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Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Human Rights Protocol Considerations Research Group G. Grover (editor) 3 Internet-Draft Centre for Internet and Society 4 Updates: 8280 (if approved) N. ten Oever (editor) 5 Intended status: Informational University of Amsterdam 6 Expires: September 10, 2020 March 09, 2020 8 Guidelines for Human Rights Protocol and Architecture Considerations 9 draft-irtf-hrpc-guidelines-04 11 Abstract 13 This document sets guidelines for human rights considerations in 14 networking protocols, similar to the work done on the guidelines for 15 privacy considerations [RFC6973]. This is an updated version of the 16 guidelines for human rights considerations in [RFC8280]. 18 Status of This Memo 20 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 21 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 23 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 24 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 25 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 26 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 28 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 29 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 30 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 31 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 33 This Internet-Draft will expire on September 10, 2020. 35 Copyright Notice 37 Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 38 document authors. All rights reserved. 40 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 41 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 42 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 43 publication of this document. Please review these documents 44 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 45 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 46 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 47 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 48 described in the Simplified BSD License. 50 Table of Contents 52 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 53 2. Vocabulary used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 54 3. Guidelines for developing human rights protocol 55 considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 56 3.1. Human rights threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 57 3.2. Conducting human rights reviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 58 3.2.1. Analyzing drafts based on guidelines for human rights 59 considerations model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 60 3.2.2. Analyzing drafts based on their perceived or 61 speculated impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 62 3.2.3. Expert interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 63 3.2.4. Interviews with impacted persons and communities . . 6 64 3.2.5. Tracing impacts of implementations . . . . . . . . . 6 65 3.3. Guidelines for human rights considerations . . . . . . . 6 66 3.3.1. Connectivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 67 3.3.2. Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 68 3.3.3. Content agnosticism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 69 3.3.4. Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 70 3.3.5. Internationalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 71 3.3.6. Censorship resistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 72 3.3.7. Open Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 73 3.3.8. Heterogeneity Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 74 3.3.9. Pseudonymity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 75 3.3.10. Accessibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 76 3.3.11. Localization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 77 3.3.12. Decentralization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 78 3.3.13. Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 79 3.3.14. Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 80 3.3.15. Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 81 3.3.16. Authenticity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 82 3.3.17. Adaptability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 83 3.3.18. Outcome Transparency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 84 3.3.19. Anonymity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 85 3.3.20. Misc. considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 86 4. Document Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 87 5. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 88 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 89 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 90 8. Research Group Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 91 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 92 9.1. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 93 9.2. URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 94 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 96 1. Introduction 98 This document outlines a set of human rights protocol considerations 99 for protocol developers. It provides questions engineers should ask 100 themselves when developing or improving protocols if they want to 101 understand their potential human rights impact. It should however be 102 noted that the impact of a protocol cannot solely be deduced from its 103 design, but its usage and implementation should also be studied to 104 form a full protocol human rights impact assessment. 106 The questions are based on the research performed by the Human Rights 107 Protocol Considerations (hrpc) research group which has been 108 documented before these considerations. The research establishes 109 that human rights relate to standards and protocols, and offers a 110 common vocabulary of technical concepts that impact human rights and 111 how these technical concepts can be combined to ensure that the 112 Internet remains an enabling environment for human rights. With 113 this, the contours of a model for developing human rights protocol 114 considerations has taken shape. 116 This document is a further iteration of the guidelines that can be 117 found in [RFC8280]. The methods for conducting human rights reviews 118 (Section 3.2), and guidelines for human rights considerations 119 (Section 3.3) in this document are being tested for relevance, 120 accuracy and validity. 122 2. Vocabulary used 124 3. Guidelines for developing human rights protocol considerations 126 3.1. Human rights threats 128 Human rights threats on the Internet come in a myriad of forms. 129 Protocols and standards can harm or enable the right to freedom of 130 expression, right to non-discrimination, right to equal protection, 131 right to participate in cultural life, arts and science, right to 132 freedom of assembly and association, and the right to security. An 133 end-user who is denied access to certain services, data or websites 134 may be unable to disclose vital information about the malpractices of 135 a government or other authority. A person whose communications are 136 monitored may be prevented from exercising their right to freedom of 137 association or participate in political processes [Penney]. In a 138 worst-case scenario, protocols that leak information can lead to 139 physical danger. A realistic example to consider is when individuals 140 perceived as threats to the state are subjected to torture or extra- 141 judicial killing or detention on the basis of information gathered by 142 state agencies through information leakage in protocols. 