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'Guide' == Outdated reference: A later version (-30) exists of draft-ietf-6tisch-architecture-08 Summary: 6 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 7 warnings (==), 2 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 6lo B. Sarikaya, Ed. 3 Internet-Draft Huawei USA 4 Intended status: Standards Track P. Thubert, Ed. 5 Expires: April 21, 2016 Cisco 6 October 19, 2015 8 Address Protected Neighbor Discovery for Low-power and Lossy Networks 9 draft-sarikaya-6lo-ap-nd-01 11 Abstract 13 This document defines an extension of 6LoWPAN Neighbor Discovery for 14 application in low-power and lossy networks. The protocol is 15 specified to be protected and to support multi-hop operation. A node 16 computes its Cryptographic, Unique Interface ID, and associates one 17 or more of its Registered Addresses with that Cryptographic ID in 18 place of the EUI-64 that is used in RFC 6775 to uniquely identify the 19 interface of the Registered Address. Once an address is registered 20 with a Cryptographic ID, only the owner of that ID can modify the 21 state in the 6LR and 6LBR regarding the Registered Address. 23 Status of This Memo 25 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 26 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 28 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 29 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 30 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 31 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 33 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 34 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 35 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 36 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 38 This Internet-Draft will expire on April 21, 2016. 40 Copyright Notice 42 Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 43 document authors. All rights reserved. 45 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 46 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 47 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 48 publication of this document. Please review these documents 49 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 50 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 51 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 52 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 53 described in the Simplified BSD License. 55 Table of Contents 57 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 58 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 59 3. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 60 4. Protocol Interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 61 4.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 62 4.2. Protocol Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 63 4.2.1. Calculation of Cryptographic Identifier . . . . . . . 8 64 4.3. Multihop Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 65 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 66 6. IANA considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 67 7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 68 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 69 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 70 8.2. Informative references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 71 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 73 1. Introduction 75 Neighbor discovery for IPv6 [RFC4861] and stateless address 76 autoconfiguration [RFC4862], together referred to as neighbor 77 discovery protocols (NDP), are defined for regular hosts operating 78 with wired/wireless links. These protocols are not suitable and 79 require optimizations for resource constrained, low power hosts 80 operating with LLN for low-power and lossy networks. Neighbor 81 Discovery optimizations for 6LoWPAN networks include simple 82 optimizations such as a host address registration feature using the 83 address registration option (ARO) which is sent in unicast Neighbor 84 Solicitation (NS) and Neighbor Advertisement (NA) messages [RFC6775]. 