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Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 ACE Working Group M. Jones 3 Internet-Draft Microsoft 4 Intended status: Standards Track L. Seitz 5 Expires: January 1, 2018 RISE SICS 6 G. Selander 7 Ericsson AB 8 E. Wahlstroem 10 S. Erdtman 11 Spotify AB 12 H. Tschofenig 13 ARM Ltd. 14 June 30, 2017 16 Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs) 17 draft-jones-ace-cwt-proof-of-possession-01 19 Abstract 21 This specification describes how to declare in a CBOR Web Token (CWT) 22 that the presenter of the CWT possesses a particular proof-of- 23 possession key. Being able to prove possession of a key is also 24 sometimes described as the presenter being a holder-of-key. This 25 specification provides equivalent functionality to "Proof-of- 26 Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)" (RFC 7800), but 27 using CBOR and CWTs rather than JSON and JWTs. 29 Status of This Memo 31 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 32 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 34 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 35 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 36 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 37 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 39 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 40 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 41 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 42 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 44 This Internet-Draft will expire on January 1, 2018. 46 Copyright Notice 48 Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 49 document authors. All rights reserved. 51 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 52 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 53 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 54 publication of this document. Please review these documents 55 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 56 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 57 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 58 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 59 described in the Simplified BSD License. 61 Table of Contents 63 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 64 1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 65 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 66 3. Representations for Proof-of-Possession Keys . . . . . . . . 3 67 3.1. Confirmation Claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 68 3.2. Representation of an Asymmetric Proof-of-Possession Key . 5 69 3.3. Representation of an Encrypted Symmetric Proof-of- 70 Possession Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 71 3.4. Representation of a Key ID for a Proof-of-Possession Key 6 72 3.5. Specifics Intentionally Not Specified . . . . . . . . . . 7 73 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 74 5. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 75 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 76 6.1. CBOR Web Token Claims Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 9 77 6.1.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 78 6.2. CWT Confirmation Methods Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 79 6.2.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 80 6.2.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 81 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 82 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 83 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 84 Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 85 Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 86 Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 87 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 89 1. Introduction 91 This specification describes how a CBOR Web Token [CWT] can declare 92 that the presenter of the CWT possesses a particular proof-of- 93 possession (PoP) key. Proof of possession of a key is also sometimes 94 described as the presenter being a holder-of-key. This specification 95 provides equivalent functionality to "Proof-of-Possession Key 96 Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)" [RFC7800], but using CBOR 97 [RFC7049] and CWTs [CWT] rather than JSON [RFC7159] and JWTs [JWT]. 99 1.1. Notational Conventions 101 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 102 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 103 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in 104 [RFC2119]. 106 Unless otherwise noted, all the protocol parameter names and values 107 are case sensitive. 109 2. Terminology 111 This specification uses terms defined in the CBOR Web Token [CWT], 112 [I-D.ietf-cose-msg], and Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) 113 [RFC7049] specifications. 