144 This document details several 'common' threats to human rights, 145 indicating how each of these can lead to human rights violations/ 146 harms and present several examples of how these threats to human 147 rights materialize on the Internet. This threat modeling is inspired 148 by [RFC6973] Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols, which is 149 based on security threat analysis. This method is a work in progress 150 and by no means a perfect solution for assessing human rights risks 151 in Internet protocols and systems. Certain specific human rights 152 threats are indirectly considered in Internet protocols as part of 153 the security considerations [BCP72], but privacy considerations 154 [RFC6973] or reviews, let alone human rights impact assessments of 155 protocols are not standardized or implemented. 157 Many threats, enablers and risks are linked to different rights. 158 This is not unsurprising if one takes into account that human rights 159 are interrelated, interdependent and indivisible. Here however we're 160 not discussing all human rights because not all human rights are 161 relevant to ICTs in general and protocols and standards in particular 162 [Bless]: "The main source of the values of human rights is the 163 International Bill of Human Rights that is composed of the Universal 164 Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR] along with the International 165 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR] and the International 166 Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [ICESCR]. In the 167 light of several cases of Internet censorship, the Human Rights 168 Council Resolution 20/8 was adopted in 2012 [UNHRC2016], affirming ". 169 . . that the same rights that people have offline must also be 170 protected online. . . " . In 2015, the Charter of Human Rights and 171 Principles for the Internet [IRP] was developed and released. 172 According to these documents, some examples of human rights relevant 173 for ICT systems are human dignity (Art. 1 UDHR), non-discrimination 174 (Art. 2), rights to life, liberty and security (Art. 3), freedom of 175 opinion and expression (Art. 19), freedom of assembly and association 176 (Art. 20), rights to equal protection, legal remedy, fair trial, due 177 process, presumed innocent (Art. 7-11), appropriate social and 178 international order (Art. 28), participation in public affairs (Art. 179 21), participation in cultural life, protection of the moral and 180 material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or 181 artistic production of which [they are] the author (Art. 27), and 182 privacy (Art. 12)." A partial catalog of human rights related to 183 Information and Communications technologies, including economic 184 rights, can be found in [Hill2014]. 186 This is by no means an attempt to exclude specific rights or 187 prioritize some rights over others. If other rights seem relevant, 188 please contact the authors. 190 3.2. Conducting human rights reviews 192 Human rights reviews can take place in different parts of the 193 development process of an Internet Draft. However, generally 194 speaking, it is easier to influence the development of a technology 195 at earlier stages than at later stages. This does not mean that 196 reviews at last-call are not relevant, but they are less likely to 197 result in significant changes in the reviewed document. 199 Methods for analyzing technology for specific human rights impacts 200 are still quite nascent. Currently five methods have been explored 201 by the Human Rights Review Team, often in conjunction with each 202 other: 204 3.2.1. Analyzing drafts based on guidelines for human rights 205 considerations model 207 This analysis of Internet-Drafts uses the model as described below. 208 The outlined categories and questions are used to review an Internet 209 Draft an generally the review is also presented in that order. The 210 advantage of this is that it provides a known overview, and document 211 authors can go back to this document as well as [RFC8280] to 212 understand the background and the context. 214 3.2.2. Analyzing drafts based on their perceived or speculated impact 216 When reviewing an Internet-Draft, specific human rights impacts might 217 become apparent by doing a close reading of the draft and seeking to 218 understand how it might affect networks or society. While less 219 structured than the straight use of the human rights considerations 220 model, this analysis might lead to new speculative understandings 221 between human rights and protocols. 223 3.2.3. Expert interviews 225 Interviews with document authors, active members of the Working 226 Group, or experts in the field can help explore the characteristics 227 of the protocol and their effects. There are two main advantages to 228 this approach: one the one hand, it allows the reviewer to gain a 229 deeper understanding of the (intended) workings of the protocol; on 230 the other hand, it also allows for the reviewer to start a discussion 231 with experts or even document authors about certain aspects, which 232 might help gain the review gain traction when it is published. 234 3.2.4. Interviews with impacted persons and communities 236 Protocols impact users of the Internet. There it might help the 237 review to understand how it impacts the people that use the protocol, 238 and the people whose lives are impacted by the protocol. Since human 239 rights should always be understood from the rightsholder, this 240 approach will improve the understanding of the real world effects of 241 the technology. At the same time, it can be hard to attribute 242 specific changes to a particular protocol, this is of course even 243 harder when a protocol has not been (widely) deployed. 245 3.2.5. Tracing impacts of implementations 247 When an Internet Draft is describing running code that has already 248 been implemented, the code could be analyzed either in an 249 experimental setting or on the Internet where its impact can be 250 observed. Other than reviewing a draft, this allows the reviewer to 251 understand how the document works in practice and potentially also 252 what unknown or unexpected effects the technology might have. 254 3.3. Guidelines for human rights considerations 256 This section provides guidance for document authors in the form of a 257 questionnaire about protocols and their (potential) impact. The 258 questionnaire may be useful at any point in the design process, 259 particularly after document authors have developed a high-level 260 protocol model as described in [RFC4101]. These guidelines do not 261 seek to replace any existing referenced specifications, but rather 262 contribute to them and look at the design process from a human rights 263 perspective. 265 Protocols and Internet Standards might benefit from a documented 266 discussion of potential human rights risks arising from potential 267 misapplications of the protocol or technology described in the RFC. 268 This might be coupled with an Applicability Statement for that RFC. 270 Note that the guidance provided in this section does not recommend 271 specific practices. The range of protocols developed in the IETF is 272 too broad to make recommendations about particular uses of data or 273 how human rights might be balanced against other design goals. 