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(The document does seem to have the reference to RFC 2119 which the ID-Checklist requires). -- The document date (December 24, 2019) is 1575 days in the past. Is this intentional? Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) == Missing Reference: 'RFC 8416' is mentioned on line 67, but not defined ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 2818 (Obsoleted by RFC 9110) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 7540 (Obsoleted by RFC 9113) Summary: 2 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 3 warnings (==), 1 comment (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 SIDROPS D. Ma 3 Internet-Draft ZDNS 4 Intended status: Standards Track H. Yan 5 Expires: June 26, 2020 CNCERT 6 December 24, 2019 8 RPKI validated cache Update in SLURM over HTTPs (RUSH) 9 draft-madi-sidrops-rush-00 11 Abstract 13 This document defines a method for transferring RPKI validated cache 14 update information in JSON object format over HTTPs. 16 Status of This Memo 18 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 19 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 21 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 22 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 23 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 24 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 26 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 27 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 28 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 29 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 31 This Internet-Draft will expire on June 26, 2020. 33 Copyright Notice 35 Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 36 document authors. All rights reserved. 38 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 39 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 40 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 41 publication of this document. Please review these documents 42 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 43 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 44 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 45 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 46 described in the Simplified BSD License. 48 Table of Contents 50 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 51 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 52 3. RUSH Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 53 3.1. Use of SLURM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 54 3.2. Use of HTTP as Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 55 3.3. RUSH Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 56 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 57 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 58 6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 59 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 60 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 61 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 62 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 64 1. Introduction 66 This document defines a mechanism called "RPKI validated cache Update 67 in SLURM [RFC 8416] over HTTPs (RUSH)", for the use of SLURM in 68 updating RPKI cache data over HTTP [RFC7540] using HTTPs [RFC2818] 69 URIs (and therefore TLS [RFC8446] security for integrity and 70 confidentiality). Integration with HTTP provides a secure transport 71 for distributing cache data, which is in alignment with SLURM file 72 format in order to take advantage of using one same API for a cache 73 server to do both remote update and local override. 75 The RPKI validated cache in this document refers to the validated 76 data of assertion information certified by corresponding RPKI signed 77 objects such as ROA [RFC6482] and BGPsec router certificate 78 [RFC8209], which are transferred from the RPKI cache server to 79 routers by RTR protocol [RFC8210] for the use of the RPKI. While 80 this document is intended for the RPKI cache update between two cache 81 servers. SLURM offers a standardized method for describing RPKI 82 cache data in JSON format [RFC8259], and SLURM is designed to carry 83 out incremental update. 85 The primary use of RUSH is to distribute RPKI validated cache within 86 an ISP or an ICP composed of a number of ASes. A small site or 87 enterprise network MAY also use RUSH by synchronizing with a third- 88 party RPKI cache provider over networks. 90 Note that RUSH merely focuses on a standardized transport and data 91 format of the RPKI cache data. RUSH has nothing to do with 92 synchronization at the RUSH end system, that is, more sophisticated 93 functions such as automatic re-synchronization and access control is 94 out of this scope and MAY be left to private implementation. 96 2. Terminology 98 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT","REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 99 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 100 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 101 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 102 capitals, as shown here. 104 3. RUSH Operations 106 3.1. Use of SLURM 108 RUSH uses SLURM file format to indicate the intended update. A SLURM 109 file consists of a single JSON object containing some members. Among 110 others, "validationOutputFilters" [Section 3.3 of [RFC8416]] and 111 "locallyAddedAssertions" [Section 3.4 of [RFC8416]] are defined to 112 describe actions of deleting some of existing data items and adding 113 new data items respectively. 