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Checking references for intended status: Informational ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 2616 (Obsoleted by RFC 7230, RFC 7231, RFC 7232, RFC 7233, RFC 7234, RFC 7235) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 2818 (Obsoleted by RFC 9110) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 5751 (Obsoleted by RFC 8551) Summary: 3 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 2 warnings (==), 1 comment (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group J. Abley 3 Internet-Draft Dyn, Inc. 4 Intended status: Informational J. Schlyter 5 Expires: October 09, 2015 Kirei 6 G. Bailey 7 Microsoft 8 April 07, 2015 10 DNSSEC Trust Anchor Publication for the Root Zone 11 draft-jabley-dnssec-trust-anchor-11 13 Abstract 15 The root zone of the Domain Name System (DNS) has been 16 cryptographically signed using DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC). 18 In order to obtain secure answers from the root zone of the DNS using 19 DNSSEC, a client must configure a suitable trust anchor. This 20 document describes how such trust anchors are published. 22 Status of This Memo 24 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 25 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 27 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 28 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 29 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 30 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 32 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 33 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 34 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 35 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 37 This Internet-Draft will expire on October 09, 2015. 39 Copyright Notice 41 Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 42 document authors. All rights reserved. 44 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 45 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 46 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 47 publication of this document. Please review these documents 48 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 49 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 50 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 51 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 52 described in the Simplified BSD License. 54 Table of Contents 56 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 57 2. Root Zone Trust Anchor Publication . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 58 2.1. XML . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 59 2.2. Certificate Signing Request (PKCS#10) . . . . . . . . . . 4 60 3. Root Zone Trust Anchor Retrieval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 61 3.1. HTTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 62 3.2. HTTP Over TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 63 3.3. Signature Verification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 64 4. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 65 4.1. HTTP Over TLS Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 66 4.2. XML Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 67 4.3. Trust Anchor Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 68 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 69 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 70 7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 71 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 72 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 73 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 74 Appendix A. Trust Anchor Publication Document Schema . . . . . . 10 75 Appendix B. Example Signed Trust Anchor Set . . . . . . . . . . 11 76 Appendix C. ASN.1 Module for DNS Resource Record . . . . . . . . 12 77 Appendix D. Historical Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 78 Appendix E. About this Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 79 E.1. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 80 E.2. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 81 E.2.1. draft-jabley-dnssec-trust-anchor-00 . . . . . . . . . 13 82 E.2.2. draft-jabley-dnssec-trust-anchor-01 . . . . . . . . . 13 83 E.2.3. draft-jabley-dnssec-trust-anchor-02 . . . . . . . . . 14 84 E.2.4. draft-jabley-dnssec-trust-anchor-04 . . . . . . . . . 14 85 E.2.5. draft-jabley-dnssec-trust-anchor-05 . . . . . . . . . 14 86 E.2.6. draft-jabley-dnssec-trust-anchor-06 . . . . . . . . . 14 87 E.2.7. draft-jabley-dnssec-trust-anchor-07 . . . . . . . . . 14 88 E.2.8. draft-jabley-dnssec-trust-anchor-10 . . . . . . . . . 14 89 E.2.9. draft-jabley-dnssec-trust-anchor-11 . . . . . . . . . 14 90 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 92 1. Introduction 94 The Domain Name System (DNS) is described in [RFC1034] and [RFC1035]. 