274 However, by carefully considering the answers to the following 275 questions, document authors should be able to produce a comprehensive 276 analysis that can serve as the basis for discussion on whether the 277 protocol adequately takes specific human rights threats into account. 278 This guidance is meant to help the thought process of a human rights 279 analysis; it does not provide specific directions for how to write a 280 human rights considerations section (following the example set in 281 [RFC6973]). 283 In considering these questions, authors will need to be aware of the 284 potential of technical advances or the passage of time to undermine 285 protections. In general, considerations of rights are likely to be 286 more effective if they are considered given a purpose and specific 287 use cases, rather than as abstract absolute goals. 289 Also note that while the section uses the word, 'protocol', the 290 principles identified in these questions may be applicable to other 291 types of solutions (extensions to existing protocols, architecture 292 for solutions to specific problems, etc.). 294 3.3.1. Connectivity 296 Question(s): Does your protocol add application-specific functions to 297 intermediary nodes? Could this functionality be added to end nodes 298 instead of intermediary nodes? Is your protocol optimized for low 299 bandwidth and high latency connections? Could your protocol also be 300 developed in a stateless manner? 302 Explanation: The end-to-end principle [Saltzer] holds that 'the 303 intelligence is end to end rather than hidden in the network' 304 [RFC1958]. Using the end-to-end principle in protocol design is 305 important to ensure the reliability and security of data 306 transmissions. 308 Considering the fact that network quality and conditions vary across 309 geography and time, it is also important to design protocols such 310 that they are reliable even on low bandwidth and high latency 311 connections. [add examples] 313 Example: Middleboxes (which can be Content Delivery Networks, 314 Firewalls, NATs or other intermediary nodes that provide 'services' 315 besides routing) serve many legitimate purposes. However, protocols 316 relying on middleboxes can create potential for abuse, and 317 intentional and unintentional censoring, thereby influencing 318 individuals' ability to communicate online freely and privately. 320 Impacts: 322 - Right to freedom of expression 324 - Right to freedom of assembly and association 326 3.3.2. Privacy 328 Question(s): Did you have a look at the Guidelines in the Privacy 329 Considerations for Internet Protocols [RFC6973] section 7? Does your 330 protocol maintain the confidentiality of metadata? Could your 331 protocol counter traffic analysis? Does your protocol adhere to data 332 minimization principles? Does your document identify potentially 333 sensitive data logged by your protocol and/or for how long that needs 334 to be retained for technical reasons? 336 Explanation: Privacy refers to the right of an entity (normally a 337 person), acting in its own behalf, to determine the degree to which 338 it will interact with its environment, including the degree to which 339 the entity is willing to share its personal information with others. 340 [RFC4949]. If a protocol provides insufficient privacy protection it 341 may have a negative impact on freedom of expression as users self- 342 censor for fear of surveillance, or find themselves unable to express 343 themselves freely. 345 Example: See [RFC6973] 347 Impacts: 349 - Right to freedom of expression 351 - Right to non-discrimination 353 3.3.3. Content agnosticism 355 Question(s): If your protocol impacts packet handling, does it use 356 user data (packet data that is not included in the header)? Is it 357 making decisions based on the payload of the packet? Does your 358 protocol prioritize certain content or services over others in the 359 routing process? Is the protocol transparent about the 360 prioritization that is made (if any)? 362 Explanation: Content agnosticism refers to the notion that network 363 traffic is treated identically regardless of payload, with some 364 exception where it comes to effective traffic handling, for instance 365 where it comes to delay tolerant or delay sensitive packets, based on 366 the header. 368 Example: Content agnosticism prevents payload-based discrimination 369 against packets. This is important because changes to this principle 370 can lead to a two-tiered Internet, where certain packets are 371 prioritized over others on the basis of their content. Effectively 372 this would mean that although all users are entitled to receive their 373 packets at a certain speed, some users become more equal than others. 375 Impacts: 377 - Right to freedom of expression 378 - Right to non-discrimination 380 - Right to equal protection 382 3.3.4. Security 384 Question(s): Did you have a look at Guidelines for Writing RFC Text 385 on Security Considerations [BCP72]? Have you found any attacks that 386 are somewhat related to your protocol yet considered out of scope of 387 your document? Would these attacks be pertinent to the human rights 388 enabling features of the Internet (as described throughout this 389 document)? 391 Explanation: Security is not a single monolithic property of a 392 protocol or system, but rather a series of related but somewhat 393 independent properties. Not all of these properties are required for 394 every application. Since communications are carried out by systems 395 and access to systems is through communications channels, security 396 goals obviously interlock, but they can also be independently 397 provided. [BCP72]. 399 Example: See [BCP72]. 401 Impacts: 403 - Right to freedom of expression 405 - Right to freedom of assembly and association 407 - Right to non-discrimination 409 - Right to security 411 3.3.5. Internationalization 413 Question(s): Does your protocol have text strings that have to be 414 understood or entered by humans? Does your protocol allow Unicode? 415 If so, do you accept texts in one charset (which must be UTF-8), or 416 several (which is dangerous for interoperability)? If character sets 417 or encodings other than UTF-8 are allowed, does your protocol mandate 418 a proper tagging of the charset? Did you have a look at [RFC6365]? 420 Explanation: Internationalization refers to the practice of making 421 protocols, standards, and implementations usable in different 422 languages and scripts (see Localization). In the IETF, 423 internationalization means to add or improve the handling of non- 424 ASCII text in a protocol. [RFC6365] A different perspective, more 425 appropriate to protocols that are designed for global use from the 426 beginning, is the definition used by W3C: 428 "Internationalization is the design and development of a 429 product, application or document content that enables easy 430 localization for target audiences that vary in culture, region, 431 or language." {{W3Ci18nDef}} 433 Many protocols that handle text only handle one charset (US-ASCII), 434 or leave the question of what coded character set and encoding are 435 used up to local guesswork (which leads, of course, to 436 interoperability problems). If multiple charsets are permitted, they 437 must be explicitly identified [RFC2277]. Adding non-ASCII text to a 438 protocol allows the protocol to handle more scripts, hopefully 439 representing users across the world. In today's world, that is 440 normally best accomplished by allowing Unicode encoded in UTF-8 only. 442 In the current IETF policy [RFC2277], internationalization is aimed 443 at user-facing strings, not protocol elements, such as the verbs used 444 by some text-based protocols. (Do note that some strings are both 445 content and protocol elements, such as the identifiers.) If IETF 446 wants the Internet to be a global network of networks, the protocols 447 should work with languages apart from English and character sets 448 apart from Latin characters. It is therefore crucial that at least 449 the content carried by the protocol can be in any script, and that 450 all scripts are treated equally. 