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Andersdotter 5 Expires: August 25, 2018 ARTICLE 19 6 February 21, 2018 8 On the Politics of Standards 9 draft-tenoever-hrpc-political-03 11 Abstract 13 This document aims to outline different views on the relation between 14 protocols and politics and seeks to answer the question whether 15 protocols are political. 17 Status of This Memo 19 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 20 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 22 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 23 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 24 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 25 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 27 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 28 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 29 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 30 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 32 This Internet-Draft will expire on August 25, 2018. 34 Copyright Notice 36 Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 37 document authors. All rights reserved. 39 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 40 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 41 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 42 publication of this document. Please review these documents 43 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 44 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 45 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 46 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 47 described in the Simplified BSD License. 49 Table of Contents 51 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 52 2. Vocabulary Used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 53 3. Literature and Positions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 54 3.1. Technology is value neutral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 55 3.2. Some protocols are political some times . . . . . . . . . 4 56 3.3. All protocols are political sometimes . . . . . . . . . . 4 57 3.4. The network has its own logic and values . . . . . . . . 4 58 3.5. Protocols are inherently political . . . . . . . . . . . 5 59 4. Examples and approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 60 5. Competition and collaboration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 61 5.1. Standards development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 62 5.2. Standards development in the IETF . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 63 6. More legacy, more politics? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 64 7. Layers of politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 65 8. How voluntary are open standards? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 66 9. The need for a positioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 67 10. The way forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 68 11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 69 12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 70 13. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 71 14. Research Group Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 72 15. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 73 15.1. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 74 15.2. URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 75 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 77 1. Introduction 79 "Science and technology lie at the heart of social asymmetry. 80 Thus technology both creates systems which close off other 81 options and generate novel, unpredictable and indeed 82 previously unthinkable, option. The game of technology is 83 never finished, and its ramifications are endless. 85 - Michel Callon 87 The design of the Internet through protocols and standards is a 88 technical issue with great political and economic impacts [RFC0613]. 89 The early Internet community already realized that it needed to make 90 decisions on political issues such as Intellectual Property, 91 Internationalization [BramanI], diversity, access [RFC0101] privacy 92 and security [RFC0049], and the military [RFC0164] [RFC0316], 93 governmental [RFC0144] [RFC0286] [RFC0313] [RFC0542] [RFC0549] and 94 non-governmental [RFC0196] uses, which has been clearly pointed out 95 by Braman [BramanII]. 