95 Security extensions to the DNS (DNSSEC) are described in [RFC4033], 96 [RFC4034], [RFC4035], [RFC4509], [RFC5155] and [RFC5702]. 98 A discussion of operational practices relating to DNSSEC can be found 99 in [RFC6781]. 101 In the DNSSEC protocol, resource record sets (RRSets) are signed 102 cryptographically. This means that a response to a query contains 103 signatures that allow the integrity and authenticity of the RRSet to 104 be verified. Signatures are validated by following a chain of 105 signatures to a key called a "trust anchor". The reason for trusting 106 such a key is outside the DNSSEC protocol, but having one or more 107 trust anchors is required for the DNSSEC protocol to work. 109 The publication of trust anchors for the root zone of the DNS is an 110 IANA function performed by ICANN. A detailed description of 111 corresponding key management practices can be found in [DPS], which 112 can be retrieved from the IANA Repository [IANA-DNSSEC-INFO]. 114 This document describes the distribution of the DNSSEC trust anchors 115 from IANA. This document is concerned only with the distribution of 116 trust anchors for the root zone, although the data formats and the 117 publication and retrieval methods described here can be adapted for 118 other uses. 120 The protocol described in this document is not a substitute for the 121 automated DNSSEC trust anchor update protocol described in [RFC5011]. 122 That protocol allows for secure in-band succession of trust anchors 123 when trust has already been established. The protocol described in 124 this document allows a trust anchor to initially be established out- 125 of-band, possibly relying on trusted out-of-band authorities. Thus, 126 this document and [RFC5011] are complimentary protocols. 128 2. Root Zone Trust Anchor Publication 130 Trust anchors for the root zone are published in two formats, each of 131 which is described in this document: 133 o as the hashes of the corresponding DNSKEY records, consistent with 134 the defined presentation format of Delegation Signer (DS) resource 135 records [RFC4034], contained within an XML document, as described 136 in Section 2.1, and 138 o as Certificate Signing Requests (CSRs) in PKCS#10 format [RFC2986] 139 for further processing by other entities such as Certification 140 Authorities and validation of proof of possession of the 141 corresponding private keys, as described in Section 2.2. 143 2.1. XML 145 Trust anchors are published in an XML document whose schema is 146 described in Appendix A. The document contains a complete set of 147 trust anchors for the root zone, including anchors suitable for 148 immediate use and also historical data. Each trust anchor optionally 149 includes one or more Certificate elements, with Uniform Resource 150 Locators (URLs) for retrieving corresponding X.509 certificates. 152 Examples of trust anchors packaged and signed for publication can be 153 found in Appendix B. 155 2.2. Certificate Signing Request (PKCS#10) 157 To facilitate signing the trust anchor by a public key 158 infrastructure, trust anchors are also published as Certificate 159 Signing Requests (CSRs) in PKCS#10 format [RFC2986]. 161 Each CSR will have a Subject with following attributes: 163 O: the string "ICANN". 165 OU: the string "IANA". 167 CN: the string "Root Zone KSK" followed by the time and date of key 168 generation in the format specified in [RFC3339], e.g. "Root Zone 169 KSK 2010-06-16T21:19:24+00:00". 171 resourceRecord: the hash of the public key consistent with the 172 presentation format of the Delegation Signer (DS) [RFC4034] 173 resource record (see Appendix C for attribute definition). 175 3. Root Zone Trust Anchor Retrieval 177 3.1. HTTP 179 Trust anchors are available for retrieval using HTTP [RFC2616]. 181 The URL for retrieving the CSR is , with "key-label" replaced by the key label of the 183 corresponding KSK. 185 The URL for retrieving a signed X.509 certificate is , with "key-label" again 187 replaced as described above. 189 The URL for retrieving the complete trust anchor set is available 190 from [TA-HTTP-XML]. 192 The URL for a detached S/MIME [RFC5751] signature for the current 193 trust anchor set, in XML format, is available from [TA-HTTP-SMIME]. 195 The URL for a detached OpenPGP [RFC4880] signature for the current 196 trust anchor set, in XML format, is available from [TA-HTTP-PGP]. 198 3.2. HTTP Over TLS 200 Trust anchors are available for retrieval using HTTP over TLS 201 [RFC2818]. 203 The URLs specified in Section 3.1 are also available using HTTPS. 204 That is: 206 The URL for retrieving the CSR is , with "key-label" replaced by the key label of the 208 corresponding KSK. 210 The URL for retrieving a signed X.509 certificate is , with "key-label" again 212 replaced as described above. 