115 These terms are defined by this specification: 117 Issuer 118 Party that creates the CWT and binds the proof-of-possession key 119 to it. 121 Presenter 122 Party that proves possession of a private key (for asymmetric key 123 cryptography) or secret key (for symmetric key cryptography) to a 124 recipient. 126 Recipient 127 Party that receives the CWT containing the proof-of-possession key 128 information from the presenter. 130 3. Representations for Proof-of-Possession Keys 132 By including a "cnf" (confirmation) claim in a CWT, the issuer of the 133 CWT declares that the presenter possesses a particular key and that 134 the recipient can cryptographically confirm that the presenter has 135 possession of that key. The value of the "cnf" claim is a CBOR map 136 and the members of that map identify the proof-of-possession key. 138 The presenter can be identified in one of several ways by the CWT 139 depending upon the application requirements. If the CWT contains a 140 "sub" (subject) claim [CWT], the presenter is normally the subject 141 identified by the CWT. (In some applications, the subject identifier 142 will be relative to the issuer identified by the "iss" (issuer) claim 143 [CWT].) If the CWT contains no "sub" claim, the presenter is 144 normally the issuer identified by the CWT using the "iss" claim. The 145 case in which the presenter is the subject of the CWT is analogous to 146 Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 2.0 147 [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] SubjectConfirmation usage. At least one of 148 the "sub" and "iss" claims is typically present in the CWT and some 149 use cases may require that both be present. 151 3.1. Confirmation Claim 153 The "cnf" claim is used in the CWT to contain members used to 154 identify the proof-of-possession key. Other members of the "cnf" map 155 may be defined because a proof-of-possession key may not be the only 156 means of confirming the authenticity of the token. This is analogous 157 to the SAML 2.0 [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] SubjectConfirmation element 158 in which a number of different subject confirmation methods can be 159 included (including proof-of-possession key information). 161 The set of confirmation members that a CWT must contain to be 162 considered valid is context dependent and is outside the scope of 163 this specification. Specific applications of CWTs will require 164 implementations to understand and process some confirmation members 165 in particular ways. However, in the absence of such requirements, 166 all confirmation members that are not understood by implementations 167 MUST be ignored. 169 This specification establishes the IANA "CWT Confirmation Methods" 170 registry for these members in Section 6.2 and registers the members 171 defined by this specification. Other specifications can register 172 other members used for confirmation, including other members for 173 conveying proof-of-possession keys using different key 174 representations. 176 The "cnf" claim value MUST represent only a single proof-of- 177 possession key; thus, at most one of the "COSE_Key" and 178 "Encrypted_COSE_Key" confirmation values defined below may be 179 present. Note that if an application needs to represent multiple 180 proof-of-possession keys in the same CWT, one way for it to achieve 181 this is to use other claim names, in addition to "cnf", to hold the 182 additional proof-of-possession key information. These claims could 183 use the same syntax and semantics as the "cnf" claim. Those claims 184 would be defined by applications or other specifications and could be 185 registered in the IANA "CBOR Web Token Claims" registry 186 [IANA.CWT.Claims]. 188 3.2. Representation of an Asymmetric Proof-of-Possession Key 190 When the key held by the presenter is an asymmetric private key, the 191 "COSE_Key" member is a COSE_Key [I-D.ietf-cose-msg] representing the 192 corresponding asymmetric public key. The following example (using 193 JSON notation) demonstrates such a declaration in the CWT Claims Set 194 of a CWT: 196 { 197 "iss": "https://server.example.com", 198 "aud": "https://client.example.org", 199 "exp": 1361398824, 200 "cnf":{ 201 "COSE_Key":{ 202 "kty": "EC", 203 "crv": "P-256", 204 "x": "18wHLeIgW9wVN6VD1Txgpqy2LszYkMf6J8njVAibvhM", 205 "y": "-V4dS4UaLMgP_4fY4j8ir7cl1TXlFdAgcx55o7TkcSA" 206 } 207 } 208 } 210 The COSE_Key MUST contain the required key members for a COSE_Key of 211 that key type and MAY contain other COSE_Key members, including the 212 "kid" (Key ID) member. 214 The "COSE_Key" member MAY also be used for a COSE_Key representing a 215 symmetric key, provided that the CWT is encrypted so that the key is 216 not revealed to unintended parties. The means of encrypting a CWT is 217 explained in [CWT]. If the CWT is not encrypted, the symmetric key 218 MUST be encrypted as described below. 