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Please use uppercase 'NOT' together with RFC 2119 keywords (if that is what you mean). Found 'MUST not' in this paragraph: If the new IKE SA is not fully authenticated, or if the peer authenticated identity in the new IKE SA is not the same as in the current IKE SA, a conformant Responder MUST NOT send the HAND_OVER_CHILD_SAS Notification, and MUST not move the Child SAs. -- The document date (August 27, 2013) is 3895 days in the past. Is this intentional? Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) == Outdated reference: A later version (-04) exists of draft-kivinen-ipsecme-ikev2-rfc5996bis-00 -- Possible downref: Normative reference to a draft: ref. 'RFC5996bis' Summary: 0 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 3 warnings (==), 2 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 IPsecME Working Group Y. Nir 3 Internet-Draft Check Point 4 Intended status: Standards Track August 27, 2013 5 Expires: February 28, 2014 7 Handing Over Child SAs Following Re-Authentication in IKEv2 8 draft-nir-ipsecme-cafr-02 10 Abstract 12 This document describes an extension to the IKEv2 protocol whereby 13 Child SAs are moved to the new IKE SA following re-authentication. 14 This allows for a smoother transition with no loss of connectivity. 16 Status of this Memo 18 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 19 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 21 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 22 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 23 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 24 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 26 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 27 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 28 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 29 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 31 This Internet-Draft will expire on February 28, 2014. 33 Copyright Notice 35 Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 36 document authors. All rights reserved. 38 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 39 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 40 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 41 publication of this document. Please review these documents 42 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 43 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 44 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 45 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 46 described in the Simplified BSD License. 48 Table of Contents 50 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 51 1.1. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 52 2. Handing Over Child SAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 53 2.1. The HAND_OVER_CHILD_SAS Notification . . . . . . . . . . . 4 54 2.2. Verifying the HAND_OVER_CHILD_SAS Notification . . . . . . 5 55 3. The Illustrated Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 56 4. Interaction with Other Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 57 5. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 58 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 59 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 60 8. Changes from Previous Versions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 61 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 62 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 63 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 64 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 66 1. Introduction 68 The Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2) protocol, as specified in 69 [RFC5996bis] associates Child SAs with the IKE SAs under which the 70 exchange that created them took place. With the deletion of the IKE 71 SA due to expiry, policy change, or an explicit message from the 72 peer, the child SAs associated with it are implicitly closed as 73 described in section 1.4.1 of the IKEv2 document. This behavior is 74 not desired when IKE SAs are replaced rather than deleted, because 75 those child SAs could still be valid and there is no security reason 76 to create new ones prematurely. 78 There are two cases where an IKE SA is replaced. 79 1. Rekeying, where new keys are generated. This is described in 80 section 2.18 of RFC 5996. This is done mainly for key freshness. 81 2. Re-Authentication, where both sides authenticate, and new keys 82 are generated. This is done as part of a risk management policy, 83 to limit the time that compromised IKE SA keys can be used to 84 provide the attacker access to the network. No reauthentication 85 exchange is specified in the RFC. Instead, it's simply the 86 Initial and Authentication exchanges done as if from scratch. 87 This is described in section 2.8.3 of RFC 5996. 89 For rekeying, RFC 5996 provides a way to avoid having to re-create 90 all child SAs. When an IKE SA is rekeyed, all the Child SAs under 91 the old IKE SA are inherited by the new IKE SA, so that the 92 subsequent deletion of the old IKE SA does not affect the Child SAs. 93 This behavior is described in section 2.8 paragraph 4 of RFC 5996. 95 For reauthentication, RFC 5996 does not provide a similar mechanism, 96 and section 2.8.3 explicitly says that Child SAs need to be created 97 from scratch. This is often inconvenient, as IPsec systems usually 98 create Child SAs only in response to traffic and multiple Child SAs 99 may exist for a single IKE SA. The protocol extension in this draft 100 closes this gap. 102 1.1. Conventions Used in This Document 104 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 105 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 106 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. 108 The terms IKE SA, Child SA, Rekeying, and Reauthentication are as 109 described in the RFC 5996. 