115 Note that RUSH re-uses the JSON members of SLURM object, not implying 116 the very actions are taken locally to any extent. Typically, RUSH 117 takes place over networks remotely while take effects to the cache in 118 question locally. 120 The RUSH-aware HTTP server/client MUST be prepared to parse SLURM 121 object. 123 3.2. Use of HTTP as Transport 125 HTTP is employed by RUSH to transfer RPKI validated cache update 126 information as expressed as a SLURM object. A new data type is 127 therefore defined to identify SLURM object in HTTP message body. 129 The RUSH-aware HTTP server/client MUST be prepared to process media 130 type "application/json-slurm". 132 3.3. RUSH Example 134 Figure 1 shows an example of using RUSH to carry out RPKI validated 135 cache by HTTP POST method. 137 POST /rpki-cache HTTP/2 138 Host: rpki.example.com 139 Content-Type : application/json-slurm 140 Content-Length:964 141 <964 bytes represented by the following json string> 142 { 143 "slurmVersion": 1, 144 "validationOutputFilters": { 145 "prefixFilters": [ 146 { 147 "prefix": "192.0.2.0/24", 148 "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix" 149 }, 150 { 151 "asn": 64496, 152 "comment": "All VRPs matching ASN" 153 }, 154 { 155 "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24", 156 "asn": 64497, 157 "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix, matching ASN" 158 } 159 ], 160 "bgpsecFilters": [ 161 { 162 "asn": 64496, 163 "comment": "All keys for ASN" 164 }, 165 { 166 "SKI": "Zm9v", 167 "comment": "Key matching Router SKI" 168 }, 169 { 170 "asn": 64497, 171 "SKI": "YmFy", 172 "comment": "Key for ASN 64497 matching Router SKI" 173 } 174 ] 175 }, 176 "locallyAddedAssertions": { 177 "prefixAssertions": [ 178 { 179 "asn": 64496, 180 "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24", 181 "comment": "My other important route" 182 }, 183 { 184 "asn": 64496, 185 "prefix": "2001:DB8::/32", 186 "maxPrefixLength": 48, 187 "comment": "My other important de-aggregated routes" 188 } 189 ], 190 "bgpsecAssertions": [ 191 { 192 "asn": 64496, 193 "comment" : "My known key for my important ASN", 194 "SKI": "", 195 "routerPublicKey": "" 196 } 197 ] 198 } 199 } 201 Figure 1.Example of an HTTP message for use of RUSH 203 4. IANA Considerations 205 Type name: application 207 Subtype name: json-slurm 209 Subtype name: json-slurm 211 Optional parameters: N/A 213 Encoding considerations: This is a JSON object. 215 Security considerations: N/A 217 Interoperability considerations: [RFC8416] 219 Published specification: 221 Applications that use this media type: 223 Systems that want to exchange RPKI cache data update information in 224 SLURM 226 file format [RFC8416] over HTTP. 228 Person&email address to contact for further information: Di Ma 229 231 Intended usage: COMMON 233 Restrictions on usage: N/A 235 Author: Di Ma 237 Change controller: IESG 239 5. Security Considerations 241 Updating RPKI validated cache over HTTPs relies on the security of 242 the underlying HTTP transport. Implementations utilizing HTTP/2 243 benefit from the TLS profile defined in Section 9.2 of [RFC7540]. An 244 HTTPS connection provides transport security for the interaction 245 between servers, but it does not provide data integrity detection. 246 An adversary that can control the cache used by the subscriber can 247 affect that subscriber's view of the RPKI. The RPKI cache server 248 security and the trust model for the interaction between cache server 249 and subscriber is out of the scope of this document. 251 6. Acknowledgments 253 7. References 255 7.1. Normative References 257 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 258 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 259 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 260 . 262 [RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, 263 DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000, 264 . 266 [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route 267 Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, 268 DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012, 269 . 271 [RFC7540] Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext 272 Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540, 273 DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015, 274 . 276 [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 277 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 278 May 2017, . 280 [RFC8209] Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for 281 BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, 282 and Certification Requests", RFC 8209, 283 DOI 10.17487/RFC8209, September 2017, 284 . 286 [RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data 287 Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259, 288 DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017, 289 . 291 [RFC8416] Ma, D., Mandelberg, D., and T. Bruijnzeels, "Simplified 292 Local Internet Number Resource Management with the RPKI 293 (SLURM)", RFC 8416, DOI 10.17487/RFC8416, August 2018, 294 . 296 [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol 297 Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, 298 . 300 7.2. Informative References 302 [RFC8210] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key 303 Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 1", 304 RFC 8210, DOI 10.17487/RFC8210, September 2017, 305 . 307 Authors' Addresses 309 Di Ma 310 ZDNS 311 4 South 4th St. Zhongguancun 312 Haidian, Beijing 100190 313 China 315 Email: madi@zdns.cn 317 Hanbing Yan 318 CNCERT 320 Email: yhb@cert.org.cn