97 Recently there has been an increased discussion on the relation 98 between Internet protocols and human rights [RFC8280] which spurred 99 the discussion on the political nature of protocols. The network 100 infrastructure is on the one hand designed, described, developed, 101 standardized and implemented by the Internet community, but the 102 Internet community and Internet users are also shaped by the 103 affordances of the technology. Companies, citizens, governments, 104 standards developing bodies, public opinion and public interest 105 groups all play a part in these discussions. In this document we aim 106 to outline different views on the relation between protocols and 107 politics and seek to answer the question whether protocols are 108 political, and if so, how. 110 2. Vocabulary Used 112 Politics (from Greek: Politika: Politika, definition "affairs of the 113 commons") is the process of making decisions applying to all 114 members of a group. More narrowly, it refers to achieving and 115 exercising positions of governance or organized control over a 116 community. Furthermore, politics is the study or practice of the 117 distribution of power and resources within a given community as 118 well as the interrelationship(s) between communities. (adapted 119 from ) 121 3. Literature and Positions 123 While discussion the impact of protocols on human rights different 124 positions could be differentiated. Without judging them on their 125 internal of external consistency they are represented here. 127 3.1. Technology is value neutral 129 This position starts from the premise that the technical and 130 political are differentiated fields and that technology is 'value 131 free'. This is also put more explicitly by Carey: "electronics is 132 neither the arrival of apocalypse nor the dispensation of grace. 133 Technology is technology; it is a means for communication and 134 transportation over space, and nothing more." [Carey] In this view 135 technology only become political when it is actually being used by 136 humans. So the technology itself is not political, the use of the 137 technology is. This is view sees technology as instrument; 138 "technologies are 'tools' standing ready to serve the purposes of 139 their users. Technology is deemed 'neutral,' without valuative 140 content of its own.'" [Feenberg]. Feenberg continues: "technology is 141 not inherently good or bad, and can be used to whatever political or 142 social ends desired by the person or institution in control. 143 Technology is a 'rational entity' and universally applicable. One 144 may make exceptions on moral grounds, but one must also understand 145 that the "price for the achievement of environmental, ethical, or 146 religious goals...is reduced efficiency." [Feenberg] 148 3.2. Some protocols are political some times 150 This stance is a pragmatic approach to the problem. It states that 151 some protocols under certain conditions can themselves have a 152 political dimension. This is different from the claim that a 153 protocol might sometimes be used in a political way; that view is 154 consistent with the idea of the technology being neutral (for the 155 human action using the technology is where the politics lies). 156 Instead, this position requires that each protocol and use be 157 evaluated for its political dimension, in order to understand the 158 extent to which it is political. 160 3.3. All protocols are political sometimes 162 While not an absolutist standpoint it recognizes that all design 163 decisions are subject to the law of unintended consequences. The 164 system consisting of the Internet and its users is vastly too complex 165 to be predictable; it is chatoic in nature; its emergent properties 166 cannot be predicted. 168 3.4. The network has its own logic and values 170 While humans create technologies, this does not mean that they are 171 forever under human control. A technology, once created, has its own 172 logic that is independent of the human actors that either create or 173 use the technology. 175 Consider, for instance, the way that the very existence of the 176 automobile imposes physical forms on the world different from those 177 that come from the electric tram or the horse-cart. The logic of the 178 automobile means speed and the rapid covering of distance, which 179 encourages suburban development and a tendency toward conurbation. 180 But even if that did not happen, widespread automobile use requires 181 paved roads, and parking lots and structures. These are pressures 182 that come from the automotive technology itself, and would not arise 183 without that technology. 185 Certain kinds of technology shape the world in this sense. As Martin 186 Heidegger says, "The hydroelectric plant is not built into the Rhine 187 River as was the old wooden bridge that joined bank with bank for 188 hundreds of years. Rather the river is dammed up into the power 189 plant. What the river is now, namely, a water power supplier, 190 derives from out of the essence of the power station." [Heidegger] 191 (p 16) The dam in the river changes the world in a way the bridge 192 does not, because the dam alters the nature of the river. 