111 2. Handing Over Child SAs 113 This document defines a new notification that can be sent over an old 114 IKE SA, just after an IKE_AUTH exchange has been used to re- 115 authenticate. The notification tells the peer to transfer all Child 116 SAs that belong to the current (old) IKE SA to be owned by the new 117 IKE SA, so that when the old IKE SA is deleted, those Child SAs are 118 not. If both peers send this notification, all Child SAs belonging 119 to the old IKE SA are immediately inherited by the new IKE SA. 121 In addition to the Child SAs, any IP address assigned to either peer 122 through the use of the CFG payload (as described in section 2.19 of 123 RFC 5996), is also associated with the new IKE SA. 125 The new notification MAY be accompanied by a DELETE payload, so as to 126 transfer the Child SAs and delete the old IKE SA at the same time. 128 2.1. The HAND_OVER_CHILD_SAS Notification 130 The HAND_OVER_CHILD_SA notification is formatted as follows: 132 1 2 3 133 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 134 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 135 ! Next Payload !C! RESERVED ! Payload Length ! 136 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 137 ! Protocol ID ! SPI Size ! HAND_OVER_CHILD_SAS Type ! 138 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 139 | | 140 ~ New IKE Security Parameter Index (SPI) ~ 141 | | 142 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 144 Figure 1 146 o Protocol ID (1 octet) MUST be zero, as specified in Section 3.10 147 of RFC 5996. 148 o SPI Size (1 octet) MUST be zero, in conformance with Section 3.10 149 of RFC 5996. 150 o HAND_OVER_CHILD_SAS Notify Message Type (2 octets) - MUST be 151 xxxxx, the value assigned for HAND_OVER_CHILD_SAS. TBA by IANA. 152 o Notification Data, or New IKE Security Parameter Index (16 octets) 153 - contains the concatenated SPIs of the new IKE SA. The Initiator 154 SPI comes first, similar to the first 16 bytes of the IKE header. 155 Note that this is not the SPI field of the notification payload, 156 but the data field. 158 2.2. Verifying the HAND_OVER_CHILD_SAS Notification 160 To go through with the new IKE SA inheriting the SAs of the old IKE 161 SA, all of the following MUST apply: 162 o Both sides have to be successfully authenticated, and the new IKE 163 SA has to be established. 164 o The authenticated identities of both sides under the new IKE SA 165 are the same as those under the old IKE SA. If the authenticated 166 identity of one peer differs from the authenticated identity that 167 it had in the previous IKE SA, the other side MUST respond with an 168 INVALID_SYNTAX notification. 169 o The New IKE SPIs in the notifications from both peers MUST match 170 bit for bit. 172 If the new IKE SA is not fully authenticated, or if the peer 173 authenticated identity in the new IKE SA is not the same as in the 174 current IKE SA, a conformant Responder MUST NOT send the 175 HAND_OVER_CHILD_SAS Notification, and MUST not move the Child SAs. 177 If the Initiator has not sent the HAND_OVER_CHILD_SAS notification, 178 but has received it in a response, it MUST ignore it and MUST NOT 179 move the Child SAs. 181 If the Initiator has sent the notification, but the Responder has not 182 sent it, then the Initiator MUST NOT move the Child SAs. 184 If the Initiator has sent the notification, but the notification from 185 the Responder does not match the IKE SPIs in the Initiator's 186 notification, the Initiator MUST send a SYNTAX_ERROR notification and 187 MUST NOT transfer the Child SAs. 189 3. The Illustrated Protocol 191 The Informational exchange after creating a new IKE SA: 193 Initiator Responder 194 ----------------------------------------------------------------- 195 HDR, SK { 196 N(HAND_OVER_IKE_SAS, new IKE SA SPIs), 197 DELETE 198 } --> 199 HDR, SK { 200 N(HAND_OVER_IKE_SAS, new IKE SA SPIs) 201 <-- } 203 Figure 2 205 Note that in the above figure, the HDR has the IKE SPIs of the old 206 IKE SAs, and the SK payload uses the keys of the old IKE SA, because 207 this message is sent over the old IKE SA. 209 4. Interaction with Other Standards 211 This document changes things so that there is often no need to create 212 new Child SAs along with the new IKE SA when reauthenticating. This 213 makes the full IKE_AUTH exchange with the piggy-backed Child SA 214 exchange (as described in RFC 5996) superfluous. Implementations 215 should consider implementing the childless extension of IKEv2 216 ([RFC6023]) in addition to this specification. 218 5. Acknowledgements 220 The author would like to thank Valery Smyslov for the suggestion of 221 moving the hand-over from the IKE_AUTH to an Informational under the 222 old IKE SA and other suggestions. This changed (in version -01) 223 simplified the protocol significantly. 225 6. IANA Considerations 227 IANA is requested to assign a notify message type from the status 228 types range (16418-40959) of the "IKEv2 Notify Message Types" 229 registry with name "HAND_OVER_CHILD_SAS" 231 7. Security Considerations 233 The HAND_OVER_CHILD_SAS notification is sent protected by the old IKE 234 SA. This protects against stealing child SAs. The requirement for 235 sameness of authenticated identity protects against errors by one 236 peer transferring child SAs to some other peer, although we cannot 237 think of any attack that would exploit this. 239 8. Changes from Previous Versions 241 [NOTE TO RFC EDITOR: PLEASE REMOVE THIS SECTION] 243 Version -01 moved the sending of the notification from the IKE_AUTH 244 exchange that is part of reauthentication to the Informational 245 exchange that is part of closing the old IKE SA. This made 246 cryptographic binding to the old IKE SA unnecessary. 248 Version -02 changed the notification payload so that the IKE SPI of 249 the other IKE SA is now in the data field of the notification 250 payload, rather than the SPI field. This makes it more in line with 251 how the notification payload is defined in RFC 5996. 253 9. References 255 9.1. Normative References 257 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 258 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 260 [RFC5996bis] 261 Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T. 262 Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 263 (IKEv2)", draft-kivinen-ipsecme-ikev2-rfc5996bis-00 (work 264 in progress), August 2013. 266 9.2. Informative References 268 [RFC6023] Nir, Y., Tschofenig, H., Deng, H., and R. Singh, "A 269 Childless Initiation of the Internet Key Exchange Version 270 2 (IKEv2) Security Association (SA)", RFC 6023, 271 October 2010. 273 Author's Address 275 Yoav Nir 276 Check Point Software Technologies Ltd. 277 5 Hasolelim st. 278 Tel Aviv 6789735 279 Israel 281 Email: ynir@checkpoint.com