85 With 6LoWPAN ND [RFC6775], the ARO option includes a EUI-64 address 86 to uniquely identify the interface of the Registered Address on the 87 registering device, so as to correlate further registrations for the 88 same address and avoid address duplication. The EUI-64 address is 89 not secured and its ownership cannot be verified. It results that 90 any device claiming the same EUI-64 address may take over a 91 registration and attract the traffic for that address. 93 In this document, we extend 6LoWPAN ND to protect the address 94 ownership with cryptographic material, but as opposed to Secure 95 Neighbor Discovery (SEND) [RFC3971], [RFC3972], the cryptographic 96 material is not embedded in the Interface ID (IID) in an IPv6 address 97 but used as a correlator associated to the registration of the IPv6 98 address. This approach is made possible with 6LoWPAN ND [RFC6775], 99 where the 6LR and the 6LBR maintain a state for each Registered 100 Address. If a cryptographic ID is associated with an original 101 6LoWPAN ND registration and stored in the registration state, then it 102 can be used to validate that any update to the registration state is 103 made by the owner of that ID. 105 To achieve this, this specification replaces the EUI-64 address, that 106 is used in 6LoWPAN ND to avoid address duplication, with 107 cryptographic material whose ownership can be verified; it also 108 provides new means for the 6LR to validate ownership of the 109 registration thus that of the registered address by the registering 110 device. The resulting protocol is called Protected address 111 autoconfiguration and registration protocol (ND-PAAR). 113 A node generates one 64-bit cryptographic ID and uses it as Unique 114 Interface ID in the registration of (one or more of) its addresses 115 with the 6LR, which it attaches to and uses as default router. The 116 6LR validates ownership of the cryptographic ID typically upon 117 creation or update of a registration state, for instance following an 118 apparent movement from a point of attachment to another. The ARO 119 option is modified to carry the Unique Interface ID, and through the 120 DAR/DAC exchange, the 6LBR is kept aware that this is the case, i.e. 121 unique and whether the 6LR has verified the claim. 123 2. Terminology 125 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 126 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 127 document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. 129 Readers are expected to be familiar with all the terms and concepts 130 that are discussed in [RFC3971], [RFC3972], "neighbor Discovery for 131 IP version 6" [RFC4861], "IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area 132 Networks (6LoWPANs): Overview, Assumptions, Problem Statement, and 133 Goals" [RFC4919], neighbor Discovery Optimization for Low-power and 134 Lossy Networks [RFC6775] where the 6LoWPAN Router (6LR) and the 135 6LoWPAN Border Router (6LBR) are introduced, and 136 [I-D.chakrabarti-nordmark-6man-efficient-nd], which proposes an 137 evolution of [RFC6775] for a larger applicability. 139 The document also conforms to the terms and models described in 140 [RFC5889] and uses the vocabulary and the concepts defined in 141 [RFC4291] for the IPv6 Architecture. 143 This document uses [RFC7102] for Terminology in Low power And Lossy 144 Networks. 146 3. Requirements 148 In this section we state requirements of a secure neighbor discovery 149 protocol for low-power and lossy networks. 151 The protocol MUST be based on the Neighbor Discovery Optimization for 152 Low-power and Lossy Networks protocol defined in [RFC6775] due to the 153 host-initiated interactions to allow for sleeping hosts, elimination 154 of multicast-based address resolution for hosts, etc. 156 New options to be added to Neighbor Solicitation messages MUST lead 157 to small packet sizes. Smaller packet sizes facilitate low-power 158 transmission by resource constrained nodes on lossy links. 160 The support of the registration mechanism SHOULD be extended to more 161 LLN links than IEEE 802.15.4, matching at least the LLN links for 162 which a 6lo "IPv6 over foo" specification exists, as well as Low- 163 Power Wi-Fi. 165 As part of this extension, a mechanism to compute a unique Identifier 166 should be provided, with the capability to form a Link Local Address 167 that SHOULD be unique at least within the LLN connected to a 6LBR 168 discovered by ND in each node within the LLN. 170 The Address Registration Option used in the ND registration SHOULD be 171 extended to carry the relevant forms of Unique Interface IDentifier. 173 The Neighbour Discovery should specify the formation of a site-local 174 address that follows the security recommendations from [RFC7217]. 176 4. Protocol Interactions 178 Protected address autoconfiguration and registration neighbor 179 discovery protocol (ND-PAAR) modifies Neighbor Discovery Optimization 180 for Low-power and Lossy Networks [RFC6775] as explained in this 181 section. 183 4.1. Overview 185 The scope of the present work is a 6LoWPAN Low Power Lossy Network 186 (LLN), typically a stub network connected to a larger IP network via 187 a Border Router called a 6LBR per [RFC6775]. 189 ---+-------- ............ ------------ 190 | External Network | 191 | 192 +-----+ 193 | | LLN Border 194 | | router 195 +-----+ 196 o o o 197 o o o o 198 o o LLN o o o 199 o o o o 200 o 202 Figure 1: Basic Configuration 204 The 6LBR maintains a registration state for all devices in the 205 attached LLN, and, in conjunction with the first-hop router (the 206 6LR), is in position to validate uniqueness and grant ownership of an 207 IPv6 address before it can be used in the LLN. This is a fundamental 208 difference with a classical network that relies on IPv6 address auto- 209 configuration [RFC4862], where there is no guarantee of ownership 210 from the network, and any IPv6 Neighbor Discovery packet must be 211 individually secured [RFC3971]. 213 In a route-over mesh network, the 6LR is directly connected to the 214 host device; this specification expects that peer-wise Layer-2 215 security is deployed so that all the packets from a particular host 216 are identified as such by the 6LR. The 6LR may be multiple hops away 217 from the 6LBR. Packets are routed between the 6LR and the 6LBR via 218 other 6LRs; this specification expects that a chain of trust is 219 established so that a packet that was validated by the first 6LR can 220 be safely routed by the next 6LRs and 6LBR. 222 The [I-D.ietf-6tisch-architecture] suggests to use RPL [RFC6550] as 223 the routing protocol between the 6LRs and the 6LBR, and to leverage 224 [I-D.chakrabarti-nordmark-6man-efficient-nd] to extend the LLN in a 225 larger multilink subnet [RFC4903]. In that model, a registration 226 flow happens as shown in Figure 2: 228 6LoWPAN Node 6LR 6LBR 6BBR 229 (RPL leaf) (router) (root) 230 | | | | 231 | 6LoWPAN ND |6LoWPAN ND+RPL | Efficient ND | IPv6 ND 232 | LLN link |Route-Over mesh| IPv6 link | Backbone 233 | | | | 234 | NS(ARO) | | | 235 |-------------->| | | 236 | 6LoWPAN ND | DAR (then DAO)| | 237 | |-------------->| | 238 | | | NS(ARO) | 239 | | |-------------->| 240 | | | | DAD 241 | | | |------> 242 | | | | 243 | | | NA(ARO) | 244 | | |<--------------| 245 | | DAC | | 246 | |<--------------| | 247 | NA(ARO) | | | 248 |<--------------| | | 250 Figure 2: (Re-)Registration Flow over Multi-Link Subnet 252 A new device that joins the network auto-configures an address and 253 performs an initial registration to an on-link 6LR with an NS message 254 that carries a new Address Registration Option (ARO) [RFC6775]. The 255 6LR validates the address with the central 6LBR using a DAR/DAC 256 exchange, and the 6LR confirms (or infirms) the address ownership 257 with an NA message that also carries an Address Registration Option. 259 The registration mechanism in [RFC6775] was created for the original 260 purpose of Duplicate Address Detection (DAD), whereby use of an 261 address would be granted as long as the address is not already 262 present in the subnet. But [RFC6775] does not require that the 6LR 263 use the registration for source address validation (SAVI). 265 In order to validate address ownership, that mechanism enables the 266 6LBR to correlate further claims for a registered address with the 267 device to which it is granted, based on a Unique Interface IDentifier 268 (UID) that is derived from the MAC address of the device (EUI-64). 270 The limitation of the mechanism in [RFC6775] is that it does not 271 enable to prove the UID itself, so any node connected to the subnet 272 and aware of the address/UID mapping may effectively fake the same 273 UID and steal an address. 275 This draft uses a randomly generated value as an alternate UID for 276 the registration. Proof of ownership of the UID is passed with the 277 first registration to a given 6LR, and enforced at the 6LR, which 278 validates the proof. With this new operation, the 6LR allows only 279 packets from a connected host if the connected host owns the 280 registration of the source address of the packet. 282 If a chain of trust is present between the 6LR and the 6LBR, then 283 there is no need to propagate the proof of ownership to the 6LBR. 284 All the 6LBR need to know is that this particular UID is randomly 285 generated, so as to enforce that any update via a different 6LR is 286 also random. 288 4.2. Protocol Operations 290 Protocol interactions are as defined in Figure 2. The crypto ID is 291 calculated as described in Section 4.2.1. 293 The Target Address field in NS message is set to the prefix 294 concatenated with the node's address. This address does not need 295 duplicate address detection as crypto ID is globally unique. So a 296 host cannot steal an address that is already registered unless it has 297 the key for the crypto ID. The same crypto ID can thus be used to 298 protect multiple addresses e.g. when the node receives a different 299 prefix. 301 Local or on-link protocol interactions are given in Figure 3. Crypto 302 ID and ARO are passed to and stored by the 6LR/6LBR on the first NS 303 and not sent again the in the next NS. 305 The 6LR/6LBR ensures first-come/first-serve by storing the ARO and 306 the crypto ID correlated to the target being registered. Then, if 307 the node is the first to claim any address it likes, then it becomes 308 owner of that address and the address is bound to the crypto ID in 309 the 6LR/6LBR registry. This procedure avoids the constrained device 310 to compute multiple keys for multiple addresses. The registration 311 process allows the node to tie all the addresses to the same crypto 312 ID and have the 6LR/6LBR enforce first come first serve after that. 314 6LN 6LR 315 | | 316 |<-----------------------RA-------------------------------| 317 | | 318 |---------------NS with ARO and Random UID --------------->| 319 | | 320 |<-----------------------NA with ARO (status=req-proof) --| 321 | | 322 |---------------NS with ARO and Random UID->| 323 | | 324 |<-----------------------NA with ARO----------------------| 325 | | 326 ... 327 | | 328 |---------------NS with ARO and Random UID --------------->| 329 | | | 330 |<-----------------------NA with ARO----------------------| 331 ... 332 | | 333 |---------------NS with ARO and Random UID --------------->| 334 | | | 335 |<-----------------------NA with ARO----------------------| 337 Figure 3: On-link Protocol Operation 339 4.2.1. Calculation of Cryptographic Identifier 341 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is used in the calculation of 342 cryptographical identifier. The digital signature is constructed by 343 using the 6LN's private key over its EUI-64, i.e. its MAC address. 344 The signature value is computed using the ECDSA signature algorithm 345 and hash function used is SHA-256. Public Key is the most important 346 parameter in CGA Parameters (sent by 6LN in an NS message). ECC 347 Public Key could be in uncompressed form or in compressed form where 348 the first octet of the OCTET STRING is 0x04 and 0x02 or 0x03, 349 respectively. Point compression using secp256r1 reduces the key size 350 by 32 octets. 352 After the calculation, 6LN sends it along with the CGA parameters in 353 the first NS message, see Figure 3. In order to send Cryptographical 354 Identifier a neighbor discovery option is defined in Figure 4. As 355 defined in the figure this ID is variable length, varying between 64 356 to 128 bits. This ID is 128 bits long if it is used as IPv6 address. 358 6LN also sends some other parameters to enable 6LR or 6LBR to verify 359 the crypto ID. One of them is 6LN's MAC address which is sent in 360 Address Registration Option (ARO) as defined in [RFC6775]. The next 361 one is shown in Figure 5. In that figure, CGA Parameters field 362 contains the public key, prefix and some other values. Digital 363 signature option contains the signature of the CGA calculated using 364 6LN's private key. 366 0 1 2 3 367 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 368 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 369 | Type | Length | Status | Reserved | 370 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 371 | Reserved | Registration Lifetime | 372 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 373 | | 374 + crypto ID + 375 | | 376 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 378 Figure 4: Crypto ID Option 380 Type: TBA 382 Length: 8-bit unsigned integer. The length of the option in units of 383 8 bytes. It is 2 or 3, if crypto ID is 128 bits. 385 Status: 8-bit unsigned integer. Indicates the status of a 386 registration in the NA response. MUST be set to 0 in NS messages. 