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Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) == Unused Reference: 'RFC4360' is defined on line 185, but no explicit reference was found in the text == Outdated reference: A later version (-10) exists of draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered-02 == Outdated reference: A later version (-12) exists of draft-ietf-idr-ix-bgp-route-server-09 == Outdated reference: A later version (-11) exists of draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling-07 Summary: 1 error (**), 0 flaws (~~), 6 warnings (==), 1 comment (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group T. King 3 Internet-Draft D. Kopp 4 Intended status: Standards Track DE-CIX 5 Expires: June 16, 2016 A. Lambrianidis 6 AMS-IX 7 A. Fenioux 8 France-IX 9 December 14, 2015 11 Signaling RPKI Validation Results from a Route-Server to Peers 12 draft-kklf-sidr-route-server-rpki-light-00 14 Abstract 16 This document defines the usage of the BGP Prefix Origin Validation 17 State Extended Community [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling] 18 to signal RPKI validation results from a route-server to its peers. 19 Upon reception of RPKI validation results peers can use this 20 information in their local routing decision process. 22 Requirements Language 24 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 25 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to 26 be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] only when they appear in all 27 upper case. They may also appear in lower or mixed case as English 28 words, without normative meaning. 30 Status of This Memo 32 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 33 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 35 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 36 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 37 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 38 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 40 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 41 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 42 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 43 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 45 This Internet-Draft will expire on June 16, 2016. 47 Copyright Notice 49 Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 50 document authors. All rights reserved. 52 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 53 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 54 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 55 publication of this document. Please review these documents 56 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 57 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 58 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 59 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 60 described in the Simplified BSD License. 62 Table of Contents 64 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 65 2. Signaling RPKI Validation Results from a Route-Server to 66 Peers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 67 3. Operational Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 68 3.1. Local Routing Decision Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 69 3.2. Route-Server Receiving the BGP Prefix Origin Validation 70 State Extended Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 71 3.3. Error Handling at Peers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 72 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 73 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 74 6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 75 6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 76 6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 77 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 79 1. Introduction 81 RPKI-based route origin validation [RFC6480] can be a significant 82 operational burden for BGP peers to implement and adopt. In order to 83 boost acceptance and usage of RPKI and ultimately increase the 84 security of the Internet routing system, IXPs may provide RPKI-based 85 route origin validation at the route-server 86 [I-D.ietf-idr-ix-bgp-route-server]. The result of this route origin 87 validation is signaled to peers by using the BGP Prefix Origin 88 Validation State Extended Community as introduced in 89 [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling]. 91 Peers receiving the route origin validation result from the route- 92 server(s) can use this information in their local routing decision 93 process for acceptance, rejection, preference, or other traffic 94 engineering purposes of a particular route. 96 2. Signaling RPKI Validation Results from a Route-Server to Peers 98 The BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community (as defined 99 in [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling]) is utilized for 100 signaling RPKI validation result from a route-server to peers. 102 [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling] proposes an encoding of 103 the RPKI validation result [RFC6811] as follows: 105 +-------+-----------+ 106 | Value | Meaning | 107 +-------+-----------+ 108 | 0 | Valid | 109 | 1 | Not found | 110 | 2 | Invalid | 111 +-------+-----------+ 113 Table 1 115 This encoding is re-used. Route-servers providing RPKI-based route 116 origin validation set the validation state according to the RPKI 117 validation result (see [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered]). 119 3. Operational Recommendations 121 3.1. Local Routing Decision Process 123 A peer receiving an RPKI validation result from the route server MAY 124 use the information in its own local routing decision process. The 125 local routing decision process SHOULD apply to the rules as described 126 in section 5 [RFC6811]. 128 A peer receiving an RPKI validation result from the route server MAY 129 redistribute this information within its own AS. 131 3.2. Route-Server Receiving the BGP Prefix Origin Validation State 132 Extended Community 134 An IXP route-server receiving routes from its peers containing the 135 BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community MUST remove the 136 extended community before the route is re-distributed to its peers. 137 This is required regardless of whether the route-server is executing 138 RPKI origin validation or not. 140 Failure to do so would allow opportunistic peers to advertise routes 141 tagged with arbitrary RPKI validation results via a route-server, 142 influencing maliciously the decision process of other route-server 143 peers. 145 3.3. Error Handling at Peers 147 A route sent by a route-server SHOULD only contain none or one BGP 148 Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community. 150 A peer receiving a route from a route-server containing more than one 151 BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community SHOULD only 152 consider the largest value (as described in Table 1) in the 153 validation result field and disregard the other values. Values 154 larger than two in the validation result field MUST be disregarded. 156 4. IANA Considerations 158 None. 160 5. Security Considerations 162 A route-server could be misused to spread malicious RPKI validation 163 results. However, peers have to trust the route-server anyway as it 164 collects and redistributes BGP routing information to other peers. 166 The introduction of a mechanisms described in this document does not 167 pose a new class of attack vectors to the relationship between route- 168 servers and peers. 170 6. References 172 6.1. Normative References 174 [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered] 175 Huston, G., Michaelson, G., Martinez, C., Bruijnzeels, T., 176 Newton, A., and A. Aina, "RPKI Validation Reconsidered", 177 draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-validation-reconsidered-02 (work in 178 progress), October 2015. 180 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 181 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/ 182 RFC2119, March 1997, 183 . 185 [RFC4360] Sangli, S., Tappan, D., and Y. Rekhter, "BGP Extended 186 Communities Attribute", RFC 4360, DOI 10.17487/RFC4360, 187 February 2006, . 189 [RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. 190 Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, DOI 191 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013, 192 . 194 6.2. Informative References 196 [I-D.ietf-idr-ix-bgp-route-server] 197 Jasinska, E., Hilliard, N., Raszuk, R., and N. Bakker, 198 "Internet Exchange BGP Route Server", draft-ietf-idr-ix- 199 bgp-route-server-09 (work in progress), October 2015. 201 [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling] 202 Mohapatra, P., Patel, K., Scudder, J., Ward, D., and R. 203 Bush, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended 204 Community", draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling-07 205 (work in progress), November 2015. 207 [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support 208 Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480, 209 February 2012, . 211 Authors' Addresses 213 Thomas King 214 DE-CIX Management GmbH 215 Lichtstrasse 43i 216 Cologne 50825 217 DE 219 Email: thomas.king@de-cix.net 221 Daniel Kopp 222 DE-CIX Management GmbH 223 Lichtstrasse 43i 224 Cologne 50825 225 DE 227 Email: daniel.kopp@de-cix.net 229 Aristidis Lambrianidis 230 Amsterdam Internet Exchange 231 Frederiksplein 42 232 Amsterdam 1017 XN 233 NL 235 Email: aristidis.lambrianidis@ams-ix.net 236 Arnaud Fenioux 237 France-IX 238 88 Avenue Des Ternes 239 Paris 75017 240 FR 242 Email: afenioux@franceix.net