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(The document does seem to have the reference to RFC 2119 which the ID-Checklist requires). -- The document date (9 May 2022) is 711 days in the past. Is this intentional? Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) == Missing Reference: 'RFC 8416' is mentioned on line 69, but not defined ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 2818 (Obsoleted by RFC 9110) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 7540 (Obsoleted by RFC 9113) Summary: 2 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 3 warnings (==), 1 comment (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 SIDROPS D. Ma 3 Internet-Draft ZDNS 4 Intended status: Standards Track H. Yan 5 Expires: 10 November 2022 CNCERT 6 M. Aelmans 7 Juniper Networks 8 9 May 2022 10 RPKI validated cache Update in SLURM over HTTPs (RUSH) 11 draft-madi-sidrops-rush-06 13 Abstract 15 This document defines a method for transferring RPKI validated cache 16 update information in JSON object format over HTTPs. 18 Status of This Memo 20 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 21 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 23 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 24 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 25 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 26 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 28 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 29 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 30 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 31 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 33 This Internet-Draft will expire on 10 November 2022. 35 Copyright Notice 37 Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 38 document authors. All rights reserved. 40 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 41 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ 42 license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. 43 Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights 44 and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components 45 extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as 46 described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are 47 provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. 49 Table of Contents 51 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 52 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 53 3. RUSH Usecase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 54 4. RUSH Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 55 4.1. Use of SLURM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 56 4.2. Use of HTTPs as Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 57 4.3. RUSH Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 58 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 59 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 60 7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 61 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 62 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 63 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 64 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 66 1. Introduction 68 This document defines a mechanism called "RPKI validated cache Update 69 in SLURM [RFC 8416] over HTTPs (RUSH)", for the use of SLURM in 70 updating RPKI cache data over HTTP [RFC7540] using HTTPs [RFC2818] 71 URIs (and therefore TLS [RFC8446] security for integrity and 72 confidentiality). Integration with HTTPs provides a secure transport 73 for distributing cache data, which is in alignment with SLURM file 74 format in order to take advantage of using one same API for a cache 75 server to do both remote update and local override. 77 The RPKI validated cache in this document refers to the validated 78 data of assertion information certified by corresponding RPKI signed 79 objects such as ROA [RFC6482] and BGPsec router certificate 80 [RFC8209], which are transferred from the RPKI cache server to 81 routers by RTR protocol [RFC8210] for the use of the RPKI. SLURM 82 offers a standardized method for describing RPKI cache data in JSON 83 format [RFC8259], and SLURM is designed to carry out incremental 84 update. 86 Note that RUSH merely focuses on a standardized transport and data 87 format of the RPKI cache data. RUSH has nothing to do with 88 synchronization at the RUSH end system, that is, more sophisticated 89 functions such as automatic re-synchronization and access control is 90 out of this scope and MAY be left to private implementation. 92 2. Terminology 94 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT","REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 95 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 96 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 97 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 98 capitals, as shown here. 100 3. RUSH Usecase 102 o Cache Distribution RUSH can be used to distribute a RPKI validated 103 cache within a single ASN or network, for example a confederation 104 composed of a number of ASes. A small site or enterprise network MAY 105 also use RUSH by synchronizing with a third-party RPKI cache provider 106 over external networks. 108 o Local Control over Networks Network operators MAY want to inject 109 SLURM Assertions/Filters via an API offered by RPKI validator/cache. 110 RUSH is therefore able to carry out such local control signals inside 111 an administrative bailiwick in a secure manner. 113 To summarize, RUSH MUST be used in scenarios where the authenticity 114 of SLURM files can be assured when carried over multiple 115 administrative domains. Alternatively, RUSH SHOULD be used inside an 116 administrative domain to provide extra security by the virtue of pre- 117 configured trust anchors. 119 4. RUSH Operations 121 4.1. Use of SLURM 123 RUSH uses SLURM file format to indicate the intended update. A SLURM 124 file consists of a single JSON object containing some members. Among 125 others, "validationOutputFilters" [Section 3.3 of [RFC8416]] and 126 "locallyAddedAssertions" [Section 3.4 of [RFC8416]] are defined to 127 describe actions of deleting some of existing data items and adding 128 new data items respectively. 