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Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) == Unused Reference: 'RFC4360' is defined on line 182, but no explicit reference was found in the text == Outdated reference: A later version (-12) exists of draft-ietf-idr-ix-bgp-route-server-09 == Outdated reference: A later version (-11) exists of draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling-07 Summary: 1 error (**), 0 flaws (~~), 5 warnings (==), 1 comment (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group T. King 3 Internet-Draft D. Kopp 4 Intended status: Standards Track DE-CIX 5 Expires: October 28, 2016 A. Lambrianidis 6 AMS-IX 7 A. Fenioux 8 France-IX 9 April 26, 2016 11 Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route-Server to Peers 12 draft-kklf-sidr-route-server-rpki-light-01 14 Abstract 16 This document defines the usage of the BGP Prefix Origin Validation 17 State Extended Community [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling] 18 to signal prefix origin validation results from a route-server to its 19 peers. Upon reception of prefix origin validation results peers can 20 use this information in their local routing decision process. 22 Requirements Language 24 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 25 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to 26 be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] only when they appear in all 27 upper case. They may also appear in lower or mixed case as English 28 words, without normative meaning. 30 Status of This Memo 32 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 33 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 35 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 36 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 37 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 38 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 40 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 41 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 42 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 43 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 45 This Internet-Draft will expire on October 28, 2016. 47 Copyright Notice 49 Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 50 document authors. All rights reserved. 52 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 53 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 54 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 55 publication of this document. Please review these documents 56 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 57 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 58 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 59 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 60 described in the Simplified BSD License. 62 Table of Contents 64 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 65 2. Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route- 66 Server to Peers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 67 3. Operational Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 68 3.1. Local Routing Decision Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 69 3.2. Route-Server Receiving the BGP Prefix Origin Validation 70 State Extended Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 71 3.3. Error Handling at Peers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 72 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 73 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 74 6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 75 6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 76 6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 77 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 79 1. Introduction 81 RPKI-based route origin validation [RFC6480] can be a significant 82 operational burden for BGP peers to implement and adopt. In order to 83 boost acceptance and usage of RPKI and ultimately increase the 84 security of the Internet routing system, IXPs may provide RPKI-based 85 prefix origin validation at the route-server 86 [I-D.ietf-idr-ix-bgp-route-server]. The result of this route origin 87 validation is signaled to peers by using the BGP Prefix Origin 88 Validation State Extended Community as introduced in 89 [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling]. 91 Peers receiving the route origin validation result from the route- 92 server(s) can use this information in their local routing decision 93 process for acceptance, rejection, preference, or other traffic 94 engineering purposes of a particular route. 96 2. Signaling Prefix Origin Validation Results from a Route-Server to 97 Peers 99 The BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community (as defined 100 in [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling]) is utilized for 101 signaling prefix origin validation result from a route-server to 102 peers. 104 [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling] proposes an encoding of 105 the prefix origin validation result [RFC6811] as follows: 107 +-------+-----------+ 108 | Value | Meaning | 109 +-------+-----------+ 110 | 0 | Valid | 111 | 1 | Not found | 112 | 2 | Invalid | 113 +-------+-----------+ 115 Table 1 117 This encoding is re-used. Route-servers providing RPKI-based origin 118 origin validation set the validation state according to the prefix 119 origin validation result (see [RFC6811]). 121 3. Operational Recommendations 123 3.1. Local Routing Decision Process 125 A peer receiving prefix origin validation result from the route 126 server MAY use the information in its own local routing decision 127 process. The local routing decision process SHOULD apply to the 128 rules as described in section 5 [RFC6811]. 130 A peer receiving a prefix origin validation result from the route 131 server MAY redistribute this information within its own AS. 133 3.2. Route-Server Receiving the BGP Prefix Origin Validation State 134 Extended Community 136 An IXP route-server receiving routes from its peers containing the 137 BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community MUST remove the 138 extended community before the route is re-distributed to its peers. 139 This is required regardless of whether the route-server is executing 140 prefix origin validation or not. 142 Failure to do so would allow opportunistic peers to advertise routes 143 tagged with arbitrary prefix origin validation results via a route- 144 server, influencing maliciously the decision process of other route- 145 server peers. 147 3.3. Error Handling at Peers 149 A route sent by a route-server SHOULD only contain none or one BGP 150 Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community. 152 A peer receiving a route from a route-server containing more than one 153 BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community SHOULD only 154 consider the largest value (as described in Table 1) in the 155 validation result field and disregard the other values. Values 156 larger than two in the validation result field MUST be disregarded. 158 4. IANA Considerations 160 None. 162 5. Security Considerations 164 A route-server could be misused to spread malicious prefix origin 165 validation results. However, peers have to trust the route-server 166 anyway as it collects and redistributes BGP routing information to 167 other peers. 169 The introduction of a mechanisms described in this document does not 170 pose a new class of attack vectors to the relationship between route- 171 servers and peers. 173 6. References 175 6.1. Normative References 177 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 178 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/ 179 RFC2119, March 1997, 180 . 182 [RFC4360] Sangli, S., Tappan, D., and Y. Rekhter, "BGP Extended 183 Communities Attribute", RFC 4360, DOI 10.17487/RFC4360, 184 February 2006, . 186 [RFC6811] Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. 187 Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", RFC 6811, DOI 188 10.17487/RFC6811, January 2013, 189 . 191 6.2. Informative References 193 [I-D.ietf-idr-ix-bgp-route-server] 194 Jasinska, E., Hilliard, N., Raszuk, R., and N. Bakker, 195 "Internet Exchange BGP Route Server", draft-ietf-idr-ix- 196 bgp-route-server-09 (work in progress), October 2015. 198 [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling] 199 Mohapatra, P., Patel, K., Scudder, J., Ward, D., and R. 200 Bush, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended 201 Community", draft-ietf-sidr-origin-validation-signaling-07 202 (work in progress), November 2015. 204 [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support 205 Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480, 206 February 2012, . 208 Authors' Addresses 210 Thomas King 211 DE-CIX Management GmbH 212 Lichtstrasse 43i 213 Cologne 50825 214 DE 216 Email: thomas.king@de-cix.net 218 Daniel Kopp 219 DE-CIX Management GmbH 220 Lichtstrasse 43i 221 Cologne 50825 222 DE 224 Email: daniel.kopp@de-cix.net 226 Aristidis Lambrianidis 227 Amsterdam Internet Exchange 228 Frederiksplein 42 229 Amsterdam 1017 XN 230 NL 232 Email: aristidis.lambrianidis@ams-ix.net 233 Arnaud Fenioux 234 France-IX 235 88 Avenue Des Ternes 236 Paris 75017 237 FR 239 Email: afenioux@franceix.net