387 See below. 389 Reserved: This field is unused. It MUST be initialized to zero by 390 the sender and MUST be ignored by the receiver. 392 Registration Lifetime: 16-bit unsigned integer. The amount of time 393 in units of 60 seconds that the router should retain the NCE for the 394 sender of the NS that includes this option. 396 Crypto ID Variable length field to carry the cryptographical 397 identifier or random UID. This field is normally 64 bits long. It 398 could be 128 bits long if IPv6 address is used as the crypto ID. 400 0 1 2 3 401 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 402 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 403 | Type | Length | Pad Length | Sig. Length | 404 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 405 | | 406 . . 407 . CGA Parameters . 408 . . 409 | | 410 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 411 | | 412 . . 413 . Digital Signature . 414 . . 415 | | 416 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 417 | | 418 . . 419 . Padding . 420 . . 421 | | 422 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ 424 Figure 5: CGA Parameters Option 426 Type TBA 428 Length The length of the option in units of 8 octets. 430 Pad Length The length of the Padding field. 432 Sig Length The length of the Digital Signature field. 434 CGA Parameters The CGA Parameters field is variable-length containing 435 the CGA Parameters data structure. 437 Digital Signature The Digital Signature field is a variable length 438 field containing a Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) 439 signature (with SHA-256 and P-256 curve of [FIPS-186-3]). 441 4.3. Multihop Operation 443 In multihop 6LoWPAN, 6LBR sends RAs with prefixes downstream and it 444 is the 6LR that receives and relays them to the nodes. 6LR and 6LBR 445 communicate with the ICMPv6 Duplicate Address Request (DAR) and the 446 Duplicate Address Confirmation (DAC) messages. The DAR and DAC use 447 the same message format as NS and NA with different ICMPv6 type 448 values. 450 In ND-PAAR we extend DAR/DAC messages to carry cryptographically 451 generated UID. 453 In a multihop 6LoWPAN, the node exchanges the messages shown in 454 Figure 2. The 6LBR must be aware of who owns an address (EUI-64) to 455 defend the first user if there is an attacker on another 6LR. 456 Because of this the content that the source signs and the signature 457 needs to be propagated to the 6LBR in DAR message. For this purpose 458 we need the DAR message sent by 6LR to 6LBR MUST contain CGA 459 Parameters and Digital Signature Option carrying the CGA that the 460 node calculates and its public key. DAR message also contains ARO. 462 It is possible that occasionally, 6LR may miss the node's UID (that 463 it received in ARO). 6LR should be able to ask for it again. This is 464 done by restarting the exchanges shown in Figure 3. The result 465 enables 6LR to refresh the information that was lost. 6LR MUST send 466 DAR message with ARO to 6LBR. 6LBR as a reply forms a DAC message 467 with the information copied from the DAR and the Status field is set 468 to zero. With this exchange, the 6LBR can (re)validate and store the 469 information to make sure that the 6LR is not a fake. 471 5. Security Considerations 473 The same considerations regarding the threats to the Local Link Not 474 Covered (as in [RFC3971]) apply. 476 The threats discussed in Section 9.2 of [RFC3971] are countered by 477 the protocol described in this document as well. 479 As to the attacks to the protocol itself, denial of service attacks 480 that involve producing a very high number of packets are deemed 481 unlikely because of the assumptions on the node capabilities in low- 482 power and lossy networks. 