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(The document does seem to have the reference to RFC 2119 which the ID-Checklist requires). -- The document date (August 29, 2020) is 1335 days in the past. Is this intentional? Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) == Missing Reference: 'RFC 8416' is mentioned on line 70, but not defined ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 2818 (Obsoleted by RFC 9110) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 7540 (Obsoleted by RFC 9113) Summary: 2 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 3 warnings (==), 1 comment (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 SIDROPS D. Ma 3 Internet-Draft ZDNS 4 Intended status: Standards Track H. Yan 5 Expires: March 2, 2021 CNCERT 6 M. Aelmans 7 Juniper Networks 8 August 29, 2020 10 RPKI validated cache Update in SLURM over HTTPs (RUSH) 11 draft-madi-sidrops-rush-02 13 Abstract 15 This document defines a method for transferring RPKI validated cache 16 update information in JSON object format over HTTPs. 18 Status of This Memo 20 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 21 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 23 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 24 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 25 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 26 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 28 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 29 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 30 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 31 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 33 This Internet-Draft will expire on March 2, 2021. 35 Copyright Notice 37 Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 38 document authors. All rights reserved. 40 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 41 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 42 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 43 publication of this document. Please review these documents 44 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 45 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 46 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 47 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 48 described in the Simplified BSD License. 50 Table of Contents 52 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 53 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 54 3. RUSH Usecase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 55 4. RUSH Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 56 4.1. Use of SLURM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 57 4.2. Use of HTTP as Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 58 4.3. RUSH Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 59 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 60 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 61 7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 62 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 63 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 64 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 65 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 67 1. Introduction 69 This document defines a mechanism called "RPKI validated cache Update 70 in SLURM [RFC 8416] over HTTPs (RUSH)", for the use of SLURM in 71 updating RPKI cache data over HTTP [RFC7540] using HTTPs [RFC2818] 72 URIs (and therefore TLS [RFC8446] security for integrity and 73 confidentiality). Integration with HTTP provides a secure transport 74 for distributing cache data, which is in alignment with SLURM file 75 format in order to take advantage of using one same API for a cache 76 server to do both remote update and local override. 78 The RPKI validated cache in this document refers to the validated 79 data of assertion information certified by corresponding RPKI signed 80 objects such as ROA [RFC6482] and BGPsec router certificate 81 [RFC8209], which are transferred from the RPKI cache server to 82 routers by RTR protocol [RFC8210] for the use of the RPKI. SLURM 83 offers a standardized method for describing RPKI cache data in JSON 84 format [RFC8259], and SLURM is designed to carry out incremental 85 update. 87 Note that RUSH merely focuses on a standardized transport and data 88 format of the RPKI cache data. RUSH has nothing to do with 89 synchronization at the RUSH end system, that is, more sophisticated 90 functions such as automatic re-synchronization and access control is 91 out of this scope and MAY be left to private implementation. 93 2. Terminology 95 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT","REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 96 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 97 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 98 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 99 capitals, as shown here. 101 3. RUSH Usecase 103 o Cache Distribution 104 RUSH can be used to distribute a RPKI validated cache within a single 105 ASN or network, for example a confederation composed of a number of 106 ASes. A small site or enterprise network MAY also use RUSH by 107 synchronizing with a third-party RPKI cache provider over external 108 networks. 110 o Local Control over Networks 111 Network operators MAY want to inject SLURM Assertions/Filters via an 112 API offered by RPKI validator/cache. RUSH is therefore able to carry 113 out such local control signals inside an administrative bailiwick in 114 a secure manner. 116 o AS0 SLURM File Delivery 117 The Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) need to publish assertions 118 with origin AS0 ([RFC6491]) for all the unallocated and unassigned 119 address space (IPv4 and IPv6) for which it is the current 120 administrator. RUSH is able to deliver those assertions to RPKI 121 relying parties if so called AS0 SLURM file are generated by the RIR. 123 To summarize, RUSH MUST be used in scenarios where the authenticity 124 of SLURM files can be assured when carried over multiple 125 administrative domains. Alternatively, RUSH SHOULD be used inside an 126 administrative domain to provide extra security by the virtue of pre- 127 configured trust anchors. 129 4. RUSH Operations 131 4.1. Use of SLURM 133 RUSH uses SLURM file format to indicate the intended update. A SLURM 134 file consists of a single JSON object containing some members. Among 135 others, "validationOutputFilters" [Section 3.3 of [RFC8416]] and 136 "locallyAddedAssertions" [Section 3.4 of [RFC8416]] are defined to 137 describe actions of deleting some of existing data items and adding 138 new data items respectively. 