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Raszuk 4 Intended status: Standards Track Cisco Systems, Inc. 5 Expires: September 8, 2011 March 7, 2011 7 BGP Security State Diagnostic Message 8 draft-retana-bgp-security-state-diagnostic-00 10 Abstract 12 This document describes an extension to the BGP Diagnostic Message to 13 communicate the security state of a route. An application of this 14 extension is to propagate information about non-secure advertisements 15 back to the eBGP peer from where the information was received. 17 Status of this Memo 19 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 20 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 22 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 23 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 24 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 25 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 27 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 28 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 29 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 30 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 32 This Internet-Draft will expire on September 8, 2011. 34 Copyright Notice 36 Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 37 document authors. All rights reserved. 39 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 40 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 41 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 42 publication of this document. Please review these documents 43 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 44 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 45 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 46 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 47 described in the Simplified BSD License. 49 Table of Contents 51 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 52 2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 53 3. The BGP Security State Diagnostic Message . . . . . . . . . . . 3 54 4. Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 55 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 56 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 57 7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 58 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 59 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 60 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 61 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 63 1. Introduction 65 BGP Prefix Origin Validation [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate] defines the 66 interaction between BGP and a database able to map prefixes to their 67 authorized ASes. One of the potential actions resulting from an 68 "invalid" route is to reject it. 70 This document describes an extension to the BGP Diagnostic Message 71 [I-D.raszuk-bgp-diagnostic-message] and its use to communicate 72 information about these "invalid" paths. The main motivation is to 73 facilitate troubleshooting, monitoring, logging or even correction of 74 the security mechanisms' operation, especially during initial 75 deployment. 77 2. Requirements Language 79 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 80 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 81 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. 83 3. The BGP Security State Diagnostic Message 85 The BGP Security State Diagnostic Message is a TLV to be carried in 86 the BGP Diagnostic Message and is used to communicate the local 87 security state of a path. It is defined as follows. 89 0 1 2 3 90 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 91 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 92 | Type | Length | 93 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 94 | Method Code | Validity Code | Reason Code |Reason Sub-Code| 95 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 96 | AFI | SAFI | # NLRI | 97 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 98 | NLRI (Variable) | 99 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 100 | Data (Variable) | 101 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 103 BGP Security State Diagnostic Message 105 Type: 106 Two octet field with a value TBD. 108 Length: 109 Two octet field indicating the TLV length in octets. 111 Method Code: 112 One octet field. Indicates which security mechanism was used to 113 determine the validity of the path. 115 Value Meaning 116 0 Reserved 117 1 BGP Prefix Origin Validation [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate] 119 Method Codes 121 Validity Code: 122 One octet field. Indicates whether the path is considered secure 123 or not by the local AS. The values are to be interpreted relative 124 to the Method defined above. 126 The following values are defined for Method Code 1: 128 Value Meaning 129 0 Reserved 130 1 Not Found 131 2 Invalid Path 133 Validity Codes 135 Reason Code: 136 One octet field. Indicates the reason the security mechanism 137 listed in the Method Code considered the path as indicated in the 138 Validity Code. The values are specific to the Method Code used. 140 The following Reason Codes are defined for Method Code 1, Validity 141 Code 2: 143 Value Meaning 144 0 Reserved 145 1 Invalid Origin 146 2 Certificate doesn't exist 148 Reason Codes 150 Reason Sub-Code: 151 One octet field. Indicates any additional information related to 152 the Reason Code indicated for the specific Method used. At this 153 time no specific values are defined. 155 AFI (Address Family Identifier): 156 Two octet field, encoded the same way as in RFC 4760 [RFC4760]. 158 SAFI (Subsequent Address Family Identifier): 159 Two octet field, encoded the same way as in RFC 4760 [RFC4760]. 161 # NLRI (Number of Network Layer Reachability Information entries): 162 One octet field indicating the number of NLRI entries to follow. 164 NLRI: 165 Variable length field encoded as one or more 2-tuples of the form 166 , as described in RFC 4760 [RFC4760]. 168 Data: 169 Variable length field. Indicates any additional information 170 related to the Reason Code indicated for the specific Method used. 171 This is an OPTIONAL field with variable length. 173 4. Operation 175 The mechanism described is intended to be primarily applied at 176 autonomous system border routers. 178 When a BGP speaker receives what considers to be an invalid 179 advertisement it MAY send a BGP Security State Diagnostic Message to 180 the eBGP peer from where it received it. It is RECOMMENDED that a 181 BGP speaker limit the number of messages sent to a specific peer over 182 a given period of time and that the messages be built in such a way 183 as to include as many NLRI as possible. 185 A BGP speaker SHOULD also send the BGP Security State Diagnostic 186 Message in response to the "Prefix specific BGP query" TLV (type 17) 187 or the "Diagnostic Message Query" TLV (type 3). The BGP Security 188 State Diagnostic Message SHOULD NOT be sent periodically to a peer; 189 to achieve this behavior the "Max frequency permitted" TLV (type 2) 190 should be used to announce a value of 0. 192 The information contained in the BGP Security State Diagnostic 193 Message can then be used to diagnose and correct any potential local 194 security policy violations. Specific actions taken are outside the 195 scope of this document, but could include withdrawing the original 196 UPDATE or simply logging the information. 198 5. IANA Considerations 200 IANA is asked to create and maintain registries for the fields 201 described in Section 3, and to assign the corresponding TLV type. 203 6. Security Considerations 205 The mechanism described in this document doesn't add any new security 206 concerns. 208 7. Acknowledgements 210 The mechanism described in this document was influenced by 211 discussions with Dacheng Zhang and Mingui Zhang. 213 The authors would like to thank the following people for their 214 comments and suggestions: Bertrand Duvivier, Keyur Patel, Roque 215 Gagliano and Russ White. 217 8. References 219 8.1. Normative References 221 [I-D.raszuk-bgp-diagnostic-message] 222 Raszuk, R., Chen, E., and B. Decraene, "BGP Diagnostic 223 Message", draft-raszuk-bgp-diagnostic-message-00 (work in 224 progress), October 2010. 226 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 227 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 229 [RFC4760] Bates, T., Chandra, R., Katz, D., and Y. Rekhter, 230 "Multiprotocol Extensions for BGP-4", RFC 4760, 231 January 2007. 233 8.2. Informative References 235 [I-D.ietf-sidr-pfx-validate] 236 Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. 237 Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", 238 draft-ietf-sidr-pfx-validate-01 (work in progress), 239 February 2011. 241 Authors' Addresses 243 Alvaro Retana 244 Cisco Systems, Inc. 245 7025 Kit Creek Rd. 246 Research Triangle Park, NC 27709 247 USA 249 Email: aretana@cisco.com 251 Robert Razsuk 252 Cisco Systems, Inc. 253 170 West Tasman Drive 254 San Jose, CA 95134 255 USA 257 Email: raszuk@cisco.com