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2 Network Working Group J. Richer, Ed.
3 Internet-Draft Bespoke Engineering
4 Intended status: Experimental L. Johansson
5 Expires: January 22, 2017 Swedish University Network
6 July 21, 2016
8 Vectors of Trust
9 draft-richer-vectors-of-trust-03
11 Abstract
13 This document defines a mechanism for describing and signaling
14 several aspects that are used to calculate trust placed in a digital
15 identity transaction.
17 Requirements Language
19 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
20 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
21 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC
22 2119 [RFC2119].
24 Status of This Memo
26 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
27 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
29 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
30 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
31 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
32 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
34 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
35 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
36 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
37 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
39 This Internet-Draft will expire on January 22, 2017.
41 Copyright Notice
43 Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
44 document authors. All rights reserved.
46 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
47 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
48 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
49 publication of this document. Please review these documents
50 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
51 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
52 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
53 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
54 described in the Simplified BSD License.
56 Table of Contents
58 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
59 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
60 1.2. An Identity Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
61 1.3. Component Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
62 2. Component Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
63 2.1. Identity Proofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
64 2.2. Primary Credential Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
65 2.3. Primary Credential Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
66 2.4. Assertion Presentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
67 3. Vectors of Trust Initial Component Value Definitions . . . . 8
68 3.1. Identity Proofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
69 3.2. Primary Credential Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
70 3.3. Primary Credential Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
71 3.4. Assertion Presentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
72 4. Communicating Vector Values to RPs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
73 4.1. On the Wire Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
74 4.2. In OpenID Connect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
75 4.3. In SAML . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
76 5. Requesting Vector Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
77 5.1. In OpenID Connect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
78 5.2. In SAML . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
79 6. Trustmark . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
80 7. Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
81 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
82 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
83 9.1. Vector Of Trust Components Registry . . . . . . . . . . . 16
84 9.2. Additions to JWT Claims Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
85 10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
86 11. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
87 12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
88 12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
89 12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
90 Appendix A. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
91 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
93 1. Introduction
95 This document defines a mechanism for measuring and signaling several
96 aspects of digital identity and authentication transactions that are
97 used to determine a level of trust in that transaction. In the past,
98 there have been two extremes of communicating authentication
99 transaction information.
101 At one extreme, all attributes can be communicated with full
102 provenance and associated trust markings. This approach seeks to
103 create a fully-distributed attribute system to support functions such
104 as attribute based access control (ABAC). These attributes can be
105 used to describe the end user, the identity provider, the relying
106 party, or even the transaction itself. While the information that
107 can be expressed in this model is incredibly detailed and robust, the
108 complexity of such a system is often prohibitive to realize,
109 especially across security domains. In particular, a large burden is
110 placed on relying parties needing to process the sea of disparate
111 attributes when making a security decision.
113 At the other extreme there are systems that collapse all of the
114 attributes and aspects into a single scalar value that communicates,
115 in sum, how much a transaction can be trusted. The NIST special
116 publication 800-63 [SP-800-63-2] version 2 defines a linear scale
117 Level of Assurance (LoA) measure that combines multiple attributes
118 about an identity transaction into such a single measure. While this
119 definition was originally narrowly targeted for a specific set of
120 government use cases, the LoA scale appeared to be applicable with a
121 wide variety of authentication scenarios in different domains. This
122 has led to a proliferation of incompatible interpretations of the
123 same scale in different contexts, preventing interoperability between
124 each LoA definition in spite of their common measurement. LoA is
125 artificially limited due to the original goal of creating a single
126 linear scale. Since identity proofing strength increases linearly
127 along with credential strength in the LoA scale, this scale is too
128 limited for describing many valid and useful forms of an identity
129 transaction that do not fit the government's original model. For
130 example, an anonymously assigned hardware token can be used in cases
131 where the real world identity of the subject cannot be known for
132 privacy reasons, but the credential itself can be highly trusted.
133 This is in contrast with a government employee accessing a government
134 system, where the identity of the individual would need to be highly
135 proofed and strongly credentialed at the same time.