130 Note that RUSH re-uses the JSON members of SLURM object, not implying 131 the very actions are taken locally to any extent. Typically, RUSH 132 takes place over networks remotely while take effects to the cache in 133 question locally. 135 The RUSH-aware HTTPs server/client MUST be prepared to parse SLURM 136 object. 138 4.2. Use of HTTPs as Transport 140 HTTPs is employed by RUSH to transfer RPKI validated cache update 141 information as expressed as a SLURM object. A new data type is 142 therefore defined to identify SLURM object in HTTPs message body. 144 The RUSH-aware HTTPs server/client MUST be prepared to process media 145 type "application/json-slurm". 147 4.3. RUSH Example 149 Figure 1 shows an example of using RUSH to carry out RPKI validated 150 cache by HTTP POST method. 152 POST /rpki-cache HTTP/2 153 Host: rpki.example.com 154 Content-Type : application/json-slurm 155 Content-Length:964 156 <964 bytes represented by the following json string> 157 { 158 "slurmVersion": 1, 159 "validationOutputFilters": { 160 "prefixFilters": [ 161 { 162 "prefix": "192.0.2.0/24", 163 "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix" 164 }, 165 { 166 "asn": 64496, 167 "comment": "All VRPs matching ASN" 168 }, 169 { 170 "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24", 171 "asn": 64497, 172 "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix, matching ASN" 173 } 174 ], 175 "bgpsecFilters": [ 176 { 177 "asn": 64496, 178 "comment": "All keys for ASN" 179 }, 180 { 181 "SKI": "Zm9v", 182 "comment": "Key matching Router SKI" 183 }, 184 { 185 "asn": 64497, 186 "SKI": "YmFy", 187 "comment": "Key for ASN 64497 matching Router SKI" 188 } 189 ] 190 }, 191 "locallyAddedAssertions": { 192 "prefixAssertions": [ 193 { 194 "asn": 64496, 195 "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24", 196 "comment": "My other important route" 197 }, 198 { 199 "asn": 64496, 200 "prefix": "2001:DB8::/32", 201 "maxPrefixLength": 48, 202 "comment": "My other important de-aggregated routes" 203 } 204 ], 205 "bgpsecAssertions": [ 206 { 207 "asn": 64496, 208 "comment" : "My known key for my important ASN", 209 "SKI": "", 210 "routerPublicKey": "" 211 } 212 ] 213 } 214 } 216 Figure 1: Figure 1.Example of an HTTP message for use of RUSH 218 5. IANA Considerations 220 Type name: application 222 Subtype name: json-slurm 224 Subtype name: json-slurm 226 Optional parameters: N/A 228 Encoding considerations: This is a JSON object. 230 Security considerations: N/A 232 Interoperability considerations: [RFC8416] 233 Published specification: 235 Applications that use this media type: 237 Systems that want to exchange RPKI cache data update information in 238 SLURM file format [RFC8416] over HTTPs. 240 Person&email address to contact for further information: Di Ma 241 243 Intended usage: COMMON 245 Restrictions on usage: N/A 247 Author: Di Ma 249 Change controller: IESG 251 6. Security Considerations 253 Note that RPKI offers signed-object-oriented security, which is not 254 provided by RUSH any longer. There are some security issues must be 255 handled properly as per different usecases as described in Section 3. 257 Cache Identity: RUSH is designed to carry out RPKI cache data update 258 from one to another, with out-of-band trust established between those 259 cache servers. That is, the scope of RUSH usage is convergent. 260 Cache subscription management might be employed to implement cache 261 identification and verification. The RPKI cache server security and 262 the trust model for the interaction between cache servers is out of 263 the scope of this document. 265 Transport Security: Updating RPKI validated cache over HTTPs relies 266 on the security of the underlying HTTPs transport. Implementations 267 utilizing HTTP/2 benefit from the TLS profile defined in Section 9.2 268 of [RFC7540]. 270 Data Integrity: An HTTPS connection provides transport security for 271 the interaction between cache servers, but it does not provide data 272 integrity detection. An adversary that can control the cache used by 273 the subscriber can affect that subscriber's view of the RPKI. 275 7. Acknowledgments 277 TBD 279 8. References 280 8.1. Normative References 282 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 283 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 284 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 285 . 287 [RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, 288 DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000, 289 . 291 [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route 292 Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, 293 DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012, 294 . 296 [RFC7540] Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext 297 Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540, 298 DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015, 299 . 301 [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 302 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 303 May 2017, . 305 [RFC8209] Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for 306 BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, 307 and Certification Requests", RFC 8209, 308 DOI 10.17487/RFC8209, September 2017, 309 . 311 [RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data 312 Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259, 313 DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017, 314 . 316 [RFC8416] Ma, D., Mandelberg, D., and T. Bruijnzeels, "Simplified 317 Local Internet Number Resource Management with the RPKI 318 (SLURM)", RFC 8416, DOI 10.17487/RFC8416, August 2018, 319 . 321 [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol 322 Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, 323 . 325 8.2. Informative References 327 [RFC8210] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key 328 Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 1", 329 RFC 8210, DOI 10.17487/RFC8210, September 2017, 330 . 332 Authors' Addresses 334 Di Ma 335 ZDNS 336 4 South 4th St. Zhongguancun 337 Haidian 338 Beijing, 100190 339 China 340 Email: madi@zdns.cn 342 Hanbing Yan 343 CNCERT 344 Email: yhb@cert.org.cn 346 Melchior Aelmans 347 Juniper Networks 348 Boeing Avenue 240 349 Email: maelmans@juniper.net