220 3.3. Representation of an Encrypted Symmetric Proof-of-Possession Key 222 When the key held by the presenter is a symmetric key, the 223 "Encrypted_COSE_Key" member is an encrypted COSE_Key 224 [I-D.ietf-cose-msg] representing the symmetric key encrypted to a key 225 known to the recipient using COSE_Encrypt or COSE_Encrypt0. 227 The following example (using JSON notation) illustrates a symmetric 228 key that could subsequently be encrypted for use in the 229 "Encrypted_COSE_Key" member: 231 { 232 "kty": "oct", 233 "alg": "HS256", 234 "k": "ZoRSOrFzN_FzUA5XKMYoVHyzff5oRJxl-IXRtztJ6uE" 235 } 237 The COSE_Key representation is used as the plaintext when encrypting 238 the key. The COSE_Key could, for instance, be encrypted using a 239 COSE_Encrypt0 representation using the AES-CCM-16-64-128 algorithm. 241 The following example CWT Claims Set of a CWT (using JSON notation) 242 illustrates the use of an encrypted symmetric key as the 243 "Encrypted_COSE_Key" member value: 245 { 246 "iss": "https://server.example.com", 247 "sub": "24400320", 248 "aud": "s6BhdRkqt3", 249 "exp": 1311281970, 250 "iat": 1311280970, 251 "cnf":{ 252 "Encrypted_COSE_Key": 253 "(TBD)" 254 } 255 } 257 3.4. Representation of a Key ID for a Proof-of-Possession Key 259 The proof-of-possession key can also be identified by the use of a 260 Key ID instead of communicating the actual key, provided the 261 recipient is able to obtain the identified key using the Key ID. In 262 this case, the issuer of a CWT declares that the presenter possesses 263 a particular key and that the recipient can cryptographically confirm 264 proof of possession of the key by the presenter by including a "cnf" 265 claim in the CWT whose value is a CBOR map with the CBOR map 266 containing a "kid" member identifying the key. 268 The following example (using JSON notation) demonstrates such a 269 declaration in the CWT Claims Set of a CWT: 271 { 272 "iss": "https://server.example.com", 273 "aud": "https://client.example.org", 274 "exp": 1361398824, 275 "cnf":{ 276 "kid": "dfd1aa97-6d8d-4575-a0fe-34b96de2bfad" 277 } 278 } 280 The content of the "kid" value is application specific. For 281 instance, some applications may choose to use a cryptographic hash of 282 the public key value as the "kid" value. 284 3.5. Specifics Intentionally Not Specified 286 Proof of possession is typically demonstrated by having the presenter 287 sign a value determined by the recipient using the key possessed by 288 the presenter. This value is sometimes called a "nonce" or a 289 "challenge". 291 The means of communicating the nonce and the nature of its contents 292 are intentionally not described in this specification, as different 293 protocols will communicate this information in different ways. 294 Likewise, the means of communicating the signed nonce is also not 295 specified, as this is also protocol specific. 297 Note that another means of proving possession of the key when it is a 298 symmetric key is to encrypt the key to the recipient. The means of 299 obtaining a key for the recipient is likewise protocol specific. 301 4. Security Considerations 303 All of the security considerations that are discussed in [CWT] also 304 apply here. In addition, proof of possession introduces its own 305 unique security issues. Possessing a key is only valuable if it is 306 kept secret. Appropriate means must be used to ensure that 307 unintended parties do not learn private key or symmetric key values. 309 Applications utilizing proof of possession should also utilize 310 audience restriction, as described in Section 4.1.3 of [JWT], as it 311 provides different protections. Proof of possession can be used by 312 recipients to reject messages from unauthorized senders. Audience 313 restriction can be used by recipients to reject messages intended for 314 different recipients. 316 A recipient might not understand the "cnf" claim. Applications that 317 require the proof-of-possession keys communicated with it to be 318 understood and processed must ensure that the parts of this 319 specification that they use are implemented. 321 Proof of possession via encrypted symmetric secrets is subject to 322 replay attacks. This attack can, for example, be avoided when a 323 signed nonce or challenge is used since the recipient can use a 324 distinct nonce or challenge for each interaction. Replay can also be 325 avoided if a sub-key is derived from a shared secret that is specific 326 to the instance of the PoP demonstration. 