137 The Vectors of Trust (VoT) effort seeks to find a balance between
138 these two extremes by creating a data model that combines attributes
139 of the user and aspects of the authentication context into several
140 values that can be communicated separately but in parallel with each
141 other. This approach is both coarser grained than the distributed
142 attributes model and finer grained than the single scalar model, with
143 the hope that it is a viable balance of expressibility and
144 processability. Importantly, these three levels of granularity can
145 be mapped to each other. The information of several attributes can
146 be folded into a vector component, while the vector itself can be
147 folded into an assurance category. As such, the vectors of trust
148 seeks to complement, not replace, these other identity and trust
149 mechanisms in the larger identity ecosystem while providing a single
150 value for RPs to process.
152 1.1. Terminology
154 Identity Provider (IdP) A system that manages identity information
155 and is able to assert this information across the network through
156 an identity API.
158 Identity Subject The person (user) engaging in the identity
159 transaction, being identified by the identity provider and
160 identified to the relying party.
162 Primary Credential The means used by the identity subject to
163 authenticate to the identity provider.
165 Federated Credential The assertion presented by the IdP to the RP
166 across the network to authenticate the user.
168 Relying Party (RP) A system that consumes identity information from
169 an IdP for the purposes of authenticating the user.
171 Trust Framework A document containing business rules and legal
172 clauses that defines how different parties in an identity
173 transaction may act.
175 Trustmark A verifiable attestation that a party has proved to follow
176 the constraints of a trust framework.
178 Trustmark Provider A system that issues and provides verification
179 for trustmarks.
181 Vector A multi-part data structure, used here for conveying
182 information about an authentication transaction.
184 Vector Component One of several constituent parts that make up a
185 vector.
187 1.2. An Identity Model
189 This document assumes the following model for identity based on
190 identity federation technologies:
192 The identity subject (also known as the user) is associated with an
193 identity provider which acts as a trusted third party on behalf of
194 the user with regard to a relying party by making identity assertions
195 about the user to the relying party.
197 The real-world person represented by the identity subject is in
198 possession of a primary credential bound to the identity subject by
199 the identity provider (or an agent thereof) in such a way that the
200 binding between the credential and the real-world user is a
201 representation of the identity proofing process performed by the
202 identity provider (or an agent thereof) to verify the identity of the
203 real-world person. This is all carried by an identity assertion
204 across the network to the relying party during the authentication
205 transaction.
207 1.3. Component Architecture
209 The term Vectors of Trust is based on the mathematical construct of a
210 vector, which is defined as an item composed of multiple independent
211 values.
213 An important goal for this work is to balance the need for simplicity
214 (particularly on the part of the relying party) with the need for
215 expressiveness. As such, this vector construct is designed to be
216 composable and extensible.
218 All components of the vector construct MUST be orthogonal such that
219 no aspect of a component overlaps an aspect of another component, as
220 much as is possible.
222 2. Component Definitions
224 This specification defines four orthogonal components: identity
225 proofing, primary credential usage, primary credential management,
226 and assertion presentation. These dimensions MUST be evaluated by
227 the RP in the context of a trust framework and SHOULD be combined
228 with other information when making a trust and authorization
229 decision.
231 This specification also defines values for each component to be used
232 in the absence of a more specific trust framework in Section 3. It
233 is expected that trust frameworks will provide context, semantics,
234 and mapping to legal statutes and business rules for each value in
235 each component. Consequently, a particular vector value can only be
236 compared with vectors defined in the same context. The RP MUST
237 understand and take into account the trust framework context in which
238 a vector is being expressed in order for it to be processed securely.
240 Each component is identified by a demarcator consisting of a single
241 uppercase ASCII letter in the range "[A-Z]". The demarcator SHOULD
242 reflect the category with which it is associated in a natural manner.
243 Demarcators for components MUST be registered as described in
244 Section 9. It is anticipated that trust framework definitions will
245 use this registry to define specialized components, though it is
246 RECOMMENDED that trust frameworks re-use existing components wherever
247 possible.
