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(The document does seem to have the reference to RFC 2119 which the ID-Checklist requires). -- The document date (November 20, 2020) is 1251 days in the past. Is this intentional? Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) == Unused Reference: 'RFC5226' is defined on line 240, but no explicit reference was found in the text ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 5246 (Obsoleted by RFC 8446) -- Obsolete informational reference (is this intentional?): RFC 5226 (Obsoleted by RFC 8126) Summary: 1 error (**), 0 flaws (~~), 3 warnings (==), 2 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group A. Melnikov, Ed. 3 Internet-Draft Isode Ltd 4 Intended status: Standards Track November 20, 2020 5 Expires: May 24, 2021 7 SCRAM-SHA3-512 and SCRAM-SHA3-512-PLUS Simple Authentication and 8 Security Layer (SASL) Mechanisms 9 draft-melnikov-scram-sha3-512-01 11 Abstract 13 This document registers the Simple Authentication and Security Layer 14 (SASL) mechanisms SCRAM-SHA3-512 and SCRAM-SHA3-512-PLUS. 16 Status of This Memo 18 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 19 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 21 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 22 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 23 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 24 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 26 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 27 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 28 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 29 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 31 This Internet-Draft will expire on May 24, 2021. 33 Copyright Notice 35 Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 36 document authors. All rights reserved. 38 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 39 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 40 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 41 publication of this document. Please review these documents 42 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 43 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 44 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 45 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 46 described in the Simplified BSD License. 48 Table of Contents 50 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 51 2. Key Word Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 52 3. SCRAM-SHA3-512 and SCRAM-SHA3-512-PLUS . . . . . . . . . . . 2 53 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 54 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 55 6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 56 6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 57 6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 58 Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 59 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 61 1. Introduction 63 This document registers the SASL [RFC4422] mechanisms SCRAM-SHA3-512 64 and SCRAM-SHA3-512-PLUS. SHA3-512 has stronger security properties 65 than SHA-1, and it is expected that SCRAM mechanisms based on it will 66 have greater predicted longevity than the SCRAM mechanisms based on 67 SHA-1. SHA3-512 works differently from SHA-2 family of hash 68 functions, so it is also expected that vulnerabilities in SHA-2 hash 69 functions are not going to necessarily affect SHA-3 family of hash 70 functions. 72 2. Key Word Definitions 74 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 75 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and 76 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 77 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 79 3. SCRAM-SHA3-512 and SCRAM-SHA3-512-PLUS 81 The SCRAM-SHA3-512 and SCRAM-SHA3-512-PLUS SASL mechanisms are 82 defined in the same way that SCRAM-SHA-1 and SCRAM-SHA-1-PLUS are 83 defined in [RFC5802], except that the hash function for HMAC() and 84 H() uses SHA3-512 [NIST.FIPS.202] instead of SHA-1. 86 For the SCRAM-SHA3-512 and SCRAM-SHA3-512-PLUS SASL mechanisms, the 87 hash iteration-count announced by a server SHOULD be at least 10000. 89 The GSS-API mechanism OID for SCRAM-SHA3-512 is 1.3.6.1.5.5. 90 (see Section 5). 92 This is a simple example of a SCRAM-SHA3-512 authentication exchange 93 when the client doesn't support channel bindings. The username 94 'user' and password 'pencil' are being used. 96 4. Security Considerations 98 The security considerations from [RFC5802] still apply. 100 To be secure, either SCRAM-SHA3-512-PLUS and SCRAM-SHA-1-PLUS MUST be 101 used over a TLS channel that has had the session hash extension 102 [RFC7627] negotiated, or session resumption MUST NOT have been used. 103 When using SCRAM over TLS 1.2 [RFC5246], the "tls-unique" channel 104 binding is still the default channel binding to use (see Section 6.1 105 of [RFC5802]), assuming the above conditions are satisfied. As "tls- 106 unique" channel binding is not defined for TLS 1.3 [RFC8446], when 107 using SCRAM over TLS 1.3, the "tls-exporter" channel binding 108 [tls-1.3-channel-binding] MUST be the default channel binding (in the 109 sense specified in Section 6.1 of [RFC5802]) to use. 111 See [RFC4270] and [RFC6194] for reasons to move from SHA-1 to a 112 strong security mechanism like SHA3-512. 