484 A collision of ID in ND-PAAR is a really rare event that does not 485 prevent the protocol operation though it opens a window for a node to 486 hijack an address from another. The nodes would normally not be 487 aware that they are in this situation, and the only thing they could 488 do if they knew would be to steal addresses from one another, so the 489 damage is limited to these 2 nodes. 491 6. IANA considerations 493 TBD. 495 7. Acknowledgements 497 TBD. 499 8. References 501 8.1. Normative References 503 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 504 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, 505 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, 506 . 508 [RFC3756] Nikander, P., Ed., Kempf, J., and E. Nordmark, "IPv6 509 Neighbor Discovery (ND) Trust Models and Threats", 510 RFC 3756, DOI 10.17487/RFC3756, May 2004, 511 . 513 [RFC3971] Arkko, J., Ed., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander, 514 "SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, 515 DOI 10.17487/RFC3971, March 2005, 516 . 518 [RFC3972] Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)", 519 RFC 3972, DOI 10.17487/RFC3972, March 2005, 520 . 522 [RFC4291] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing 523 Architecture", RFC 4291, DOI 10.17487/RFC4291, February 524 2006, . 526 [RFC4861] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman, 527 "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861, 528 DOI 10.17487/RFC4861, September 2007, 529 . 531 [RFC4862] Thomson, S., Narten, T., and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless 532 Address Autoconfiguration", RFC 4862, 533 DOI 10.17487/RFC4862, September 2007, 534 . 536 [RFC4903] Thaler, D., "Multi-Link Subnet Issues", RFC 4903, 537 DOI 10.17487/RFC4903, June 2007, 538 . 540 [RFC4919] Kushalnagar, N., Montenegro, G., and C. Schumacher, "IPv6 541 over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs): 542 Overview, Assumptions, Problem Statement, and Goals", 543 RFC 4919, DOI 10.17487/RFC4919, August 2007, 544 . 546 [RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk, 547 "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key 548 Information", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 2009, 549 . 551 [RFC5889] Baccelli, E., Ed. and M. Townsley, Ed., "IP Addressing 552 Model in Ad Hoc Networks", RFC 5889, DOI 10.17487/RFC5889, 553 September 2010, . 555 [RFC6550] Winter, T., Ed., Thubert, P., Ed., Brandt, A., Hui, J., 556 Kelsey, R., Levis, P., Pister, K., Struik, R., Vasseur, 557 JP., and R. Alexander, "RPL: IPv6 Routing Protocol for 558 Low-Power and Lossy Networks", RFC 6550, 559 DOI 10.17487/RFC6550, March 2012, 560 . 562 [RFC6775] Shelby, Z., Ed., Chakrabarti, S., Nordmark, E., and C. 563 Bormann, "Neighbor Discovery Optimization for IPv6 over 564 Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs)", 565 RFC 6775, DOI 10.17487/RFC6775, November 2012, 566 . 568 [RFC7102] Vasseur, JP., "Terms Used in Routing for Low-Power and 569 Lossy Networks", RFC 7102, DOI 10.17487/RFC7102, January 570 2014, . 572 [RFC7217] Gont, F., "A Method for Generating Semantically Opaque 573 Interface Identifiers with IPv6 Stateless Address 574 Autoconfiguration (SLAAC)", RFC 7217, 575 DOI 10.17487/RFC7217, April 2014, 576 . 578 [Guide] "Guidelines for 64-bit global Identifier (EUI-64TM)", 579 November 2012, 580 . 582 8.2. Informative references 584 [I-D.rafiee-6man-ssas] 585 Rafiee, H. and C. Meinel, "A Simple Secure Addressing 586 Scheme for IPv6 AutoConfiguration (SSAS)", draft-rafiee- 587 6man-ssas-11 (work in progress), September 2014. 589 [I-D.chakrabarti-nordmark-6man-efficient-nd] 590 Chakrabarti, S., Nordmark, E., Thubert, P., and M. 591 Wasserman, "IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Optimizations for 592 Wired and Wireless Networks", draft-chakrabarti-nordmark- 593 6man-efficient-nd-07 (work in progress), February 2015. 595 [I-D.ietf-6tisch-architecture] 596 Thubert, P., "An Architecture for IPv6 over the TSCH mode 597 of IEEE 802.15.4", draft-ietf-6tisch-architecture-08 (work 598 in progress), May 2015. 600 Authors' Addresses 602 Behcet Sarikaya (editor) 603 Huawei USA 604 5340 Legacy Dr. Building 3 605 Plano, TX 75024 607 Email: sarikaya@ieee.org 609 Pascal Thubert (editor) 610 Cisco Systems, Inc 611 Building D 612 45 Allee des Ormes - BP1200 613 MOUGINS - Sophia Antipolis 06254 614 FRANCE 616 Phone: +33 497 23 26 34 617 Email: pthubert@cisco.com