249 The value for a given component within a vector of trust is defined
250 by its demarcator character followed by a single digit or lowercase
251 ASCII letter in the range "[0-9a-z]". Categories which have a
252 natural ordering SHOULD use digits, with "0" as the lowest value.
253 Categories which do not have a natural ordering, or which can have an
254 ambiguous ordering, SHOULD use letters. Categories MAY use both
255 letter style and number style value indicators. For example, a
256 category could define "0" as a special "empty" value while using
257 letters such as "a", "b", "c" for normal values can to differentiate
258 between these types of options.
260 Regardless of the type of value indicator used, the values assigned
261 to each component of a vector MUST NOT be assumed always to have
262 inherent ordinal properties when compared to the same or other
263 components in the vector space. In other words, "1" is different
264 from "2", but it is dangerous to assume that "2" is always better
265 than "1" in a given transaction.
267 2.1. Identity Proofing
269 The Identity Proofing dimension defines, overall, how strongly the
270 set of identity attributes have been verified and vetted. In other
271 words, this dimension describes how likely it is that a given digital
272 identity transaction corresponds to a particular (real-world)
273 identity subject.
275 This dimension SHALL be represented by the "P" demarcator and a
276 single-character level value, such as "P0", "P1", etc. Most
277 definitions of identity proofing will have a natural ordering, as
278 more or less stringent proofing can be applied to an individual. In
279 such cases it is RECOMMENDED that a digit style value be used for
280 this component.
282 2.2. Primary Credential Usage
284 The primary credential usage dimension defines how strongly the
285 primary credential can be verified by the IdP. In other words, how
286 easily that credential could be spoofed or stolen.
288 This dimension SHALL be represented by the "C" demarcator and a
289 single-character level value, such as "Ca", "Cb", etc. Most
290 definitions of credential usage will not have an overall natural
291 ordering, as there may be several equivalent classes described within
292 a trust framework. In such cases it is RECOMMENDED that a letter
293 style value be used for this component. Multiple credential usage
294 factors MAY be communicated simultaneously, such as when Multi-Factor
295 Authentication is used.
297 2.3. Primary Credential Management
299 The primary credential management dimension conveys information about
300 the expected lifecycle of the primary credential in use, including
301 its binding, rotation, and revocation. In other words, the use and
302 strength of policies, practices, and security controls used in
303 managing the credential at the IdP and its binding to the intended
304 individual.
306 This dimension SHALL be represented by the "M" demarcator and a
307 single-character level value, such as "Ma", "Mb", etc. Most
308 definitions of credential management will not have an overall natural
309 ordering, though there can be preference and comparison between
310 values in some circumstances. In such cases it is RECOMMENDED that a
311 letter style value be used for this component.
313 2.4. Assertion Presentation
315 The Assertion Presentation dimension defines how well the given
316 digital identity can be communicated across the network without
317 information leaking to unintended parties, and without spoofing. In
318 other words, this dimension describes how likely it is that a given
319 digital identity was actually asserted by a given identity provider
320 for a given transaction. While this information is largely already
321 known by the RP as a side effect of processing an identity assertion,
322 this dimension is still very useful when the RP requests a login
323 (Section 5) and when describing the capabilities of an IdP
324 (Section 7).
326 This dimension SHALL be represented by the "A" demarcator and a level
327 value, such as "Aa", "Ab", etc. Most definitions of assertion
328 presentation will not have an overall natural ordering. In such
329 cases, it is RECOMMENDED that a letter style value be used for this
330 component.
332 3. Vectors of Trust Initial Component Value Definitions
334 This specification defines the following general-purpose component
335 definitions, which MAY be used when a more specific set is
336 unavailable. These component values are referenced in a trustmark
337 definition defined by [[ this document URL ]].
339 It is anticipated that trust frameworks and specific applications of
340 this specification will define their own component values. In order
341 to simplify processing by RPs, it is RECOMMENDED that trust framework
342 definitions carefully define component values such that they are
343 mutually exclusive or subsumptive in order to avoid repeated vector
344 components where possible.
346 3.1. Identity Proofing
348 The identity proofing component of this vector definition represents
349 increasing scrutiny during the proofing process. Higher levels are
350 largely subsumptive of lower levels, such that "P2" fulfills
351 requirements for "P1", etc.
353 P0 No proofing is done, data is not guaranteed to be persistent
354 across sessions
356 P1 Attributes are self-asserted but consistent over time, potentially
357 pseudonymous
359 P2 Identity has been proofed either in person or remotely using
360 trusted mechanisms (such as social proofing)
362 P3 There is a binding relationship between the identity provider and
363 the identified party (such as signed/notarized documents,
364 employment records)
366 3.2. Primary Credential Usage
368 The primary credential usage component of this vector definition
369 represents distinct categories of primary credential that MAY be used
370 together in a single transaction.
372 C0 No credential is used / anonymous public service
374 Ca Simple session cookies (with nothing else)
376 Cb Known device
377 Cc Shared secret such as a username and password combination
379 Cd Cryptographic proof of key possession using shared key
381 Ce Cryptographic proof of key possession using asymmetric key
383 Cf Sealed hardware token / trusted biometric / TPM-backed keys
385 3.3. Primary Credential Management
387 The primary credential management component of this vector definition
388 represents distinct categories of management that MAY be considered
389 separately or together in a single transaction.
391 Ma Self-asserted primary credentials (user chooses their own
392 credentials and must rotate or revoke them manually) / no
393 additional verification for primary credential issuance or
394 rotation
396 Mb Remote issuance and rotation / use of backup recover credentials
397 (such as email verification) / deletion on user request
399 Mc Full proofing required for each issuance and rotation / revocation
400 on suspicious activity
402 3.4. Assertion Presentation
404 The assertion presentation component of this vector definition
405 represents distinct categories of assertion which are RECOMMENDED to
406 be used in a subsumptive manner but MAY be used together.
408 Aa No protection / unsigned bearer identifier (such as a session
409 cookie in a web browser)
411 Ab Signed and verifiable assertion, passed through the user agent
412 (web browser)
414 Ac Signed and verifiable assertion, passed through a back channel
416 Ad Assertion encrypted to the relying parties key and audience
417 protected
419 4. Communicating Vector Values to RPs
421 A vector of trust is designed to be used in the context of an
422 identity and authentication transaction, providing information about
423 the context of a federated credential. The vector therefore needs to
424 be able to be communicated in the context of the federated credential
425 in a way that is strongly bound to the assertion representing the
426 federated credential.
428 This vector has several requirements for use.
430 o All applicable vector components and values need to be combined
431 into a single vector.
433 o The vector can be communicated across the wire unbroken and
434 untransformed.
436 o All vector components need to remain individually available, not
437 "collapsed" into a single value.
439 o The vector needs to be protected in transit.
441 o The vector needs to be cryptographically bound to the assertion
442 which it is describing.
444 These requirements lead us to defining a simple string-based
445 representation of the vector that can be incorporated within a number
446 of different locations and protocols without further encoding.
448 4.1. On the Wire Representation
450 The vector MUST be represented as a period-separated ('.') list of
451 vector components, with no specific order. A vector component type
452 MAY occur multiple times within a single vector, with each component
453 separated by periods. Multiple values for a component are considered
454 a logical AND of the values. A specific value of a vector component
455 MUST NOT occur more than once in a single vector. That is, while
456 "Cc.Cd" is a valid vector, "Cc.Cc" is not.
458 Vector components MAY be omitted from a vector. No holding space is
459 left for an omitted vector component. If a vector component is
460 omitted, the vector is making no claim for that component. This MAY
461 be distinct from a specific component value stating that a component
462 was not used.
464 Vector values MUST be communicated along side of a trustmark
465 definition to give the components context. A vector value without
466 context is unprocessable, and vectors defined in different contexts
467 are not directly comparable as whole values. Different trustmarks
468 MAY re-use component definitions (including their values), allowing
469 comparison of individual components across contexts without requiring
470 complete understanding of all aspects of a context. The proper
471 processing of such cross-context values is outside the scope of this
472 specification.
474 For example, the vector value "P1.Cc.Ab" translates to "pseudonymous,
475 proof of shared key, signed browser-passed verified assertion, and no
476 claim made toward credential management" in the context of this
477 specification's definitions (Section 3). The vector value of
478 "Cb.Mc.Cd.Ac" translates to "known device, full proofing require for
479 issuance and rotation, cryptographic proof of possession of a shared
480 key, signed back-channel verified assertion, and no claim made toward
481 identity proofing" in the same context.
483 4.2. In OpenID Connect
485 In OpenID Connect [OpenID], the IdP MUST send the vector as a string
486 within the "vot" (vector of trust) claim in the ID token. The
487 trustmark (Section 6) that applies to this vector MUST be sent as an
488 HTTPS URL in the "vtm" (vector trust mark) claim to provide context
489 to the vector.
491 For example, the body of an ID token claiming "pseudonymous, proof of
492 shared key, signed back-channel verified token, and no claim made
493 toward credential management" could look like this JSON object
494 payload of the ID token.
496 {
497 "iss": "https://idp.example.com/",
498 "sub": "jondoe1234",
499 "vot": "P1.Cc.Ac",
500 "vtm": "https://trustmark.example.org/trustmark/idp.example.com"
501 }
503 The body of the ID token is signed and optionally encrypted using
504 JOSE, as per the OpenID Connect specification. By putting the "vot"
505 and "vtm" values inside the ID token, the vector and its context are
506 strongly bound to the federated credential represented by the ID
507 token.
509 4.3. In SAML
511 In SAML, a vector is communicated as an AuthenticationContextDeclRef.
512 A vector is represented by prefixing it with the urn
513 urn:ietf:param:[TBD] to form a full URN. The
514 AuthenticationContextDeclaration corresponding to a given vector is a
515 AuthenticationContextDeclaration element containing an Extension
516 element with components of the vector represented by the following
517 XML schema:
519
520
524
525 This represents a set of vector components.
526
527
528
529
530 This represents a vector component.
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
548 For instance the vector P1.Cc.Ac is represented by the
549 AuthenticationContextDeclRef URN urn:ietf:param:[TBD]:P1.Cc.Ac (or
550 urn:ietf:param:[TBD]:Cc.P1.Ac or ...) which corresponds to the
551 following AuthenticationContextDeclaration:
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
561
562
563 5. Requesting Vector Values
565 In some identity protocols, the RP can request that particular vector
566 components be applied to a given identity transaction. Using the
567 same syntax as defined in Section 4.1, an RP can indicate that it
568 desires particular aspects be present in the authentication.
569 Processing and fulfillment of these requests are in the purview of
570 the IdP and details are outside the scope of this specification.
572 5.1. In OpenID Connect
574 In OpenID Connect [OpenID], the client MAY request a set of
575 acceptable VoT values with the "vtr" (vector of trust request) claim
576 request as part of the Request Object. The value of this field is an
577 array of JSON strings, each string identifying an acceptable set of
578 vector components. The component values within each vector are ANDed
579 together while the separate vectors are ORed together. For example,
580 a list of vectors in the form "["P1.Cb.Cc.Ab", "Ce.Ab"]" is stating
581 that either the full set of "P1 AND Cb AND Cc AND Ab" simultaneously
582 OR the set of "Ce AND Ab" simultaneously are acceptable to this RP
583 for this transaction.
585 Vector request values MAY omit components, indicating that any value
586 is acceptable for that component category, including omission of that
587 component in the response vector.
589 The mechanism by which the IdP processes the "vtr" and maps that to
590 the authentication transaction are out of scope of this
591 specification.
593 5.2. In SAML
595 In SAML (Section 4.3) the client can request a set of acceptable VoT
596 values by including the corresponding AuthenticationContextDeclRef
597 URIs together with an AuthenticationContextClassRef corresponding to
598 the trust mark (cf below). The processing rules in [[ SAMLAuthnCtx
599 ]] apply.
601 6. Trustmark
603 When an RP receives a specific vector from an IdP, it needs to make a
604 decision to trust the vector within a specific context. A trust
605 framework can provide such a context, allowing legal and business
606 rules to give weight to an IdP's claims. A trustmark is a verifiable
607 claim to conform to a specific component of a trust framework, such
608 as a verified identity provider. The trustmark conveys the root of
609 trustworthiness about the claims and assertions made by the IdP,
610 including the vector itself.
612 The trustmark MUST be available from an HTTPS URL served by the trust
613 framework provider. The contents of this URL are a JSON [RFC7159]
614 document with the following fields:
616 idp The issuer URL of the identity provider that this trustmark
617 pertains to. This MUST match the corresponding issuer claim in
618 the identity token, such as the OpenID Connect "iss" field. This
619 MUST be an HTTPS URL.
621 trustmark_provider The issuer URL of the trustmark provider that
622 issues this trustmark. The URL that a trustmark is fetched from
623 MUST start with the "iss" URL in this field. This MUST be an
624 HTTPS URL.
626 P Array of strings containing identity proofing values for which the
627 identity provider has been assessed and approved.
629 C Array of strings containing primary credential usage values for
630 which the identity provider has been assessed and approved.
632 M Array of strings containing primary credential management values
633 for which the identity provider has been assessed and approved.
635 A Array of strings containing assertion strength values for which
636 the identity provider has been assessed and approved.
638 Additional vector component values MUST be listed in a similar
639 fashion using their demarcator.
641 For example, the following trustmark provided by the
642 trustmark.example.org organization applies to the idp.example.org
643 identity provider:
645 {
646 "idp": "https://idp.example.org/",
647 "trustmark_provider": "https://trustmark.example.org/",
648 "P": ["P0", "P1"],
649 "C": ["C0", "Ca", "Cb"],
650 "M": ["Mb"],
651 "A": ["Ab", "Ac"]
652 }
654 An RP wishing to check the claims made by an IdP can fetch the
655 information from the trustmark provider about what claims the IdP is
656 allowed to make in the first place and process them accordingly. The
657 RP MAY cache the information returned from the trustmark URL.
659 The operational aspects of the IdP MAY be included in the trustmark
660 definition. For example, if a trustmark can indicate that an IdP
661 uses multiple redundant hosts, encrypts all data at rest, or other
662 operational security mechanisms that affect the trustworthiness of
663 assertions made by the IdP. The definition of these additional
664 aspects is outside the scope of this specfication.
666 The means by which the RP decides which trustmark providers it trusts
667 is out of scope for this specification and is generally configured
668 out of band.
670 Though most trust frameworks will provide a third-party independent
671 verification service for components, an IdP MAY host its own
672 trustmark. For example, a self-hosted trustmark would look like:
674 {
675 "idp": "https://idp.example.org/",
676 "trustmark_provider": "https://idp.example.org/",
677 "P": ["P0", "P1"],
678 "C": ["C0", "Ca", "Cb"],
679 "M": ["Mb"],
680 "A": ["Ab", "Ac"]
681 }
683 7. Discovery
685 The IdP MAY list all of its available trustmarks as part of its
686 discovery document, such as the OpenID Connect Discovery server
687 configuration document. In this context, trustmarks are listed in
688 the "trustmarks" element which contains a single JSON [RFC7159]
689 object. The keys of this JSON object are trustmark provider issuer
690 URLs and the values of this object are the corresponding trustmark
691 URLs for this IdP.
693 {
694 "iss": "https://idp.example.org/",
695 "trustmark": {
696 "https://trustmark.example.org/": "https://trustmark.example.org/trustmark/idp.example.org/"
697 }
698 }
700 8. Acknowledgements
702 The authors would like to thank the members of the Vectors of Trust
703 mailing list in the IETF for discussion and feedback on the concept
704 and document, and the members of the ISOC Trust and Identity team for
705 their support.
707 9. IANA Considerations
709 This specification creates one registry and registers several values
710 into an existing registry.
712 9.1. Vector Of Trust Components Registry
714 The Vector of Trust Components Registry contains the definitions of
715 vector components and their associated demarcators.
