RFC 4101,
1161 DOI 10.17487/RFC4101, June 2005,
1162 .
1164 [RFC4941] Narten, T., Draves, R., and S. Krishnan, "Privacy
1165 Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in
1166 IPv6", RFC 4941, DOI 10.17487/RFC4941, September 2007,
1167 .
1169 [RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
1170 FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
1171 .
1173 [RFC5321] Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321,
1174 DOI 10.17487/RFC5321, October 2008,
1175 .
1177 [RFC5646] Phillips, A., Ed. and M. Davis, Ed., "Tags for Identifying
1178 Languages", BCP 47, RFC 5646, DOI 10.17487/RFC5646,
1179 September 2009, .
1181 [RFC6108] Chung, C., Kasyanov, A., Livingood, J., Mody, N., and B.
1182 Van Lieu, "Comcast's Web Notification System Design",
1183 RFC 6108, DOI 10.17487/RFC6108, February 2011,
1184 .
1186 [RFC6235] Boschi, E. and B. Trammell, "IP Flow Anonymization
1187 Support", RFC 6235, DOI 10.17487/RFC6235, May 2011,
1188 .
1190 [RFC6365] Hoffman, P. and J. Klensin, "Terminology Used in
1191 Internationalization in the IETF", BCP 166, RFC 6365,
1192 DOI 10.17487/RFC6365, September 2011,
1193 .
1195 [RFC6701] Farrel, A. and P. Resnick, "Sanctions Available for
1196 Application to Violators of IETF IPR Policy", RFC 6701,
1197 DOI 10.17487/RFC6701, August 2012,
1198 .
1200 [RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
1201 Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
1202 Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
1203 DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
1204 .
1206 [RFC7258] Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
1207 Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May
1208 2014, .
1210 [RFC7624] Barnes, R., Schneier, B., Jennings, C., Hardie, T.,
1211 Trammell, B., Huitema, C., and D. Borkmann,
1212 "Confidentiality in the Face of Pervasive Surveillance: A
1213 Threat Model and Problem Statement", RFC 7624,
1214 DOI 10.17487/RFC7624, August 2015,
1215 .
1217 [RFC7725] Bray, T., "An HTTP Status Code to Report Legal Obstacles",
1218 RFC 7725, DOI 10.17487/RFC7725, February 2016,
1219 .
1221 [RFC7844] Huitema, C., Mrugalski, T., and S. Krishnan, "Anonymity
1222 Profiles for DHCP Clients", RFC 7844,
1223 DOI 10.17487/RFC7844, May 2016,
1224 .
1226 [RFC8280] ten Oever, N. and C. Cath, "Research into Human Rights
1227 Protocol Considerations", RFC 8280, DOI 10.17487/RFC8280,
1228 October 2017, .
1230 [Saltzer] Saltzer, J., Reed, D., and D. Clark, "End-to-End Arguments
1231 in System Design", ACM TOCS, Vol 2, Number 4, November
1232 1984, pp 277-288. , 1984.
1234 [UDHR] United Nations General Assembly, "The Universal
1235 Declaration of Human Rights", 1948,
1236 .
1238 [UNHRC2016]
1239 United Nations Human Rights Council, "UN Human Rights
1240 Council Resolution "The promotion, protection and
1241 enjoyment of human rights on the Internet" (A/HRC/32/
1242 L.20)", 2016, .
1246 [W3CAccessibility]
1247 W3C, "Accessibility", 2015,
1248 .
1250 [W3Ci18nDef]
1251 W3C, "Localization vs. Internationalization", 2010,
1252 .
1254 [Zittrain]
1255 Zittrain, J., "The Future of the Internet - And How to
1256 Stop It", Yale University Press , 2008,
1257 .
1260 9.2. URIs
1262 [1] mailto:hrpc@ietf.org
1264 [2] https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc
1266 [3] https://www.irtf.org/mail-archive/web/hrpc/current/index.html
1268 Author's Address
1270 Niels ten Oever
1271 University of Amsterdam
1273 EMail: mail@nielstenoever.net