140 Note that RUSH re-uses the JSON members of SLURM object, not implying 141 the very actions are taken locally to any extent. Typically, RUSH 142 takes place over networks remotely while take effects to the cache in 143 question locally. 145 The RUSH-aware HTTP server/client MUST be prepared to parse SLURM 146 object. 148 4.2. Use of HTTP as Transport 150 HTTP is employed by RUSH to transfer RPKI validated cache update 151 information as expressed as a SLURM object. A new data type is 152 therefore defined to identify SLURM object in HTTP message body. 154 The RUSH-aware HTTP server/client MUST be prepared to process media 155 type "application/json-slurm". 157 4.3. RUSH Example 159 Figure 1 shows an example of using RUSH to carry out RPKI validated 160 cache by HTTP POST method. 162 POST /rpki-cache HTTP/2 163 Host: rpki.example.com 164 Content-Type : application/json-slurm 165 Content-Length:964 166 <964 bytes represented by the following json string> 167 { 168 "slurmVersion": 1, 169 "validationOutputFilters": { 170 "prefixFilters": [ 171 { 172 "prefix": "192.0.2.0/24", 173 "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix" 174 }, 175 { 176 "asn": 64496, 177 "comment": "All VRPs matching ASN" 178 }, 179 { 180 "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24", 181 "asn": 64497, 182 "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix, matching ASN" 183 } 184 ], 185 "bgpsecFilters": [ 186 { 187 "asn": 64496, 188 "comment": "All keys for ASN" 189 }, 190 { 191 "SKI": "Zm9v", 192 "comment": "Key matching Router SKI" 193 }, 194 { 195 "asn": 64497, 196 "SKI": "YmFy", 197 "comment": "Key for ASN 64497 matching Router SKI" 198 } 199 ] 200 }, 201 "locallyAddedAssertions": { 202 "prefixAssertions": [ 203 { 204 "asn": 64496, 205 "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24", 206 "comment": "My other important route" 207 }, 208 { 209 "asn": 64496, 210 "prefix": "2001:DB8::/32", 211 "maxPrefixLength": 48, 212 "comment": "My other important de-aggregated routes" 213 } 214 ], 215 "bgpsecAssertions": [ 216 { 217 "asn": 64496, 218 "comment" : "My known key for my important ASN", 219 "SKI": "", 220 "routerPublicKey": "" 221 } 222 ] 223 } 224 } 226 Figure 1.Example of an HTTP message for use of RUSH 228 5. IANA Considerations 230 Type name: application 232 Subtype name: json-slurm 234 Subtype name: json-slurm 236 Optional parameters: N/A 238 Encoding considerations: This is a JSON object. 240 Security considerations: N/A 242 Interoperability considerations: [RFC8416] 244 Published specification: 246 Applications that use this media type: 248 Systems that want to exchange RPKI cache data update information in 249 SLURM 251 file format [RFC8416] over HTTP. 253 Person&email address to contact for further information: Di Ma 254 256 Intended usage: COMMON 258 Restrictions on usage: N/A 260 Author: Di Ma 262 Change controller: IESG 264 6. Security Considerations 266 Note that RPKI offers signed-object-oriented security, which is not 267 provide by RUSH any longer. There are some security issues must be 268 handled properly as per different usecases as described in Section 3. 270 Cache Identity: RUSH is designed to carry out RPKI cache data update 271 from one to another, with out-of-band trust established between those 272 cache servers. That is, the scope of RUSH usage is convergent. 273 Cache subscription management might be employed to implement cache 274 identification and verification. The RPKI cache server security and 275 the trust model for the interaction between cache servers is out of 276 the scope of this document. 278 Transport Security: Updating RPKI validated cache over HTTPs relies 279 on the security of the underlying HTTP transport. Implementations 280 utilizing HTTP/2 benefit from the TLS profile defined in Section 9.2 281 of [RFC7540]. 283 Data Integrity: An HTTPS connection provides transport security for 284 the interaction between cache servers, but it does not provide data 285 integrity detection. An adversary that can control the cache used by 286 the subscriber can affect that subscriber's view of the RPKI. 288 7. Acknowledgments 290 TBD 292 8. References 294 8.1. Normative References 296 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 297 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 298 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 299 . 301 [RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, 302 DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000, 303 . 305 [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route 306 Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, 307 DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012, 308 . 310 [RFC6491] Manderson, T., Vegoda, L., and S. Kent, "Resource Public 311 Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Objects Issued by IANA", 312 RFC 6491, DOI 10.17487/RFC6491, February 2012, 313 . 315 [RFC7540] Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext 316 Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540, 317 DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015, 318 . 320 [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 321 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 322 May 2017, . 324 [RFC8209] Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for 325 BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, 326 and Certification Requests", RFC 8209, 327 DOI 10.17487/RFC8209, September 2017, 328 . 330 [RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data 331 Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259, 332 DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017, 333 . 335 [RFC8416] Ma, D., Mandelberg, D., and T. Bruijnzeels, "Simplified 336 Local Internet Number Resource Management with the RPKI 337 (SLURM)", RFC 8416, DOI 10.17487/RFC8416, August 2018, 338 . 340 [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol 341 Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, 342 . 344 8.2. Informative References 346 [RFC8210] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key 347 Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 1", 348 RFC 8210, DOI 10.17487/RFC8210, September 2017, 349 . 351 Authors' Addresses 353 Di Ma 354 ZDNS 355 4 South 4th St. Zhongguancun 356 Haidian, Beijing 100190 357 China 359 Email: madi@zdns.cn 361 Hanbing Yan 362 CNCERT 364 Email: yhb@cert.org.cn 366 Melchior Aelmans 367 Juniper Networks 368 Boeing Avenue 240 369 Schiphol-Rijk 1119 PZ 370 The Netherlands 372 Email: maelmans@juniper.net