452 Example: See localization 454 Impacts: 456 - Right to freedom of expression 458 - Right to political participation 460 - Right to participate in cultural life, arts and science 462 3.3.6. Censorship resistance 464 Question(s): Does your protocol make it apparent or transparent when 465 access to a resource it restricted? Can your protocol contribute to 466 filtering in a way it could be implemented to censor data or 467 services? Could this be designed to ensure this doesn't happen? 468 Does your protocol introduce new identifiers or reuse existing 469 identifiers (e.g. MAC addresses) that might be associated with 470 persons or content? 471 Explanation: Censorship resistance refers to the methods and measures 472 to prevent Internet censorship. See [draft-irtf-pearg-censorship] 473 for a survey of censorship techniques employed across the world, 474 which lays out protocol properties that have been exploited to censor 475 access to information. 477 Example: In the development of the IPv6 protocol, it was discussed to 478 embed a Media Access Control (MAC) address into unique IP addresses. 479 This would make it possible for 'eavesdroppers and other information 480 collectors to identify when different addresses used in different 481 transactions actually correspond to the same node. This is why 482 Privacy Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6 483 have been introduced. [RFC4941] 485 Identifiers of content exposed within a protocol might be used to 486 facilitate censorship, as in the case of Application Layer based 487 censorship, which affects protocols like HTTP. In HTTP, denial or 488 restriction of access can be made apparent by the use of status code 489 451, which allows server operators to operate with greater 490 transparency in circumstances where issues of law or public policy 491 affect their operation [RFC7725]. 493 Impacts: 495 - Right to freedom of expression 497 - Right to political participation 499 - Right to participate in cultural life, arts and science 501 - Right to freedom of assembly and association 503 3.3.7. Open Standards 505 Question(s): Is your protocol fully documented in a way that it could 506 be easily implemented, improved, built upon and/or further developed? 507 Do you depend on proprietary code for the implementation, running or 508 further development of your protocol? Does your protocol favor a 509 particular proprietary specification over technically-equivalent 510 competing specification(s), for instance by making any incorporated 511 vendor specification "required" or "recommended" [RFC2026]? Do you 512 normatively reference another standard that is not available without 513 cost (and could you do without it)? Are you aware of any patents 514 that would prevent your standard from being fully implemented 515 [RFC8179] [RFC6701]? 517 Explanation: The Internet was able to be developed into the global 518 network of networks because of the existence of open, non-proprietary 519 standards [Zittrain]. They are crucial for enabling 520 interoperability. Yet, open standards are not explicitly defined 521 within the IETF. On the subject, [RFC2026] states: "Various national 522 and international standards bodies, such as ANSI, ISO, IEEE, and ITU- 523 T, develop a variety of protocol and service specifications that are 524 similar to Technical Specifications defined at the IETF. National 525 and international groups also publish "implementors' agreements" that 526 are analogous to Applicability Statements, capturing a body of 527 implementation-specific detail concerned with the practical 528 application of their standards. All of these are considered to be 529 "open external standards" for the purposes of the Internet Standards 530 Process." Similarly, [RFC3935] does not define open standards but 531 does emphasize the importance of an "open process", i.e. "any 532 interested person can participate in the work, know what is being 533 decided, and make his or her voice heard on the issue." 535 Open standards are important as they allow for permissionless 536 innovation, which is important to maintain the freedom and ability to 537 freely create and deploy new protocols on top of the communications 538 constructs that currently exist. It is at the heart of the Internet 539 as we know it, and to maintain its fundamentally open nature, we need 540 to be mindful of the need for developing open standards. 542 All standards that need to be normatively implemented should be 543 freely available and with reasonable protection for patent 544 infringement claims, so it can also be implemented in open source or 545 free software. Patents have often held back open standardization or 546 been used against those deploying open standards, particularly in the 547 domain of cryptography [newegg]. An exemption of this is sometimes 548 made when a protocol is standardized that normatively relies on 549 specifications produced by others SDOs that are not freely available. 550 Patents in open standards or in normative references to other 551 standards should have a patent disclosure [notewell], royalty-free 552 licensing [patentpolicy], or some other form of fair, reasonable and 553 non-discriminatory terms. 555 Example: [RFC6108] describes a system for providing critical end-user 556 notifications to web browsers, which has been deployed by Comcast, an 557 Internet Service Provider (ISP). Such a notification system is being 558 used to provide near-immediate notifications to customers, such as to 559 warn them that their traffic exhibits patterns that are indicative of 560 malware or virus infection. There are other proprietary systems that 561 can perform such notifications, but those systems utilize Deep Packet 562 Inspection (DPI) technology. In contrast, that document describes a 563 system that does not rely upon DPI, and is instead based on open IETF 564 standards and open source applications. 566 Impacts: 568 - Right to freedom of expression 570 - Right to participate in cultural life, arts and science 572 3.3.8. Heterogeneity Support 574 Question(s): Does your protocol support heterogeneity by design? 575 Does your protocol allow for multiple types of hardware? Does your 576 protocol allow for multiple types of application protocols? Is your 577 protocol liberal in what it receives and handles? Will it remain 578 usable and open if the context changes? Does your protocol allow 579 there to be well-defined extension points? Do these extension points 580 allow for open innovation? 