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Richardson 3 Internet-Draft Sandelman Software Works 4 Intended status: Informational August 06, 2018 5 Expires: February 7, 2019 7 Enabling secure network enrollment in RPL networks 8 draft-richardson-6tisch-roll-enrollment-priority-01 10 Abstract 12 [I-D.richardson-6tisch-enrollment-enhanced-beacon] defines a method 13 by which a potential [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security] can announce 14 itself as a available for new Pledges to Join a network. The 15 announcement includes a priority for join. This document provides a 16 mechanism by which a RPL DODAG root can disable join announcements, 17 or adjust the base priority for join operation. 19 Status of This Memo 21 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 22 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 24 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 25 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 26 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 27 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 29 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 30 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 31 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 32 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 34 This Internet-Draft will expire on February 7, 2019. 36 Copyright Notice 38 Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 39 document authors. All rights reserved. 41 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 42 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 43 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 44 publication of this document. Please review these documents 45 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 46 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 47 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 48 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 49 described in the Simplified BSD License. 51 Table of Contents 53 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 54 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 55 2. Protocol Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 56 3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 57 4. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 58 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 59 6. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 60 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 61 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 62 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 63 Appendix A. Change history . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 64 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 66 1. Introduction 68 [RFC7554] describes the use of the time-slotted channel hopping 69 (TSCH) mode of [ieee802154]. [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security] and 70 [I-D.ietf-6tisch-dtsecurity-secure-join] describe mechanisms by which 71 a new node (the "pledge)" can use a friendly router as a Join Proxy. 72 [I-D.richardson-6tisch-enrollment-enhanced-beacon] describes an 73 extension to the 802.15.4 Enhanced Beacon that is used by a Join 74 Proxy to announce its existence such that Pledges can find them. 76 It has become clear that not every routing member of the mesh ought 77 to announce itself as a Join Proxy. There are a variety of local 78 reasons by which a 6LR might not want to provide the Join Proxy 79 function. They include available battery power, already committed 80 network bandwidth, and also total available memory available for Join 81 proxy neighbor cache slots. 83 There are other situations where the operator of the network would 84 like to selective enable or disable the join process in a particular 85 DODAG. 87 As the join process involves permitting unencrypted traffic into the 88 best effort part of a (TSCH) network, it would be better to have the 89 join process off when no new nodes are expected. 91 A network operator might also be able to recognize when certain parts 92 of the network are overloaded and can not accomodate additional join 93 traffic, and it would like to adjust the join priority among all 94 nodes in the subtree of a congested link. 96 This document describes an RPL DIO option that can be used to 97 announce a minimum join priority. Each potential Join Proxy would 98 this value as a base on which to add (decreasing likely hood of 99 attracting traffic) values relating to local conditions. 101 A network operator can set this value to the maximum value allowed, 102 effectively disable all new join traffic. 104 1.1. Terminology 106 In this document, the key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", 107 "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", 108 and "OPTIONAL" are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, RFC 2119 109 [RFC2119] and indicate requirement levels for compliant STuPiD 110 implementations. 112 In addition, the terminology of [I-D.ietf-6tisch-terminology] and 113 from [I-D.ietf-anima-voucher] are used. 115 2. Protocol Definition 117 The following option is defined to transmission in the DIO issued by 118 the DODAG root. It may also be added by a router on part of the sub- 119 tree as a result of some (out of scope for this document) management 120 function. 