214 The URL for retrieving the complete trust anchor set available from 215 [TA-HTTPS-XML]. 217 The URL for a detached S/MIME [RFC5751] signature for the current 218 trust anchor set is available from [TA-HTTPS-SMIME]. 220 The URL for a detached OpenPGP [RFC4880] signature for the current 221 trust anchor set is available from [TA-HTTPS-PGP]. 223 TLS sessions are authenticated with certificates presented from the 224 server. No client certificate verification is performed. The 225 certificate presented by the server is chosen such that it can be 226 trusted using an X.509 trust anchor that is believed to be well- 227 known, e.g. one that corresponds to a WebTrust-accredited Certificate 228 Authority. Other TLS authentication mechanisms may be considered in 229 the future. 231 3.3. Signature Verification 233 The OpenPGP [RFC4880] keys used to sign trust anchor documents carry 234 signatures from personal keys of staff who are able to personally 235 attest to their validity. Those staff members will continue to make 236 their personal keys freely available for examination by third 237 parties, e.g. by way of PGP key parties at operator and IETF 238 meetings. In this fashion a diverse set of paths through the PGP web 239 of trust will be maintained to the trust anchor PGP keys. 241 An OpenPGP keyring containing public keys pertinent to signature 242 verification is published at [ICANN-PGP]. The public keys on that 243 keyring will also be distributed widely, e.g. to public PGP key 244 servers. 246 Certificates used to create S/MIME [RFC5751] signatures for the 247 current trust anchor set, in XML format, are signed by a Certificate 248 Authority (CA) administered by ICANN as the IANA functions operator 249 and also optionally by well-known (e.g. WebTrust-certified) CAs to 250 facilitate signature validation with widely-available X.509 trust 251 anchors. 253 4. Implementation Considerations 255 Note: This non-normative section gives suggestions for implementing 256 root zone trust anchor retrieval. 258 Root trust anchor retrieval by the HTTP or HTTP over TLS transports 259 has several implementation considerations to ensure robustness, 260 usability and secure operation. 262 4.1. HTTP Over TLS Transport 264 The HTTP over TLS transport [RFC2818] is suggested instead of using 265 the unencrypted HTTP transport [RFC2616] for implementations that use 266 the XML-format root trust anchors, since the latter transport does 267 not provide authentication. It is not suggested that implementations 268 restrict certification path validation of the HTTP over TLS transport 269 session to the current or historical certificate authorities used by 270 the root trust anchor server, since doing so would reduce robustness 271 of the implementation. It is suggested that the implementation 272 configure the HTTP over TLS transport library to: validate the 273 certification path against certificate revocation lists [RFC5280], 274 and/or with the online certificate status protocol [RFC6960]; and 275 reject self-signed certificates and certification paths that do not 276 terminate in a trusted certificate authority. 278 Implementations can allow configuration of the URL used to retrieve 279 the root trust anchor resources, but it is suggested that the default 280 configuration use the URLs specified in Section 3.2. 282 4.2. XML Validation 283 Implementations may perform strict validation of the retrieved XML 284 document against the XML schema; however, such an implementation 285 would not be robust against future changes in the XML schema. It is 286 suggested that the implementation perform "loose" validation, where 287 unknown attributes and elements are ignored. This suggestion allows 288 for future additions to the XML schema without affecting existing 289 implementations. 291 4.3. Trust Anchor Validation 293 The implementation can ignore trust anchors for which the Algorithm 294 or DigestType elements refer to an unknown, or unsupported algorithm. 295 Additionally, trust anchors for which the Algorithm or DigestType 296 elements refer to a deprecated algorithm can be ignored, provided 297 that this suggestion does not cause all trust anchors to be ignored. 298 Further, note that these suggestions may not apply where an 299 implementation shares trust anchors between many DNS validating 300 resolvers, since the set of supported algorithms may vary between 301 resolvers, and could possibly be disjoint. 303 The implementation can also ignore a trust anchor when the validUntil 304 time, if present, is in the past. If the implementation also 305 supports automated updates of trust anchors [RFC5011], it can ignore 306 trust anchors where the current time subtracted from the validFrom 307 time, if present, is greater than the add-hold down time [RFC5011] 308 for the trust point. 310 The implementation can reject any trust anchor for a trust point 311 other than the root zone. 313 5. IANA Considerations 315 Key Signing Key (KSK) management for the root zone is an IANA 316 function. This document describes an initial set of publication 317 mechanisms for trust anchors related to that management. In the 318 future, additional publication schemes may also be made available, in 319 which case they will be described in a new document that updates this 320 one. 322 Existing mechanisms will not be deprecated without very strong 323 technical justification. 325 This document serves as the reference for id-mod-dns-resource-record, 326 value 70, in the SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier registry. 328 6. Security Considerations 329 This document describes how DNSSEC trust anchors for the root zone of 330 the DNS are published. It is to be expected that many DNSSEC clients 331 will only configure IANA-issued trust anchors to perform validation, 332 and that the trust anchors they use will be those of the root zone. 333 As a consequence, reliable publication of trust anchors is important. 335 This document aims to specify carefully the means by which such trust 336 anchors are published, as an aid to the formats and retrieval methods 337 described here being integrated usefully into user environments. 339 7. Acknowledgements 341 Many pioneers paved the way for the deployment of DNSSEC in the root 342 zone of the DNS, and the authors hereby acknowledge their substantial 343 collective contribution. 345 This document incorporates suggestions made by Paul Hoffman and 346 Alfred Hoenes, whose contributions are appreciated. 348 8. References 350 8.1. Normative References 352 [RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities", 353 STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987. 355 [RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and 356 specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987. 358 [RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H., 359 Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext 360 Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999. 362 [RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000. 364 [RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification 365 Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986, 366 November 2000. 368 [RFC3339] Klyne, G., Ed. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the 369 Internet: Timestamps", RFC 3339, July 2002. 371 [RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. 372 Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC 373 4033, March 2005. 375 [RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. 376 Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", 377 RFC 4034, March 2005. 379 [RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. 380 Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security 381 Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005. 383 [RFC4509] Hardaker, W., "Use of SHA-256 in DNSSEC Delegation Signer 384 (DS) Resource Records (RRs)", RFC 4509, May 2006. 386 [RFC4880] Callas, J., Donnerhacke, L., Finney, H., Shaw, D., and R. 387 Thayer, "OpenPGP Message Format", RFC 4880, November 2007. 389 [RFC5011] StJohns, M., "Automated Updates of DNS Security (DNSSEC) 390 Trust Anchors", STD 74, RFC 5011, September 2007. 392 [RFC5155] Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS 393 Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of 394 Existence", RFC 5155, March 2008. 396 [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., 397 Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key 398 Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List 399 (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008. 401 [RFC5702] Jansen, J., "Use of SHA-2 Algorithms with RSA in DNSKEY 402 and RRSIG Resource Records for DNSSEC", RFC 5702, October 403 2009. 405 [RFC5751] Ramsdell, B. and S. Turner, "Secure/Multipurpose Internet 406 Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2 Message 407 Specification", RFC 5751, January 2010. 409 [RFC6781] Kolkman, O., Mekking, W., and R. Gieben, "DNSSEC 410 Operational Practices, Version 2", RFC 6781, December 411 2012. 413 [RFC6960] Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., 414 Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key 415 Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", 416 RFC 6960, June 2013. 418 8.2. Informative References 420 [DPS] Ljunggren, F., Okubo, T., Lamb, R., and J. Schlyter, 421 "DNSSEC Practice Statement for the Root Zone KSK 422 Operator", May 2010. 424 [IANA-DNSSEC-INFO] 425 , "IANA DNSSEC Information", , . 428 [ICANN-PGP] 429 , "ICANN PGP Keys", , 430 . 432 [TA-HTTP-PGP] 433 , "Root DNSSEC Trust Anchors (OpenPGP)", , 434 . 436 [TA-HTTP-SMIME] 437 , "Root DNSSEC Trust Anchors (S/MIME)", , 438 . 440 [TA-HTTP-XML] 441 , "Root DNSSEC Trust Anchors (XML)", , 442 . 