582 Explanation: The Internet is characterized by heterogeneity on many 583 levels: devices and nodes, router scheduling algorithms and queue 584 management mechanisms, routing protocols, levels of multiplexing, 585 protocol versions and implementations, underlying link layers (e.g., 586 point-to-point, multi-access links, wireless, FDDI, etc.), in the 587 traffic mix and in the levels of congestion at different times and 588 places. Moreover, as the Internet is composed of autonomous 589 organizations and Internet service providers, each with their own 590 separate policy concerns, there is a large heterogeneity of 591 administrative domains and pricing structures. As a result, the 592 heterogeneity principle proposed in [RFC1958] needs to be supported 593 by design [FIArch]. 595 Example: Heterogeneity is inevitable and needs be supported by 596 design. Multiple types of hardware must be allowed for, e.g. 597 transmission speeds differing by at least 7 orders of magnitude, 598 various computer word lengths, and hosts ranging from memory-starved 599 microprocessors up to massively parallel supercomputers. Multiple 600 types of application protocols must be allowed for, ranging from the 601 simplest such as remote login up to the most complex such as commit 602 protocols for distributed databases. [RFC1958]. 604 Impacts: 606 - Right to freedom of expression 608 - Right to political participation 610 3.3.9. Pseudonymity 612 Question(s): Have you considered the Privacy Considerations for 613 Internet Protocols [RFC6973], especially section 6.1.2 ? Does the 614 protocol collect personally derived data? Does the protocol generate 615 or process anything that can be, or be tightly correlated with, 616 personally identifiable information? Does the protocol utilize data 617 that is personally-derived, i.e. derived from the interaction of a 618 single person, or their device or address? Does this protocol 619 generate personally derived data, and if so how will that data be 620 handled? 622 Explanation: Pseudonymity - the ability to use a persistent 623 identifier not linked to one's offline identity - is an important 624 feature for many end-users, as it allows them different degrees of 625 disguised identity and privacy online. 627 Example: While designing a standard that exposes personal data, it is 628 important to consider ways to mitigate the obvious impacts. While 629 pseudonyms cannot be simply reverse engineered - some early 630 approaches simply took approaches such as simple hashing of IP 631 addresses, these could then be simply reversed by generating a hash 632 for each potential IP address and comparing it to the pseudonym - 633 limiting the exposure of personal data remains important. 635 Pseudonymity means using a pseudonym instead of one's "real" name. 636 There are many reasons for users to use pseudonyms, for instance to: 637 hide their gender, protect themselves against harassment, protect 638 their families' privacy, frankly discuss sexuality, or develop a 639 artistic or journalistic persona without repercussions from an 640 employer, (potential) customers, or social surrounding. 641 [geekfeminism] The difference between anonymity and pseudonymity is 642 that a pseudonym often is persistent. "Pseudonymity is strengthened 643 when less personal data can be linked to the pseudonym; when the same 644 pseudonym is used less often and across fewer contexts; and when 645 independently chosen pseudonyms are more frequently used for new 646 actions (making them, from an observer's or attacker's perspective, 647 unlinkable)." [RFC6973] 649 Impacts: 651 - Right to non-discrimination 653 - Right to freedom of assembly and association 655 3.3.10. Accessibility 657 Question(s): Is your protocol designed to provide an enabling 658 environment for people who are not able-bodied? Have you looked at 659 the W3C Web Accessibility Initiative for examples and guidance? 661 Explanation: Sometimes in the design of protocols, websites, web 662 technologies, or web tools, barriers are created that exclude people 663 from using the Web. The Internet should be designed to work for all 664 people, whatever their hardware, software, language, culture, 665 location, or physical or mental ability. When the Internet 666 technologies meet this goal, it will be accessible to people with a 667 diverse range of hearing, movement, sight, and cognitive ability. 668 [W3CAccessibility] 670 Example: The HTML protocol as defined in [HTML5] specifically 671 requires that every image must have an alt attribute (with a few 672 exceptions) to ensure images are accessible for people that cannot 673 themselves decipher non-text content in web pages. 675 Impacts: 677 - Right to non-discrimination 679 - Right to freedom of assembly and association 681 - Right to education 683 - Right to political participation 685 3.3.11. Localization 687 Question(s): Does your protocol uphold the standards of 688 internationalization? Have you made any concrete steps towards 689 localizing your protocol for relevant audiences? 691 Explanation: Localization refers to the adaptation of a product, 692 application or document content to meet the language, cultural and 693 other requirements of a specific target market (a locale) 694 [W3Ci18nDef]. It is also described as the practice of translating an 695 implementation to make it functional in a specific language or for 696 users in a specific locale (see Internationalization). 698 Example: The Internet is a global medium, but many of its protocols 699 and products are developed with a certain audience in mind, that 700 often share particular characteristics like knowing how to read and 701 write in ASCII and knowing English. This limits the ability of a 702 large part of the world's online population from using the Internet 703 in a way that is culturally and linguistically accessible. An 704 example of a protocol that has taken into account the view that 705 individuals like to have access to data in their native language can 706 be found in [RFC5646]. This protocol labels the information content 707 with an identifier for the language in which it is written. And this 708 allows information to be presented in more than one language. 710 Impacts: 712 - Right to non-discrimination 714 - Right to participate in cultural life, arts and science 716 - Right to freedom of expression 718 3.3.12. Decentralization 720 Question(s): Can your protocol be implemented without a single point 721 of control? If applicable, can your protocol be deployed in a 722 federated manner? What is the potential for discrimination against 723 users of your protocol? How can your protocol be used to implicate 724 users? Does your protocol create additional centralized points of 725 control? 727 Explanation: Decentralization is one of the central technical 728 concepts of the architecture of the networks, and embraced as such by 729 the IETF [RFC3935]. It refers to the absence or minimization of 730 centralized points of control, a feature that is assumed to make it 731 easy for new users to join and new uses to unfold [Brown]. It also 732 reduces issues surrounding single points of failure, and distributes 733 the network such that it continues to function even if one or several 734 nodes are disabled. With the commercialization of the Internet in 735 the early 1990s, there has been a slow move away from 736 decentralization, to the detriment of the technical benefits of 737 having a decentralized Internet. 739 Example: The bits traveling the Internet are increasingly susceptible 740 to monitoring and censorship, from both governments and Internet 741 service providers, as well as third (malicious) parties. The ability 742 to monitor and censor is further enabled by the increased 743 centralization of the network that creates central infrastructure 744 points that can be tapped in to. The creation of peer-to-peer 745 networks and the development of voice-over-IP protocols using peer- 746 to-peer technology in combination with distributed hash table (DHT) 747 for scalability are examples of how protocols can preserve 748 decentralization [Pouwelse]. 750 Impacts: 752 - Right to freedom of expression 754 - Right to freedom of assembly and association 756 3.3.13. Reliability 758 Question(s): Is your protocol fault tolerant? Does it downgrade 759 gracefully? Can your protocol resist malicious degradation attempts? 760 Do you have a documented way to announce degradation? Do you have 761 measures in place for recovery or partial healing from failure? Can 762 your protocol maintain dependability and performance in the face of 763 unanticipated changes or circumstances? 765 Explanation: Reliability ensures that a protocol will execute its 766 function consistently and error resistant as described, and function 767 without unexpected result. A system that is reliable degenerates 768 gracefully and will have a documented way to announce degradation. 769 It also has mechanisms to recover from failure gracefully, and if 770 applicable, allow for partial healing. It is important here to draw 771 a distinction between random degradation and malicious degradation. 772 Many current attacks against TLS, for example, exploit TLS' ability 773 to gracefully downgrade to older cipher suites - from a functional 774 perspective, this is good; from a security perspective, this can be 775 very bad. As with confidentiality, the growth of the Internet and 776 fostering innovation in services depends on users having confidence 777 and trust [RFC3724] in the network. For reliability, it is necessary 778 that services notify the users if a delivery fails. In the case of 779 real-time systems in addition to the reliable delivery the protocol 780 needs to safeguard timeliness. 782 Example: In the modern IP stack structure, a reliable transport layer 783 requires an indication that transport processing has successfully 784 completed, such as given by TCP's ACK message [RFC0793], and not 785 simply an indication from the IP layer that the packet arrived. 786 Similarly, an application layer protocol may require an application- 787 specific acknowledgment that contains, among other things, a status 788 code indicating the disposition of the request (See [RFC3724]). 790 Impacts: 792 - Right to freedom of expression 794 - Right to security 796 3.3.14. Confidentiality 798 Question(s): Does this protocol expose information related to 799 identifiers or data? If so, does it do so to each other protocol 800 entity (i.e., recipients, intermediaries, and enablers) [RFC6973]? 801 What options exist for protocol implementers to choose to limit the 802 information shared with each entity? What operational controls are 803 available to limit the information shared with each entity? 804 What controls or consent mechanisms does the protocol define or 805 require before personal data or identifiers are shared or exposed via 806 the protocol? If no such mechanisms or controls are specified, is it 807 expected that control and consent will be handled outside of the 808 protocol? 810 Does the protocol provide ways for initiators to share different 811 pieces of information with different recipients? If not, are there 812 mechanisms that exist outside of the protocol to provide initiators 813 with such control? 815 Does the protocol provide ways for initiators to limit the sharing or 816 express individuals' preferences to recipients or intermediaries with 817 regard to the collection, use, or disclosure of their personal data? 818 If not, are there mechanisms that exist outside of the protocol to 819 provide users with such control? Is it expected that users will have 820 relationships that govern the use of the information (contractual or 821 otherwise) with those who operate these intermediaries? Does the 822 protocol prefer encryption over clear text operation? 824 Explanation: Confidentiality refers to keeping your data secret from 825 unintended listeners [BCP72]. The growth of the Internet depends on 826 users having confidence that the network protects their personal data 827 [RFC1984]. 829 Example: Protocols that do not encrypt their payload make the entire 830 content of the communication available to the idealized attacker 831 along their path. Following the advice in [RFC3365], most such 832 protocols have a secure variant that encrypts the payload for 833 confidentiality, and these secure variants are seeing ever-wider 834 deployment. A noteworthy exception is DNS [RFC1035], as DNSSEC 835 [RFC4033] does not have confidentiality as a requirement. This 836 implies that, in the absence of the use of more recent standards like 837 DNS over TLS [RFC7858] or DNS over HTTPS [RFC8484], all DNS queries 838 and answers generated by the activities of any protocol are available 839 to the attacker. When store-and-forward protocols are used (e.g., 840 SMTP [RFC5321]), intermediaries leave this data subject to 841 observation by an attacker that has compromised these intermediaries, 842 unless the data is encrypted end-to-end by the application-layer 843 protocol or the implementation uses an encrypted store for this data 844 [RFC7624]. 846 Impacts: 848 - Right to privacy 850 - Right to security 852 3.3.15. Integrity 854 Question(s): Does your protocol maintain, assure and/or verify the 855 accuracy of payload data? Does your protocol maintain and assure the 856 consistency of data? Does your protocol in any way allow for the 857 data to be (intentionally or unintentionally) altered? 859 Explanation: Integrity refers to the maintenance and assurance of the 860 accuracy and consistency of data to ensure it has not been 861 (intentionally or unintentionally) altered. 863 Example: Integrity verification of data is important to prevent 864 vulnerabilities and attacks from on-path attackers. These attacks 865 happen when a third party (often for malicious reasons) intercepts a 866 communication between two parties, inserting themselves in the middle 867 changing the content of the data. In practice this looks as follows: 869 Alice wants to communicate with Bob. 870 Corinne forges and sends a message to Bob, impersonating Alice. 871 Bob cannot see the data from Alice was altered by Corinne. 872 Corinne intercepts and alters the communication as it is sent between 873 Alice and Bob. 874 Corinne is able to control the communication content. 876 Impacts: 878 - Right to freedom of expression 880 - Right to security 882 3.3.16. Authenticity 884 Question(s): Do you have sufficient measures to confirm the truth of 885 an attribute of a single piece of data or entity? Can the attributes 886 get garbled along the way (see security)? If relevant, have you 887 implemented IPsec, DNSsec, HTTPS and other Standard Security Best 888 Practices? 890 Explanation: Authenticity ensures that data does indeed come from the 891 source it claims to come from. This is important to prevent certain 892 attacks or unauthorized access and use of data. 894 At the same time, authentication should not be used as a way to 895 prevent heterogeneity support, as is often done for vendor lock-in or 896 digital rights management. 