114 The strength of this mechanism is dependent in part on the hash 115 iteration-count, as denoted by "i" in [RFC5802]. As a rule of thumb, 116 the hash iteration-count should be such that a modern machine will 117 take 0.1 seconds to perform the complete algorithm; however, this is 118 unlikely to be practical on mobile devices and other relatively low- 119 performance systems. At the time this was written, the rule of thumb 120 gives around 15,000 iterations required; however, a hash iteration- 121 count of 10000 takes around 0.5 seconds on current mobile handsets. 122 This computational cost can be avoided by caching the ClientKey 123 (assuming the Salt and hash iteration-count is stable). Therefore, 124 the recommendation of this specification is that the hash iteration- 125 count SHOULD be at least 10000, but careful consideration ought to be 126 given to using a significantly higher value, particularly where 127 mobile use is less important. 129 5. IANA Considerations 131 IANA is requested to add the following new SASL SCRAM mechanisms to 132 the "SASL SCRAM Family Mechanisms" registry: 134 To: iana@iana.org 136 Subject: Registration of a new SASL SCRAM Family mechanism SCRAM- 137 SHA3-512 139 SASL mechanism name (or prefix for the family): SCRAM-SHA3-512 141 Security considerations: Section 4 of RFC XXXX 142 Published specification (optional, recommended): RFC XXXX 144 Minimum iteration-count: 10000 146 OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5. 148 Person & email address to contact for further information: IETF 149 KITTEN WG 151 Intended usage: COMMON 153 Owner/Change controller: IESG 155 Note: 157 To: iana@iana.org 159 Subject: Registration of a new SASL SCRAM Family mechanism SCRAM- 160 SHA3-512-PLUS 162 SASL mechanism name (or prefix for the family): SCRAM- 163 SHA3-512-PLUS 165 Security considerations: Section 4 of RFC XXXX 167 Published specification (optional, recommended): RFC XXXX 169 Minimum iteration-count: 10000 171 OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5. 173 Person & email address to contact for further information: IETF 174 KITTEN WG 176 Intended usage: COMMON 178 Owner/Change controller: IESG 180 Note: 182 6. References 184 6.1. Normative References 186 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 187 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 188 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 189 . 191 [RFC4422] Melnikov, A., Ed. and K. Zeilenga, Ed., "Simple 192 Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)", RFC 4422, 193 DOI 10.17487/RFC4422, June 2006, 194 . 196 [RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security 197 (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, 198 DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008, 199 . 201 [RFC5802] Newman, C., Menon-Sen, A., Melnikov, A., and N. Williams, 202 "Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism 203 (SCRAM) SASL and GSS-API Mechanisms", RFC 5802, 204 DOI 10.17487/RFC5802, July 2010, 205 . 207 [RFC7627] Bhargavan, K., Ed., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Pironti, A., 208 Langley, A., and M. Ray, "Transport Layer Security (TLS) 209 Session Hash and Extended Master Secret Extension", 210 RFC 7627, DOI 10.17487/RFC7627, September 2015, 211 . 213 [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 214 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 215 May 2017, . 217 [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol 218 Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, 219 . 221 [tls-1.3-channel-binding] 222 Whited, S., "Channel Bindings for TLS 1.3", draft-ietf- 223 kitten-tls-channel-bindings-for-tls13-00 (work in 224 progress), June 2020. 226 [NIST.FIPS.202] 227 Dworkin, M., "SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and 228 Extendable-Output Functions", FIPS PUB 202, 229 DOI 10.6028/nist.fips.202, August 2015, 230 . 233 6.2. Informative References 235 [RFC4270] Hoffman, P. and B. Schneier, "Attacks on Cryptographic 236 Hashes in Internet Protocols", RFC 4270, 237 DOI 10.17487/RFC4270, November 2005, 238 . 240 [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an 241 IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226, 242 DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008, 243 . 245 [RFC6194] Polk, T., Chen, L., Turner, S., and P. Hoffman, "Security 246 Considerations for the SHA-0 and SHA-1 Message-Digest 247 Algorithms", RFC 6194, DOI 10.17487/RFC6194, March 2011, 248 . 250 Acknowledgements 252 This document is based on RFC 7677 by Tony Hansen. 254 Author's Address 256 Alexey Melnikov (editor) 257 Isode Ltd 258 14 Castle Mews 259 Hampton, Middlesex TW12 2NP 260 UK 262 EMail: alexey.melnikov@isode.com