194 In much same way, then, networking technology once created makes its 195 own demands. One of the most important conditions for protocol 196 success is that the protocol is incremental deployability [RFC5218]. 197 This means that the network already deployed constrains what can be 198 deployed into it. Moreover, one interpretation of [RFC7258] is that 199 pervasive monitoring is an "attack" in the narrow sense precisely 200 because of the network's need not to leak traces of online exchanges. 201 A different network with a different design might not have been 202 subject to this kind of attack. 204 3.5. Protocols are inherently political 206 On the other side of the spectrum there are the ones who insist that 207 technology is non-neutral. This is for instance made explicit by 208 Postman where he writes: 'the uses made of technology are largely 209 determined by the structure of the technology itself' [Postman]. He 210 states that the medium itself 'contains an ideological bias'. He 211 continues to argue that technology is non-neutral: 213 (1) because of the symbolic forms in which information is encoded, 214 different media have different intellectual and emotional biases; (2) 215 because of the accessibility and speed of their information, 216 different media have different political biases; (3) because of their 217 physical form, different media have different sensory biases; (4) 218 because of the conditions in which we attend to them, different media 219 have different social biases; (5) because of their technical and 220 economic structure, different media have different content biases. 221 [Postman] 223 More recent scholars of Internet infrastructure and governance have 224 also pointed out that Internet processes and protocols have become 225 part and parcel of political processes and public policies: one only 226 has to look at the IANA transition or global innovation policy for 227 concrete examples [DeNardis]. Similarly one can look at the Raven 228 process in which the IETF after a long discussion refused to 229 standardize wiretapping (which resulted in [RFC2804]. That was an 230 instance where the IETF took a position that was largely political, 231 although driven by a technical argument. It was similar to the 232 process that led to [RFC6973], in which something that occurred in 233 the political space (Snowden disclosures) engendered the IETF to act. 234 This is summarized in [Abbate] who says: "protocols are politics by 235 other means". This emphasizes the interests that are at play in the 236 process of designing standards. This position holds further that 237 protocols can never be understood without their contextual 238 embeddedness: protocols do not exist solely by themselves but always 239 are to be understood in a more complex context - the stack, hardware, 240 or nation-state interests and their impact on civil rights. Finally, 241 this view is that that protocols are political because they affect or 242 sometimes effect the socio-technical ordering of reality. The latter 243 observation leads Winner to conclude that the reality of 244 technological progress has too often been a scenario where the 245 innovation has dictated change for society. Those who had the power 246 to introduce a new technology also had the power to create a consumer 247 class to use the technology, 'with new practices, relationships, and 248 identities supplanting the old, --and those who had the wherewithal 249 to implement new technologies often molded society to match the needs 250 of emerging technologies and organizations.' [Winner]. 252 4. Examples and approaches 254 5. Competition and collaboration 256 Standards exist for nearly everything: processes, technologies, 257 safety, hiring, elections, and training. Standards provide blue- 258 prints for how to accomplish a particular task in a similar way to 259 others trying to accomplish the same thing, while reducing overhead 260 and inefficiencies. Standards enhance competition by allowing 261 different entities to work from a commonly accepted baseline. And 262 they exist in many forms: there can be informal standards, that are 263 just agreed upon normal ways of interacting within a specific 264 community (i.e. the process through which greetings to a new 265 acquaintance are expressed through a bow, a handshake or similar). 266 There can be formal standards, that are normally codified in writing. 268 And there can be de facto standards: standards that arise in market 269 situations where one entity is particularly dominant, and downstream 270 competitors are therefore tied to the dominant entity's technological 271 solutions [Ahlborn]. Under EU anti-trust law, de facto standards 272 have been found to be able to restrict competition for downstream 273 services for PC software products [CJEU2007], as well as downstream 274 services dependent on health information [CJEU2004]. 276 The World Trade Organisation (WTO) recognises a difference between 277 standards and technical regulations, where standards are voluntary 278 formal codes to which products or services may conform while 279 technical regulations are mandatory requirements the fulfillment of 280 which is required for a product to be accessible on one of the WTO 281 country markets. The WTO rules have implications for how nation 282 states, at least those that have signed on to the WTO agreements, may 283 impose specific technical requirements on companies. 285 But there are many standardisation groups that were originally 286 launched by nation states or groups of nation states. ISO, BIS, 287 CNIS, NIST, ABNT and ETSI are examples of institutions that are, 288 wholly or partially, sponsored by public money in order to ensure 289 smooth development of formal standards. Even if under WTO rules 290 these organisations cannot create the equivalent of a technical 291 regulation, they have important normative functions in their 292 respective countries. 294 5.1. Standards development 296 The development of formal standards development faces a number of 297 economic and organisational challenges. The cost and difficulty of 298 organising many entities around a mutual goal, as well as the cost of 299 research and development leading up to a mutually beneficial 300 technological platform. In addition, one faces the problem of 301 deciding what the mutual goal is. 303 These problems may be described as inter-organisational costs. Even 304 after a goal is decided upon, coordination of multiple entities 305 requires time and money. One needs communication platforms, 306 processes and a commitment to mutual investment in a higher good. 307 They are not simple tasks, and the more different communities are 308 affected by a particular standardisation process, the more difficult 309 the organisational challenges become. 311 5.2. Standards development in the IETF 313 The standards enabling interoperating networks, what we think of 314 today as the Internet, were created as open, formal and voluntary 315 standards. A platform for internet standardisation, the Internet 316 Engineering Task Force (IETF), was created in 1992 to enable the 317 continuation of such standardisation work. 319 The IETF has sought to make the standards process transparent (by 320 ensuring everyone can access standards, mailing-lists and meetings), 321 predictable (by having clear procedures and reviews) and of high 322 quality (by having draft documents reviewed by members from its own 323 epistemic community). This is all aimed at increasing the 324 accountability of the process and the quality of the standard. 326 The IETF implements what has been referred to as an "informal ex ante 327 disclosure policy" for patents [Contreras], which includes the 328 possibility for participants to disclose the existence of a patent 329 relevant for the standard, royalty-terms which would apply to the 330 implementors of that standard should it enter into effect, as well as 331 other licensing terms that may be interesting for implementors to 332 know. The community ethos in the IETF seems to lead to 100% royalty- 333 free disclosures of prior patents which is a record number, even 334 among other comparable standard organisations [Contreras]. 336 In spite of a strong community ethos and transparent procedures, the 337 IETF is not immune to externalities. Sponsorship to the IETF is 338 varied, but is also of the nature that ongoing projects that are in 339 the specific interest of one or some group of corporations may be 340 given more funding than other projects (see 341 [draft-finance-thoughts]). The IETF has faced three periods of 342 decreased commitment from participants in funding its meetings in the 343 past ten years, leading, naturally, to self-scrutiny, see for 344 instance [IAOC69], [IAOC77], [IAOC99]. 346 6. More legacy, more politics? 348 Roman engineers complained about inadequate legacy standards they 349 needed to comply with, which hampered them in their engineering 350 excellence. In that sense not much has changed in the last 2100 351 years. When starting from a tabula rasa, one does not need to take 352 other systems, layers or standards into account. The need for 353 interoperability, and backward compatability makes engineering work 354 harder. And once a standard is designed, it does not automatically 355 means it will be broadly adopted at as fast pace. Examples of this 356 are IPv6, DNSSEC, DKIM, etc. The need for interoperability means 357 that a new protocol needs to take into account a much more diverse 358 environment than early protocols, and also be amendable to different 359 needs: protocols needs to relate and negotiate in a busy agora, as do 360 the protocol developers. This means that some might get priority, 361 whereas others get dropped. Thus with the 363 7. Layers of politics 365 There is a competition between layers, and even contestation about 366 what the borders of different layers are. This leads to competition 367 between layers and different solutions for similar problems on 368 different layers, which in its turn leads to further ossification, 369 which leads to more contestation. 371 8. How voluntary are open standards? 373 Coordinating transnational stakeholders in a process of negotiation 374 and agreement through the development of common rules is a form of 375 global governance [Nadvi]. Standards are among the mechanisms by 376 which this governance is achieved. Conformance to certain standards 377 is often a basic condition of participation in international trade 378 and communication, so there are strong economic and political 379 incentives to conform, even in the absence of legal requirements 380 [Russell]. [RogersEden] argue: 382 "As unequal participants compete to define standards, technological 383 compromises emerge, which add complexity to standards. For instance, 384 when working group participants propose competing solutions, it may 385 be easier for them to agree on a standard that combines all the 386 proposals rather than choosing any single proposal. This shifts the 387 responsibility for selecting a solution onto those who implement the 388 standard, which can lead to complex implementations that may not be 389 interoperable. On its face this appears to be a failure of the 390 standardization process, but this outcome may benefit certain 391 participants-- for example, by allowing an implementer with large 392 market share to establish a de facto standard within the scope of the 393 documented standard." 395 9. The need for a positioning 397 It is indisputable that the Internet plays an increasingly important 398 role in the lives of individuals. The community that produces 399 standards for the Internet therefore also has an impact on society, 400 which it itself has recognised in a number of previously adopted 401 documents [RFC1958]. 403 The IETF cannot ordain what standards are to be used on the networks, 404 and it specifically does not determine the laws of regions or 405 countries where networks are being used, but it does set open 406 standards for interoperability on the Internet, and has done so since 407 the inception of the Internet. Because a standard is the blue-print 408 for how to accomplish a particular task in a similar way to others, 409 the standards adopted have a normative effect. The standardisation 410 work at the IETF will have implications on what is perceived as 411 technologically possible and useful where networking technologies are 412 being deployed, and its standards output reflect was is considered by 413 the technical community as feasible and good practice. 415 This calls for providing a methodology in the IETF community to 416 evaluate which routes forward should indeed be feasible, what 417 constitutes the "good" in "good practice" and what trade-offs between 418 different feasible features of technologies are useful and should 419 therefore be made possible. Such an analysis should take societal 420 implication into account. 422 The risk of not doing this is threefold: (1) the IETF might make 423 decisions which have a political impact that was not intended by the 424 community, (2) other bodies or entities might make the decisions for 425 the IETF because the IETF does not have an explicit stance, (3) other 426 bodies that do take these issues into account might increase in 427 importance on behest of the influence of the IETF. 429 This does not mean the IETF does not have a position on particular 430 political issues. The policies for open and diverse participation 431 [RFC7704], the anti-harassment policy [RFC7776], as well as the 432 Guidelines for Privacy Considerations [RFC6973] are testament of 433 this. But these are all examples of positions about the IETF's work 434 processes or product. What is absent is a way for IETF participants 435 to evaluate their role with respect to the wider implications of that 436 IETF work. 438 10. The way forward 440 There are instruments that can help the IETF develop an approach to 441 address the politics of protocols. Part of this can be found in 442 [RFC8280] as well as the United National Guiding Principles for 443 Business and Human Rights [UNGP]. But there is not a one-size-fits- 444 all solution. The IETF is a particular organization, with a 445 particular mandate, and even if a policy is in place, its success 446 depends on the implementation of the policy by the community. 448 Since 'de facto standardization is reliant on market forces' 449 [Hanseth] we need to live with the fact standards bodies have a 450 political nature [Webster]. This does not need to be problematic as 451 long as there are sufficient accountability and transparency 452 mechanisms in place. The importance of these mechanisms increases 453 with the importance of the standards and their implementations. The 454 complexity of the work inscribes a requirement of competence in the 455 work in the IETF, which forms an inherent barrier for end-user 456 involvement. Even though this might not be intentional, it is a 457 result of the interplay between the characteristics of the epistemic 458 community in the IETF and the nature of the standard setting process. 460 Rather than arguing for the fairly general blanket statement that 461 'standards are political' [Winner] [Woolgar] we argue that we need to 462 look at the politics of individual standards and invite document 463 authors and reviewers to take these dynamics into account. 465 11. Security Considerations 467 As this draft concerns a research document, there are no security 468 considerations as described in [RFC3552], which does not mean that 469 not addressing the issues brought up in this draft will not impact 470 the security of end-users or operators. 472 12. IANA Considerations 474 This document has no actions for IANA. 476 13. Acknowledgements 478 Thanks to all Andrew Sullivan, Brian Carpenter and all contributors 479 on the hrpc mailinglist. 481 14. Research Group Information 483 The discussion list for the IRTF Human Rights Protocol Considerations 484 working group is located at the e-mail address hrpc@ietf.org [1]. 485 Information on the group and information on how to subscribe to the 486 list is at: https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc [2] 488 Archives of the list can be found at: https://www.irtf.org/mail- 489 archive/web/hrpc/current/index.html [3] 491 15. References 493 15.1. Informative References 495 [Abbate] Abbate, J., "Inventing the Internet", MIT Press , 2000, 496 . 498 [Ahlborn] Ahlborn, C., Denicolo, V., Geradin, D., and A. Padilla, 499 "Implications of the Proposed Framework and Antitrust 500 Rules for Dynamically Competitive Industries", DG Comp's 501 Discussion Paper on Article 82, DG COMP, European 502 Commission , 2006, 503 . 505 [BramanI] Braman, S., "Internationalization of the Internet by 506 design: The first decade", Global Media and Communication, 507 Vol 8, Issue 1, pp. 27 - 45 , 2012, . 510 [BramanII] 511 Braman, S., "The Framing Years: Policy Fundamentals in the 512 Internet Design Process, 1969-1979", The Information 513 Society Vol. 27, Issue 5, 2011 , 2010, . 516 [Carey] Carey, J., "Communication As Culture", p. 139 , 1992. 518 [CJEU2004] 519 Court of Justice of the European Union, ., 520 "ECLI:EU:C:2004:257, C-418/01 IMS Health", Cambridge, UK: 521 Cambridge University Press , 2004, 522 . 524 [CJEU2007] 525 Court of Justice of the European Union, ., 526 "ECLI:EU:T:2007:289, T-201/04 Microsoft Corp.", Cambridge, 527 UK: Cambridge University Press , 2007, 528 . 530 [Contreras] 531 Contreras, J., "Technical Standards and Ex Ante 532 Disclosure: Results and Analysis of an Empirical Study", 533 Jurimetrics: The Journal of Law, Science & Technology, 534 vol. 53, p. 163-211 , 2013. 536 [DeNardis] 537 Denardis, L., "The Internet Design Tension between 538 Surveillance and Security", IEEE Annals of the History of 539 Computing (volume 37-2) , 2015, . 541 [draft-finance-thoughts] 542 Arkko, J., "Thoughts on IETF Finance Arrangements", 2017, 543 . 546 [Feenberg] 547 Feenberg, A., "Critical Theory of Technology", p.5-6 , 548 1991. 550 [Hanseth] Hanseth, O. and E. Monteiro, "Insribing Behaviour in 551 Information Infrastructure Standards", Accounting, 552 Management and Infomation Technology 7 (14) p.183-211 , 553 1997. 555 [Heidegger] 556 Heidegger, M., "The Question Concerning Technology and 557 Other Essays", Garland: New York, 1977 , 1977, 558 . 561 [IAOC69] IAOC, ., "IAOC Report Chicago", 2007, 562 . 565 [IAOC77] IAOC, ., "IAOC Report Anaheim", 2010, 566 . 569 [IAOC99] IAOC, ., "IAOC Report Prague", 2017, 570 . 573 [Nadvi] Nadvi, K. and F. Waeltring, "Making sense of global 574 standards", In: H. Schmitz (Ed.), Local enterprises in the 575 global economy (pp. 53-94). Cheltenham, UK: Edward 576 Elgar. , 2004. 578 [Postman] Postman, N., "Technopoly: the Surrender of Culture to 579 Technology", Vintage: New York. pp. 3-20. , 1992. 581 [RFC0049] Meyer, E., "Conversations with S. Crocker (UCLA)", RFC 49, 582 DOI 10.17487/RFC0049, April 1970, 583 . 585 [RFC0101] Watson, R., "Notes on the Network Working Group meeting, 586 Urbana, Illinois, February 17, 1971", RFC 101, 587 DOI 10.17487/RFC0101, February 1971, 588 . 590 [RFC0144] Shoshani, A., "Data sharing on computer networks", 591 RFC 144, DOI 10.17487/RFC0144, April 1971, 592 . 594 [RFC0164] Heafner, J., "Minutes of Network Working Group meeting, 595 5/16 through 5/19/71", RFC 164, DOI 10.17487/RFC0164, May 596 1971, . 598 [RFC0196] Watson, R., "Mail Box Protocol", RFC 196, 599 DOI 10.17487/RFC0196, July 1971, 600 . 602 [RFC0286] Forman, E., "Network Library Information System", RFC 286, 603 DOI 10.17487/RFC0286, December 1971, 604 . 606 [RFC0313] O'Sullivan, T., "Computer based instruction", RFC 313, 607 DOI 10.17487/RFC0313, March 1972, 608 . 610 [RFC0316] McKay, D. and A. Mullery, "ARPA Network Data Management 611 Working Group", RFC 316, DOI 10.17487/RFC0316, February 612 1972, . 614 [RFC0542] Neigus, N., "File Transfer Protocol", RFC 542, 615 DOI 10.17487/RFC0542, August 1973, 616 . 618 [RFC0549] Michener, J., "Minutes of Network Graphics Group meeting, 619 15-17 July 1973", RFC 549, DOI 10.17487/RFC0549, July 620 1973, . 622 [RFC0613] McKenzie, A., "Network connectivity: A response to RFC 623 603", RFC 613, DOI 10.17487/RFC0613, January 1974, 624 . 626 [RFC1958] Carpenter, B., Ed., "Architectural Principles of the 627 Internet", RFC 1958, DOI 10.17487/RFC1958, June 1996, 628 . 630 [RFC2804] IAB and IESG, "IETF Policy on Wiretapping", RFC 2804, 631 DOI 10.17487/RFC2804, May 2000, 632 . 634 [RFC3552] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC 635 Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552, 636 DOI 10.17487/RFC3552, July 2003, 637 . 639 [RFC5218] Thaler, D. and B. Aboba, "What Makes for a Successful 640 Protocol?", RFC 5218, DOI 10.17487/RFC5218, July 2008, 641 . 643 [RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J., 644 Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy 645 Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973, 646 DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013, 647 . 649 [RFC7258] Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an 650 Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May 651 2014, . 653 [RFC7704] Crocker, D. and N. Clark, "An IETF with Much Diversity and 654 Professional Conduct", RFC 7704, DOI 10.17487/RFC7704, 655 November 2015, . 657 [RFC7776] Resnick, P. and A. Farrel, "IETF Anti-Harassment 658 Procedures", BCP 25, RFC 7776, DOI 10.17487/RFC7776, March 659 2016, . 661 [RFC8280] ten Oever, N. and C. Cath, "Research into Human Rights 662 Protocol Considerations", RFC 8280, DOI 10.17487/RFC8280, 663 October 2017, . 665 [RogersEden] 666 Rogers, M. and G. Eden, "The Snowden Disclosures, 667 Technical Standards, and the Making of Surveillance 668 Infrastructures", International Journal of Communication 669 11(2017), 802-823 , 2017, 670 . 672 [Russell] Russell, A., "Open standards and the digital age: History, 673 ideology, and networks", Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 674 University Press , 2014. 676 [UNGP] Ruggie, J. and United Nations, "United Nations Guiding 677 Principles for Business and Human Rights", 2011, 678 . 681 [Webster] Webster, J., "Networks of Collaboration or Conflict? The 682 Development of EDI", The social shaping of inter- 683 organizational IT systems and data interchange, eds: I. 684 McLougling & D. Mason, European Commission PICT/COST A4 , 685 1995. 687 [Winner] Winner, L., "Upon openig the black box and finding it 688 empty: Social constructivism and the philosophy of 689 technology", Science, Technology, and Human Values 18 (3) 690 p. 362-378 , 1993. 692 [Woolgar] Woolgar, S., "Configuring the user: the case of usability 693 trials", A sociology of monsters. Essays on power, 694 technology and dominatior, ed: J. Law, Routeledge p. 695 57-102. , 1991. 697 15.2. URIs 699 [1] mailto:hrpc@ietf.org 701 [2] https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc 703 [3] https://www.irtf.org/mail-archive/web/hrpc/current/index.html 705 Authors' Addresses 707 Niels ten Oever 708 University of Amsterdam 710 EMail: mail@nielstenoever.net 712 Amelia Andersdotter 713 ARTICLE 19 715 EMail: amelia@article19.org