898 Example: Authentication of data is important to prevent 899 vulnerabilities, and attacks from on-path attackers. These attacks 900 happen when a third party (often for malicious reasons) intercepts a 901 communication between two parties, inserting themselves in the middle 902 and posing as both parties. In practice this looks as follows: 904 Alice wants to communicate with Bob. 905 Alice sends data to Bob. 906 Corinne intercepts the data sent to Bob. 907 Corinne reads (and potentially alters) the message to Bob. 908 Bob cannot see the data did not come from Alice but from Corinne. 910 When there is proper authentication the scenario would be as follows: 912 Alice wants to communicate with Bob. 913 Alice sends data to Bob. 914 Corinne intercepts the data sent to Bob. 915 Corinne reads and alters the message to Bob. 916 Bob can see the data did not come from Alice. 918 Impacts: 920 - Right to privacy 922 - Right to freedom of expression 924 - Right to security 926 3.3.17. Adaptability 928 Question(s): Is your protocol written in such a way that is would be 929 easy for other protocols to be developed on top of it, or to interact 930 with it? Does your protocol impact permissionless innovation? (See 931 Connectivity) 933 Explanation: Adaptability is closely interrelated with permissionless 934 innovation: both maintain the freedom and ability to freely create 935 and deploy new protocols on top of the communications constructs that 936 currently exist. It is at the heart of the Internet as we know it, 937 and to maintain its fundamentally open nature, we need to be mindful 938 of the impact of protocols on maintaining or reducing permissionless 939 innovation to ensure the Internet can continue to develop. 941 Example: WebRTC generates audio and/or video data. In order to 942 ensure that WebRTC can be used in different locations by different 943 parties, it is important that standard Javascript APIs are developed 944 to support applications from different voice service providers. 945 Multiple parties will have similar capabilities, in order to ensure 946 that all parties can build upon existing standards these need to be 947 adaptable, and allow for permissionless innovation. 949 Impacts: 951 - Right to education 953 - Freedom of expression 955 - Freedom of assembly and association 957 3.3.18. Outcome Transparency 959 Question(s): Are the effects of your protocol fully and easily 960 comprehensible, including with respect to unintended consequences of 961 protocol choices? 963 Explanation: Certain technical choices may have unintended 964 consequences. 966 Example: Lack of authenticity may lead to lack of integrity and 967 negative externalities, of which spam is an example. Lack of data 968 that could be used for billing and accounting can lead to so-called 969 "free" arrangements which obscure the actual costs and distribution 970 of the costs, for example the barter arrangements that are commonly 971 used for Internet interconnection; and the commercial exploitation of 972 personal data for targeted advertising which is the most common 973 funding model for the so-called "free" services such as search 974 engines and social networks. Other unexpected outcomes might not be 975 technical, but rather architectural, social or economical. 977 Impacts: 979 - Freedom of expression 981 - Privacy 983 - Freedom of assembly and association 985 - Access to information 987 3.3.19. Anonymity 989 Question(s): Does your protocol make use of persistent identifiers? 990 Can it be done without them? Did you have a look at the Privacy 991 Considerations for Internet Protocols [RFC6973], especially section 992 6.1.1 of that document? 994 Explanation: Anonymity refers to the condition of an identity being 995 unknown or concealed [RFC4949]. Even though full anonymity is hard 996 to achieve, it is a non-binary concept. Making pervasive monitoring 997 and tracking harder is important for many users as well as for the 998 IETF [RFC7258]. Achieving a higher level of anonymity is an 999 important feature for many end-users, as it allows them different 1000 degrees of privacy online. Anonymity is an inherent part of the 1001 right to freedom of opinion and expression and the right to privacy. 1002 Avoid adding identifiers, options or configurations that create or 1003 might lead to patterns or regularities that are not explicitly 1004 required by the protocol. 1006 If your protocol collects data and distributes it (see [RFC6235]), 1007 you should anonymize the data, but keep in mind that "anonymizing" 1008 data is notoriously hard. Do not think that just dropping the last 1009 byte of an IP address "anonymizes" data. If your protocol allows for 1010 identity management, there should be a clear barrier between the 1011 identities to ensure that they cannot (easily) be associated with 1012 each other. 1014 Often protocols expose personal data, it is important to consider 1015 ways to mitigate the obvious privacy impacts. A protocol that uses 1016 data that could help identify a sender (items of interest) should be 1017 protected from third parties. For instance, if one wants to hide the 1018 source/destination IP addresses of a packet, the use of IPsec in 1019 tunneling mode (e.g., inside a virtual private network) can be 1020 helpful to protect from third parties likely to eavesdrop packets 1021 exchanged between the tunnel endpoints. 1023 Example: An example is DHCP where sending a persistent identifier as 1024 the client name was not mandatory but, in practice, done by many 1025 implementations, before [RFC7844]. 1027 Impacts: 1029 - Right to non-discrimination 1031 - Right to political participation 1033 - Right to freedom of assembly and association 1035 - Right to security 1037 3.3.20. Misc. considerations 1039 Question(s): Is your document 1041 Explanation: Publication of a particular RFC under a certain status 1042 has consequences. Publication as an Internet Standard as part of the 1043 Standards Track may signal to implementers that the specification has 1044 a certain level of maturity, operational experience, and consensus. 1046 Similarly, publication of a specification an experimental document as 1047 part of the non-standards track would signal to the community that 1048 the document "may be intended for eventual standardization but [may] 1049 not yet [be] ready" for wide deployment. The extent of the 1050 deployment, and consequently its overall impact on end-users, may 1051 depend on the document status presented in the RFC. See [BCP9] and 1052 updates to it for a fuller explanation. 1054 4. Document Status 1056 This RG document is currently documenting best practices and 1057 guidelines for human rights reviews of networking protocols and other 1058 Internet-Drafts and RFCs 1060 5. Acknowledgements 1062 Thanks to: 1064 - Corinne Cath for work on [RFC8280]. 1066 - Theresa Engelhard, Joe Hall, Avri Doria and the hrpc list for 1067 reviews and suggestions. 1069 - Individuals who conducted human rights reviews for their work and 1070 feedback: Amelia Andersdotter, Beatrice Martini, Karan Saini and 1071 Shivan Kaul Sahib. 1073 6. Security Considerations 1075 As this document concerns a research document, there are no security 1076 considerations. 1078 7. IANA Considerations 1080 This document has no actions for IANA. 1082 8. Research Group Information 1084 The discussion list for the IRTF Human Rights Protocol Considerations 1085 Research Group is located at the e-mail address hrpc@ietf.org [1]. 1086 Information on the group and information on how to subscribe to the 1087 list is at https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc [2] 1089 Archives of the list can be found at: https://www.irtf.org/mail- 1090 archive/web/hrpc/current/index.html [3] 1092 9. References 1094 9.1. Informative References 1096 [BCP72] IETF, "Guidelines for Writing RFC Text on Security 1097 Considerations", 2003, 1098 . 