717 o Demarcator Symbol: P
719 o Description: Identity proofing
721 o Document: [[ this document ]]
723 o Demarcator Symbol: C
725 o Description: Primary credential usage
727 o Document: [[ this document ]]
729 o Demarcator Symbol: M
731 o Description: Primary credential management
733 o Document: [[ this document ]]
735 o Demarcator Symbol: A
737 o Description: Assertion presentation
739 o Document: [[ this document ]]
741 9.2. Additions to JWT Claims Registry
743 This specification adds the following values to the JWT Claims
744 Registry.
746 o Claim name: vot
748 o Description: Vector of Trust value
750 o Document: [[ this document ]]
752 o Demarcator Symbol: vtm
754 o Description: Vector of Trust Trustmark
755 o Document: [[ this document ]]
757 o Demarcator Symbol: vtr
759 o Description: Vector of Trust Request
761 o Document: [[ this document ]]
763 10. Security Considerations
765 The vector of trust value MUST be cryptographically protected in
766 transit, using TLS as described in [BCP195]. The vector of trust
767 value MUST be associated with a trustmark marker, and the two MUST be
768 carried together in a cryptographically bound mechanism such as a
769 signed identity assertion. A signed OpenID Connect ID Token and a
770 signed SAML assertion both fulfil this requirement.
772 The VoT framework provides a mechanism for describing and conveying
773 trust information. It does not define any policies for asserting the
774 values of the vector, nor does it define any policies for applying
775 the values of a vector to an RP's security decision process. These
776 policies MUST be agreed upon by the IdP and RP, and they SHOULD be
777 expressed in detail in an associated trust framework.
779 11. Privacy Considerations
781 By design, vector of trust values contain information about the
782 user's authentication and associations that can be made thereto.
783 Therefore, all aspects of a vector of trust contain potentially
784 privacy-sensitive information and MUST be guarded as such. Even in
785 the absence of specific attributes about a user, knowledge that the
786 user has been highly proofed or issued a strong token could provide
787 more information about the user than was intended. It is RECOMMENDED
788 that systems in general use the minimum vectors applicable to their
789 use case in order to prevent inadvertent information disclosure.
791 12. References
793 12.1. Normative References
795 [OpenID] Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., and M. Jones, "OpenID Connect
796 Core 1.0", November 2014.
798 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
799 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
800 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
801 .
803 [RFC7159] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
804 Interchange Format", RFC 7159, DOI 10.17487/RFC7159, March
805 2014, .
807 12.2. Informative References
809 [BCP195] Sheffer, Y., Holz, R., and P. Saint-Andre,
810 "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
811 Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
812 (DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 7525, DOI 10.17487/RFC7525, May
813 2015, .
815 [SP-800-63-2]
816 , , , , , , and , "Electronic Authentication Guideline",
817 August 2013.
819 Appendix A. Document History
821 -03
823 o Clarified language of LoA's in introduction.
825 o Added note on operational security in trustmarks.
827 o Removed empty sections and references.
829 -02
831 o Converted C, M, and A values to use letters instead of numbers in
832 examples.
834 o Updated SAML to a structured example pending future updates.
836 o Defined guidance for when to use letters vs. numbers in category
837 values.
839 o Restricted category demarcators to uppercase and values to
840 lowercase and digits.
842 o Applied clarifying editorial changes from list comments.
844 - 01
846 o Added IANA registry for components.
848 o Added preliminary security considerations and privacy
849 considerations.
851 o Split "credential binding" into "primary credential usage" and
852 "primary credential management".
854 - 00
856 o Created initial IETF drafted based on strawman proposal discussed
857 on VoT list.
859 o Split vector component definitions into their own section to allow
860 extension and override.
862 o Solidified trustmark document definition.
864 Authors' Addresses
866 Justin Richer (editor)
867 Bespoke Engineering
869 Email: ietf@justin.richer.org
871 Leif Johansson
872 Swedish University Network
873 Thulegatan 11
874 Stockholm
875 Sweden
877 Email: leifj@sunet.se
878 URI: http://www.sunet.se