328 As is the case with other information included in a CWT, it is 329 necessary to apply data origin authentication and integrity 330 protection (via a keyed message digest or a digital signature). Data 331 origin authentication ensures that the recipient of the CWT learns 332 about the entity that created the CWT since this will be important 333 for any policy decisions. Integrity protection prevents an adversary 334 from changing any elements conveyed within the CWT payload. Special 335 care has to be applied when carrying symmetric keys inside the CWT 336 since those not only require integrity protection but also 337 confidentiality protection. 339 5. Privacy Considerations 341 A proof-of-possession key can be used as a correlation handle if the 342 same key is used with multiple parties. Thus, for privacy reasons, 343 it is recommended that different proof-of-possession keys be used 344 when interacting with different parties. 346 6. IANA Considerations 348 The following registration procedure is used for all the registries 349 established by this specification. 351 Values are registered on a Specification Required [RFC5226] basis 352 after a three-week review period on the cwt-reg-review@ietf.org 353 mailing list, on the advice of one or more Designated Experts. 354 However, to allow for the allocation of values prior to publication, 355 the Designated Experts may approve registration once they are 356 satisfied that such a specification will be published. [[ Note to 357 the RFC Editor: The name of the mailing list should be determined in 358 consultation with the IESG and IANA. Suggested name: cwt-reg- 359 review@ietf.org. ]] 361 Registration requests sent to the mailing list for review should use 362 an appropriate subject (e.g., "Request to Register CWT Confirmation 363 Method: example"). Registration requests that are undetermined for a 364 period longer than 21 days can be brought to the IESG's attention 365 (using the iesg@ietf.org mailing list) for resolution. 367 Criteria that should be applied by the Designated Experts include 368 determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing 369 functionality, determining whether it is likely to be of general 370 applicability or whether it is useful only for a single application, 371 and evaluating the security properties of the item being registered 372 and whether the registration makes sense. 374 It is suggested that multiple Designated Experts be appointed who are 375 able to represent the perspectives of different applications using 376 this specification in order to enable broadly informed review of 377 registration decisions. In cases where a registration decision could 378 be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular 379 Expert, that Expert should defer to the judgment of the other 380 Experts. 382 6.1. CBOR Web Token Claims Registration 384 This specification registers the "cnf" claim in the IANA "CBOR Web 385 Token Claims" registry [IANA.CWT.Claims] established by [CWT]. 387 6.1.1. Registry Contents 389 o Claim Name: "cnf" 390 o Claim Description: Confirmation 391 o JWT Claim Name: "cnf" 392 o Claim Key: TBD (maybe 8) 393 o Claim Value Type(s): map 394 o Change Controller: IESG 395 o Specification Document(s): Section 3.1 of [[ this document ]] 397 6.2. CWT Confirmation Methods Registry 399 This specification establishes the IANA "CWT Confirmation Methods" 400 registry for CWT "cnf" member values. The registry records the 401 confirmation method member and a reference to the specification that 402 defines it. 404 6.2.1. Registration Template 406 Confirmation Method Name: 407 The human-readable name requested (e.g., "kid"). 409 Confirmation Method Description: 410 Brief description of the confirmation method (e.g., "Key 411 Identifier"). 413 JWT Confirmation Method Name: 414 Claim Name of the equivalent JWT confirmation method value, as 415 registered in [IANA.JWT.Claims]. CWT claims should normally have 416 a corresponding JWT claim. If a corresponding JWT claim would not 417 make sense, the Designated Experts can choose to accept 418 registrations for which the JWT Claim Name is listed as "N/A". 420 Confirmation Key: 421 CBOR map key value for the confirmation method. 423 Confirmation Value Type(s): 424 CBOR types that can be used for the confirmation method value. 426 Change Controller: 428 For Standards Track RFCs, list the "IESG". For others, give the 429 name of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal 430 address, email address, home page URI) may also be included. 432 Specification Document(s): 433 Reference to the document or documents that specify the parameter, 434 preferably including URIs that can be used to retrieve copies of 435 the documents. An indication of the relevant sections may also be 436 included but is not required. 438 6.2.2. Initial Registry Contents 440 o Confirmation Method Name: "COSE_Key" 441 o Confirmation Method Description: COSE_Key Representing Public Key 442 o JWT Confirmation Method Name: "jwk" 443 o Confirmation Key: 1 444 o Confirmation Value Type(s): map 445 o Change Controller: IESG 446 o Specification Document(s): Section 3.2 of [[ this document ]] 448 o Confirmation Method Name: "Encrypted_COSE_Key" 449 o Confirmation Method Description: Encrypted COSE_Key 450 o JWT Confirmation Method Name: "jwe" 451 o Confirmation Key: 2 452 o Confirmation Value Type(s): array (with an optional COSE_Encrypt 453 or COSE_Encrypt0 tag) 454 o Change Controller: IESG 455 o Specification Document(s): Section 3.3 of [[ this document ]] 457 o Confirmation Method Name: "kid" 458 o Confirmation Method Description: Key Identifier 459 o JWT Confirmation Method Name: "kid" 460 o Confirmation Key: 3 461 o Confirmation Value Type(s): binary string 462 o Change Controller: IESG 463 o Specification Document(s): Section 3.4 of [[ this document ]] 465 7. References 467 7.1. Normative References 469 [CWT] Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig, 470 "CBOR Web Token (CWT)", Work in Progress, draft-ietf-ace- 471 cbor-web-token-06, June 2017, 472 . 475 [I-D.ietf-cose-msg] 476 Schaad, J., "CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)", 477 draft-ietf-cose-msg-24 (work in progress), November 2016. 479 [IANA.CWT.Claims] 480 IANA, "CBOR Web Token Claims", 481 . 483 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 484 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 485 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 486 . 488 [RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 489 10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November 490 2003, . 492 [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform 493 Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, 494 RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005, 495 . 497 [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an 498 IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226, 499 DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008, 500 . 502 [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security 503 (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, 504 DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008, 505 . 507 [RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and 508 Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity 509 within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 510 (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer 511 Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March 512 2011, . 514 [RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object 515 Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049, 516 October 2013, . 518 7.2. Informative References 520 [IANA.JWT.Claims] 521 IANA, "JSON Web Token Claims", 522 . 524 [JWT] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token 525 (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, May 2015, 526 . 528 [OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os] 529 Cantor, S., Kemp, J., Philpott, R., and E. Maler, 530 "Assertions and Protocol for the OASIS Security Assertion 531 Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-core- 532 2.0-os, March 2005, 533 . 535 [RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data 536 Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March 537 2014, . 539 [RFC7800] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Proof-of- 540 Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)", 541 RFC 7800, DOI 10.17487/RFC7800, April 2016, 542 . 544 Acknowledgements 546 Thanks to the following people for their reviews of the 547 specification: Michael Richardson and Jim Schaad. 549 Open Issues 551 o Convert the examples from JSON/JWT to CBOR/CWT. 553 Document History 555 [[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]] 557 -01 559 o Tracked CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims Registry updates. 561 o Addressed review comments by Michael Richardson and Jim Schaad. 563 o Added co-authors. 565 -00 567 o Created the initial draft from RFC 7800. 569 Authors' Addresses 571 Michael B. Jones 572 Microsoft 574 Email: mbj@microsoft.com 575 URI: http://self-issued.info/ 577 Ludwig Seitz 578 RISE SICS 579 Scheelevaegen 17 580 Lund 223 70 581 Sweden 583 Email: ludwig@ri.se 585 Goeran Selander 586 Ericsson AB 587 Faeroegatan 6 588 Kista 164 80 589 Sweden 591 Email: goran.selander@ericsson.com 593 Erik Wahlstroem 594 Sweden 596 Email: erik@wahlstromstekniska.se 598 Samuel Erdtman 599 Spotify AB 600 Birger Jarlsgatan 61, 4tr 601 Stockholm 113 56 602 Sweden 604 Phone: +46702691499 605 Email: erdtman@spotify.com 606 Hannes Tschofenig 607 ARM Ltd. 608 Hall in Tirol 6060 609 Austria 611 Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@arm.com