1100 [BCP9] Bradner, S. and IETF, "The Internet Standards Process -- 1101 Revision 3", 1996, 1102 . 1104 [Bless] Bless, R. and C. Orwat, "Values and Networks", 2015. 1106 [Brown] Brown, I. and M. Ziewitz, "A Prehistory of Internet 1107 Governance", Research Handbook on Governance of the 1108 Internet. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar. , 2013. 1110 [draft-irtf-pearg-censorship] 1111 Hall, J., Aaron, M., Adams, S., Jones, B., and N. 1112 Feamster, "A Survey of Worldwide Censorship Techniques", 1113 2020, 1114 . 1116 [FIArch] "Future Internet Design Principles", January 2012, 1117 . 1120 [geekfeminism] 1121 Geek Feminism Wiki, "Pseudonymity", 2015, 1122 . 1124 [Hill2014] 1125 Hill, R., "Partial Catalog of Human Rights Related to ICT 1126 Activities", 2014, 1127 . 1129 [HTML5] W3C, "HTML5", 2014, . 1131 [ICCPR] United Nations General Assembly, "International Covenant 1132 on Civil and Political Rights", 1976, 1133 . 1136 [ICESCR] United Nations General Assembly, "International Covenant 1137 on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights", 1966, 1138 . 1141 [IRP] Internet Rights and Principles Dynamic Coalition, "10 1142 Internet Rights & Principles", 2014, 1143 . 1147 [newegg] Mullin, J., "Newegg on trial: Mystery company TQP rewrites 1148 the history of encryption", 2013, . 1152 [notewell] 1153 IETF, "Note Well", 2015, 1154 . 1156 [patentpolicy] 1157 W3C, "W3C Patent Policy", 2004, 1158 . 1160 [Penney] Penney, J., "Chilling Effects: Online Surveillance and 1161 Wikipedia Use", 2016, . 1164 [Pouwelse] 1165 Pouwelse, Ed, J., "Media without censorship", 2012, 1166 . 1169 [RFC0793] Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7, 1170 RFC 793, DOI 10.17487/RFC0793, September 1981, 1171 . 1173 [RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and 1174 specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035, 1175 November 1987, . 1177 [RFC1958] Carpenter, B., Ed., "Architectural Principles of the 1178 Internet", RFC 1958, DOI 10.17487/RFC1958, June 1996, 1179 . 1181 [RFC1984] IAB and IESG, "IAB and IESG Statement on Cryptographic 1182 Technology and the Internet", BCP 200, RFC 1984, 1183 DOI 10.17487/RFC1984, August 1996, 1184 . 1186 [RFC2026] Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision 1187 3", BCP 9, RFC 2026, DOI 10.17487/RFC2026, October 1996, 1188 . 1190 [RFC2277] Alvestrand, H., "IETF Policy on Character Sets and 1191 Languages", BCP 18, RFC 2277, DOI 10.17487/RFC2277, 1192 January 1998, . 1194 [RFC3365] Schiller, J., "Strong Security Requirements for Internet 1195 Engineering Task Force Standard Protocols", BCP 61, 1196 RFC 3365, DOI 10.17487/RFC3365, August 2002, 1197 . 1199 [RFC3724] Kempf, J., Ed., Austein, R., Ed., and IAB, "The Rise of 1200 the Middle and the Future of End-to-End: Reflections on 1201 the Evolution of the Internet Architecture", RFC 3724, 1202 DOI 10.17487/RFC3724, March 2004, 1203 . 1205 [RFC3935] Alvestrand, H., "A Mission Statement for the IETF", 1206 BCP 95, RFC 3935, DOI 10.17487/RFC3935, October 2004, 1207 . 1209 [RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. 1210 Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", 1211 RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005, 1212 . 1214 [RFC4101] Rescorla, E. and IAB, "Writing Protocol Models", RFC 4101, 1215 DOI 10.17487/RFC4101, June 2005, 1216 . 1218 [RFC4941] Narten, T., Draves, R., and S. Krishnan, "Privacy 1219 Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in 1220 IPv6", RFC 4941, DOI 10.17487/RFC4941, September 2007, 1221 . 1223 [RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", 1224 FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007, 1225 . 1227 [RFC5321] Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321, 1228 DOI 10.17487/RFC5321, October 2008, 1229 . 1231 [RFC5646] Phillips, A., Ed. and M. Davis, Ed., "Tags for Identifying 1232 Languages", BCP 47, RFC 5646, DOI 10.17487/RFC5646, 1233 September 2009, . 1235 [RFC6108] Chung, C., Kasyanov, A., Livingood, J., Mody, N., and B. 1236 Van Lieu, "Comcast's Web Notification System Design", 1237 RFC 6108, DOI 10.17487/RFC6108, February 2011, 1238 . 1240 [RFC6235] Boschi, E. and B. Trammell, "IP Flow Anonymization 1241 Support", RFC 6235, DOI 10.17487/RFC6235, May 2011, 1242 . 1244 [RFC6365] Hoffman, P. and J. Klensin, "Terminology Used in 1245 Internationalization in the IETF", BCP 166, RFC 6365, 1246 DOI 10.17487/RFC6365, September 2011, 1247 . 1249 [RFC6701] Farrel, A. and P. Resnick, "Sanctions Available for 1250 Application to Violators of IETF IPR Policy", RFC 6701, 1251 DOI 10.17487/RFC6701, August 2012, 1252 . 1254 [RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J., 1255 Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy 1256 Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973, 1257 DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013, 1258 . 1260 [RFC7258] Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an 1261 Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May 1262 2014, . 1264 [RFC7624] Barnes, R., Schneier, B., Jennings, C., Hardie, T., 1265 Trammell, B., Huitema, C., and D. Borkmann, 1266 "Confidentiality in the Face of Pervasive Surveillance: A 1267 Threat Model and Problem Statement", RFC 7624, 1268 DOI 10.17487/RFC7624, August 2015, 1269 . 1271 [RFC7725] Bray, T., "An HTTP Status Code to Report Legal Obstacles", 1272 RFC 7725, DOI 10.17487/RFC7725, February 2016, 1273 . 1275 [RFC7844] Huitema, C., Mrugalski, T., and S. Krishnan, "Anonymity 1276 Profiles for DHCP Clients", RFC 7844, 1277 DOI 10.17487/RFC7844, May 2016, 1278 . 1280 [RFC7858] Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D., 1281 and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport 1282 Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May 1283 2016, . 1285 [RFC8179] Bradner, S. and J. Contreras, "Intellectual Property 1286 Rights in IETF Technology", BCP 79, RFC 8179, 1287 DOI 10.17487/RFC8179, May 2017, 1288 . 1290 [RFC8280] ten Oever, N. and C. Cath, "Research into Human Rights 1291 Protocol Considerations", RFC 8280, DOI 10.17487/RFC8280, 1292 October 2017, . 1294 [RFC8484] Hoffman, P. and P. McManus, "DNS Queries over HTTPS 1295 (DoH)", RFC 8484, DOI 10.17487/RFC8484, October 2018, 1296 . 1298 [Saltzer] Saltzer, J., Reed, D., and D. Clark, "End-to-End Arguments 1299 in System Design", ACM TOCS, Vol 2, Number 4, November 1300 1984, pp 277-288. , 1984. 1302 [UDHR] United Nations General Assembly, "The Universal 1303 Declaration of Human Rights", 1948, 1304 . 1306 [UNHRC2016] 1307 United Nations Human Rights Council, "UN Human Rights 1308 Council Resolution "The promotion, protection and 1309 enjoyment of human rights on the Internet" (A/HRC/32/ 1310 L.20)", 2016, . 1314 [W3CAccessibility] 1315 W3C, "Accessibility", 2015, 1316 . 1318 [W3Ci18nDef] 1319 W3C, "Localization vs. Internationalization", 2010, 1320 . 1322 [Zittrain] 1323 Zittrain, J., "The Future of the Internet - And How to 1324 Stop It", Yale University Press , 2008, 1325 . 1328 9.2. URIs 1330 [1] mailto:hrpc@ietf.org 1332 [2] https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc 1334 [3] https://www.irtf.org/mail-archive/web/hrpc/current/index.html 1336 Authors' Addresses 1338 Gurshabad Grover 1339 Centre for Internet and Society 1341 EMail: gurshabad@cis-india.org 1343 Niels ten Oever 1344 University of Amsterdam 1346 EMail: mail@nielstenoever.net