444 [TA-HTTPS-PGP] 445 , "Root DNSSEC Trust Anchors (OpenPGP)", , . 448 [TA-HTTPS-SMIME] 449 , "Root DNSSEC Trust Anchors (S/MIME)", , . 452 [TA-HTTPS-XML] 453 , "Root DNSSEC Trust Anchors (XML)", , . 456 [root-anchors] 457 , "DNSSEC Trust Anchors", , . 460 Appendix A. Trust Anchor Publication Document Schema 462 A Relax NG Compact Schema for the documents used to publish trust 463 anchors can be found in Figure 1. 465 datatypes xsd = "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-datatypes" 467 start = element TrustAnchor { 468 attribute id { xsd:string }, 469 attribute source { xsd:string }, 470 element Zone { xsd:string }, 472 keydigest+ 473 } 475 keydigest = element KeyDigest { 476 attribute id { xsd:string }, 477 attribute validFrom { xsd:dateTime }, 478 attribute validUntil { xsd:dateTime }?, 480 element KeyTag { 481 xsd:nonNegativeInteger { maxInclusive = "65535" } }, 482 element Algorithm { 483 xsd:nonNegativeInteger { maxInclusive = "255" } }, 484 element DigestType { 485 xsd:nonNegativeInteger { maxInclusive = "255" } }, 486 element Digest { xsd:hexBinary }, 488 element Certificate { 489 attribute source { xsd:string }, 490 empty 491 }+ 492 } 494 Figure 1 496 Appendix B. Example Signed Trust Anchor Set 498 Figure 2 describes two trust anchors for the root zone such as might 499 be retrieved from [root-anchors]. 501 503 507 . 509 512 34291 513 5 514 1 515 c8cb3d7fe518835490af8029c23efbce6b6ef3e2 516 518 520 12345 521 5 522 1 523 a3cf809dbdbc835716ba22bdc370d2efa50f21c7 524 526 528 530 532 Figure 2 534 Appendix C. ASN.1 Module for DNS Resource Record 536 ResourceRecord 537 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) 538 mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-dns-resource-record(70) } 540 DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= 542 BEGIN 544 -- EXPORTS ALL -- 546 IMPORTS 548 caseIgnoreMatch FROM SelectedAttributeTypes 549 { joint-iso-itu-t ds(5) module(1) selectedAttributeTypes(5) 4 } 551 ; 553 iana OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) 554 dod(6) internet(1) private(4) enterprise(1) 1000 } 556 iana-dns OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iana 53 } 557 resourceRecord ATTRIBUTE ::= { 558 WITH SYNTAX IA5String 559 EQUALITY MATCHING RULE caseIgnoreIA5Match 560 ID iana-dns 561 } 563 END 565 Appendix D. Historical Note 567 The first KSK for use in the root zone of the DNS was generated at a 568 key ceremony at an ICANN Key Management Facility (KMF) in Culpeper, 569 Virginia, USA on 2010-06-16. This key entered production during a 570 second key ceremony held at an ICANN KMF in El Segundo, California, 571 USA on 2010-07-12. The resulting trust anchor was first published on 572 2010-07-15. 574 Appendix E. About this Document 576 [RFC Editor: please remove this section, including all subsections, 577 prior to publication.] 579 E.1. Discussion 581 This document is not the product of any IETF working group. However, 582 communities interested in similar technical work can be found at the 583 IETF in the DNSOP and DNSEXT working groups. 585 The team responsible for deployment of DNSSEC in the root zone can be 586 reached at rootsign@icann.org. 588 The authors also welcome feedback sent to them directly. 590 E.2. Document History 592 E.2.1. draft-jabley-dnssec-trust-anchor-00 594 This document is based on earlier documentation used within and 595 published by the team responsible for DNSSEC deployment in the root 596 zone. This is the first revision circulated with the intention of 597 publication in the RFC series. 599 E.2.2. draft-jabley-dnssec-trust-anchor-01 601 Incorporated initial community suggestions. Editorial improvements. 602 Allocate OID and clean up syntax of ASN.1 module. 604 E.2.3. draft-jabley-dnssec-trust-anchor-02 606 Draft expired. 608 E.2.4. draft-jabley-dnssec-trust-anchor-04 610 Added the optional element to the XML schema to provide 611 a mechanism for locating external X.509 certificates relating to a 612 particular key. 614 E.2.5. draft-jabley-dnssec-trust-anchor-05 616 Update author address. 618 E.2.6. draft-jabley-dnssec-trust-anchor-06 620 Update references. 622 E.2.7. draft-jabley-dnssec-trust-anchor-07 624 Minor changes based on review by Paul Hoffman. 626 E.2.8. draft-jabley-dnssec-trust-anchor-10 628 Incorporate additional suggestions by Paul Hoffman. Add 629 consideration for OCSP to Implementation Considerations. 631 E.2.9. draft-jabley-dnssec-trust-anchor-11 633 Draft expired. 635 Authors' Addresses 637 Joe Abley 638 Dyn, Inc. 639 470 Moore Street 640 London, ON N6C 2C2 641 Canada 643 Phone: +1 519 670 9327 644 Email: jabley@dyn.com 646 Jakob Schlyter 647 Kirei AB 649 Email: jakob@kirei.se 650 Guillaume Bailey 651 Microsoft Corporation 652 One Microsoft Way 653 Redmond, WA 98052 654 US 656 Phone: +1 425 538 6153 x86153 657 Email: gubailey@microsoft.com