122 6LRs that see this DIO Option SHOULD increment the minimum priority 123 if they observe congestion on the channel used for join traffic. 124 (TODO: how much? Do we need to standardize this?) 126 A 6LR which would otherwise be willing to act as a Join Proxy, will 127 examine the minimum priority field, and to that number, add any 128 additional local consideration (such as upstream congestion). The 129 resulting priority, if less than 0x7f should enable the Join Proxy 130 function. 132 0 1 2 133 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 134 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 135 | Type = TBD01|Opt Length = 1|R| min. priority | 136 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 138 min.priority a 7 bit field which provides a base value for the 139 Enhanced Beacon Join priority. A value of 0x7f (127) disables the 140 Join Proxy function entirely. 142 R a reserved bit that SHOULD be set to 0 by senders, and MUST be 143 ignored by receivers. The reserved bit SHOULD be copied to 144 options created. 146 3. Security Considerations 148 As per [RFC7416], RPL control frames either run over a secured layer 149 2, or use the [RFC6550] Secure DIO methods. This option can be 150 placed into either a "clear" (layer-2 secured) DIO, or a layer-3 151 Secure DIO. As such this option will have both integrity and 152 confidentiality mechanisms applied to it. 154 A malicious node (that was part of the RPL control plane) could see 155 these options and could, based upon the observed minimal join 156 priority signal a confederate that it was a good time to send 157 malicious join traffic. 159 A malicious node (that was part of the RPL control plane) could also 160 send DIOs with a different minimal join priority which would cause 161 downstream mesh routers to change their Join Proxy behaviour. Lower 162 minimal priorities would cause downstream nodes to accept more 163 pledges than the network was expecting, and higher minimal priorities 164 cause the join process to stall. 166 The use of layer-2 or layer-3 security for RPL control messages 167 prevents the above two attacks. 169 4. Privacy Considerations 171 There are no new privacy issues caused by this extension. 173 5. IANA Considerations 175 Allocate a new number TBD01 from Registry RPL Control Message 176 Options. This entry should be called Minimum Join Priority. 178 6. Acknowledgements 180 This has been reviewed by Pascal Thubert and Thomas Wattenye. 182 7. References 184 7.1. Normative References 186 [I-D.ietf-6tisch-minimal-security] 187 Vucinic, M., Simon, J., Pister, K., and M. Richardson, 188 "Minimal Security Framework for 6TiSCH", draft-ietf- 189 6tisch-minimal-security-06 (work in progress), May 2018. 191 [I-D.richardson-6tisch-enrollment-enhanced-beacon] 192 Dujovne, D. and M. Richardson, "IEEE802.15.4 Informational 193 Element encapsulation of 6tisch Join and Enrollment 194 Information", draft-richardson-6tisch-enrollment-enhanced- 195 beacon-01 (work in progress), April 2018. 197 [ieee802154] 198 IEEE Standard, ., "802.15.4-2015 - IEEE Standard for Low- 199 Rate Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPANs)", 2015, 200 . 203 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 204 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 205 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 206 . 208 [RFC6550] Winter, T., Ed., Thubert, P., Ed., Brandt, A., Hui, J., 209 Kelsey, R., Levis, P., Pister, K., Struik, R., Vasseur, 210 JP., and R. Alexander, "RPL: IPv6 Routing Protocol for 211 Low-Power and Lossy Networks", RFC 6550, 212 DOI 10.17487/RFC6550, March 2012, 213 . 215 [RFC7416] Tsao, T., Alexander, R., Dohler, M., Daza, V., Lozano, A., 216 and M. Richardson, Ed., "A Security Threat Analysis for 217 the Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks 218 (RPLs)", RFC 7416, DOI 10.17487/RFC7416, January 2015, 219 . 221 [RFC7554] Watteyne, T., Ed., Palattella, M., and L. Grieco, "Using 222 IEEE 802.15.4e Time-Slotted Channel Hopping (TSCH) in the 223 Internet of Things (IoT): Problem Statement", RFC 7554, 224 DOI 10.17487/RFC7554, May 2015, 225 . 227 7.2. Informative References 229 [I-D.ietf-6tisch-architecture] 230 Thubert, P., "An Architecture for IPv6 over the TSCH mode 231 of IEEE 802.15.4", draft-ietf-6tisch-architecture-14 (work 232 in progress), April 2018. 234 [I-D.ietf-6tisch-dtsecurity-secure-join] 235 Richardson, M., "6tisch Secure Join protocol", draft-ietf- 236 6tisch-dtsecurity-secure-join-01 (work in progress), 237 February 2017. 239 [I-D.ietf-6tisch-terminology] 240 Palattella, M., Thubert, P., Watteyne, T., and Q. Wang, 241 "Terms Used in IPv6 over the TSCH mode of IEEE 802.15.4e", 242 draft-ietf-6tisch-terminology-10 (work in progress), March 243 2018. 245 [I-D.ietf-anima-voucher] 246 Watsen, K., Richardson, M., Pritikin, M., and T. Eckert, 247 "Voucher Profile for Bootstrapping Protocols", draft-ietf- 248 anima-voucher-07 (work in progress), January 2018. 250 [RFC8137] Kivinen, T. and P. Kinney, "IEEE 802.15.4 Information 251 Element for the IETF", RFC 8137, DOI 10.17487/RFC8137, May 252 2017, . 254 Appendix A. Change history 256 version 00. 258 Author's Address 260 Michael Richardson 261 Sandelman Software Works 263 Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca