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Andersdotter 5 Expires: September 20, 2018 ARTICLE 19 6 March 19, 2018 8 On the Politics of Standards 9 draft-tenoever-hrpc-political-04 11 Abstract 13 This document argues that the politics of standards need to be taken 14 into account in the standards development process. We come to this 15 conclusion by mapping different perspectives on the relation between 16 standards and politics in the Internet community and by providing 17 illustrations of the political aspects of standard development. 19 Status of This Memo 21 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 22 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 24 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 25 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 26 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 27 Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 29 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 30 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 31 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 32 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 34 This Internet-Draft will expire on September 20, 2018. 36 Copyright Notice 38 Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 39 document authors. All rights reserved. 41 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 42 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 43 (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 44 publication of this document. Please review these documents 45 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 46 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 47 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 48 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 49 described in the Simplified BSD License. 51 Table of Contents 53 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 54 2. Vocabulary Used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 55 3. Literature and Positions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 56 3.1. Technology is value neutral . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 57 3.2. Some protocols are political some times . . . . . . . . . 4 58 3.3. All protocols are political sometimes . . . . . . . . . . 4 59 3.4. The network has its own logic and values . . . . . . . . 4 60 3.5. Protocols are inherently political . . . . . . . . . . . 5 61 4. Examples and approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 62 5. Competition and collaboration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 63 5.1. Standards development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 64 5.2. Standards development in the IETF . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 65 6. More legacy, more politics? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 66 7. Layers of politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 67 8. How voluntary are open standards? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 68 9. The need for a positioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 69 10. The way forward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 70 11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 71 12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 72 13. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 73 14. Research Group Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 74 15. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 75 15.1. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 76 15.2. URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 77 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 79 1. Introduction 81 "Science and technology lie at the heart of social asymmetry. 82 Thus technology both creates systems which close off other 83 options and generate novel, unpredictable and indeed 84 previously unthinkable, option. The game of technology is 85 never finished, and its ramifications are endless. 87 - Michel Callon 89 The design of the Internet through protocols and standards is a 90 technical issue with great political and economic impacts [RFC0613]. 91 The early Internet community already realized that it needed to make 92 decisions on political issues such as Intellectual Property, 93 Internationalization [BramanI], diversity, access [RFC0101] privacy 94 and security [RFC0049], and the military [RFC0164] [RFC0316], 95 governmental [RFC0144] [RFC0286] [RFC0313] [RFC0542] [RFC0549] and 96 non-governmental [RFC0196] uses, which has been clearly pointed out 97 by Braman [BramanII]. 99 Recently there has been an increased discussion on the relation 100 between Internet protocols and human rights [RFC8280] which spurred 101 the discussion on the political nature of standards. The network 102 infrastructure is on the one hand designed, described, developed, 103 standardized and implemented by the Internet community, but the 104 Internet community and Internet users are also shaped by the 105 affordances of the technology. Companies, citizens, governments, 106 standards developing bodies, public opinion and public interest 107 groups all play a part in these discussions. In this document we aim 108 to outline different views on the relation between standards and 109 politics and seek to answer the question whether standards are 110 political, and if so, how. 112 2. Vocabulary Used 114 Politics (from Greek: Politika: Politika, definition "affairs of the 115 commons") is the process of making decisions applying to all 116 members of a diverse group with conflicting interests. More 117 narrowly, it refers to achieving and exercising positions of 118 governance or organized control over a community. Furthermore, 119 politics is the study or practice of the distribution of power and 120 resources within a given community as well as the 121 interrelationship(s) between communities. (adapted from ) 123 3. Literature and Positions 125 While discussing the impact of protocols on human rights different 126 positions can be differentiated. Without judging them on their 127 internal of external consistency they are represented here. 129 3.1. Technology is value neutral 131 This position starts from the premise that the technical and 132 political are differentiated fields and that technology is 'value 133 free'. This is also put more explicitly by Carey: "electronics is 134 neither the arrival of apocalypse nor the dispensation of grace. 135 Technology is technology; it is a means for communication and 136 transportation over space, and nothing more." [Carey] In this view 137 technology only become political when it is actually being used by 138 humans. So the technology itself is not political, the use of the 139 technology is. This view sees technology as instrument; 140 "technologies are 'tools' standing ready to serve the purposes of 141 their users. Technology is deemed 'neutral,' without valuative 142 content of its own.'" [Feenberg]. Feenberg continues: "technology is 143 not inherently good or bad, and can be used to whatever political or 144 social ends desired by the person or institution in control. 145 Technology is a 'rational entity' and universally applicable. One 146 may make exceptions on moral grounds, but one must also understand 147 that the "price for the achievement of environmental, ethical, or 148 religious goals...is reduced efficiency." [Feenberg] 150 3.2. Some protocols are political some times 152 This stance is a pragmatic approach to the problem. It states that 153 some protocols under certain conditions can themselves have a 154 political dimension. This is different from the claim that a 155 protocol might sometimes be used in a political way; that view is 156 consistent with the idea of the technology being neutral (for the 157 human action using the technology is where the politics lies). 158 Instead, this position requires that each protocol and use be 159 evaluated for its political dimension, in order to understand the 160 extent to which it is political. 162 3.3. All protocols are political sometimes 164 While not an absolutist standpoint it recognizes that all design 165 decisions are subject to the law of unintended consequences. The 166 system consisting of the Internet and its users is vastly too complex 167 to be predictable; it is chaotic in nature; its emergent properties 168 cannot be predicted. 170 3.4. The network has its own logic and values 172 While humans create technologies, this does not mean that they are 173 forever under human control. A technology, once created, has its own 174 logic that is independent of the human actors that either create or 175 use the technology. 177 Consider, for instance, the way that the very existence of the 178 automobile imposes physical forms on the world different from those 179 that come from the electric tram or the horse-cart. The logic of the 180 automobile means speed and the rapid covering of distance, which 181 encourages suburban development and a tendency toward conurbation. 182 But even if that did not happen, widespread automobile use requires 183 paved roads, and parking lots and structures. These are pressures 184 that come from the automotive technology itself, and would not arise 185 without that technology. 187 Certain kinds of technology shape the world in this sense. As Martin 188 Heidegger says, "The hydroelectric plant is not built into the Rhine 189 River as was the old wooden bridge that joined bank with bank for 190 hundreds of years. Rather the river is dammed up into the power 191 plant. What the river is now, namely, a water power supplier, 192 derives from out of the essence of the power station." [Heidegger] 193 (p 16) The dam in the river changes the world in a way the bridge 194 does not, because the dam alters the nature of the river. 196 In much same way, then, networking technology once created makes its 197 own demands. One of the most important conditions for protocol 198 success is that the protocol is incremental deployability [RFC5218]. 199 This means that the network already deployed constrains what can be 200 deployed into it. Moreover, one interpretation of [RFC7258] is that 201 pervasive monitoring is an "attack" precisely because of the 202 network's need not to leak traces of online exchanges. A different 203 network with a different design might not have been subject to this 204 kind of attack. 206 3.5. Protocols are inherently political 208 On the other side of the spectrum there are the ones who insist that 209 technology is non-neutral. This is for instance made explicit by 210 Postman where he writes: 'the uses made of technology are largely 211 determined by the structure of the technology itself' [Postman]. He 212 states that the medium itself 'contains an ideological bias'. He 213 continues to argue that technology is non-neutral: 215 (1) because of the symbolic forms in which information is encoded, 216 different media have different intellectual and emotional biases; (2) 217 because of the accessibility and speed of their information, 218 different media have different political biases; (3) because of their 219 physical form, different media have different sensory biases; (4) 220 because of the conditions in which we attend to them, different media 221 have different social biases; (5) because of their technical and 222 economic structure, different media have different content biases. 223 [Postman] 225 More recent scholars of Internet infrastructure and governance have 226 also pointed out that Internet processes and standards have become 227 part and parcel of political processes and public policies: one only 228 has to look at the IANA transition or global innovation policy for 229 concrete examples [DeNardis]. Similarly one can look at the Raven 230 process in which the IETF after a long discussion refused to 231 standardize wiretapping (which resulted in [RFC2804]. That was an 232 instance where the IETF took a position that was largely political, 233 although driven by a technical argument. It was similar to the 234 process that led to [RFC6973], in which something that occurred in 235 the political space (Snowden disclosures) engendered the IETF to act. 236 This is summarized in [Abbate] who says: "protocols are politics by 237 other means". This emphasizes the interests that are at play in the 238 process of designing standards. This position holds further that 239 protocols can never be understood without their contextual 240 embeddedness: protocols do not exist solely by themselves but always 241 are to be understood in a more complex context - the stack, hardware, 242 or nation-state interests and their impact on civil rights. Finally, 243 this view is that that protocols are political because they affect or 244 sometimes effect the socio-technical ordering of reality. The latter 245 observation leads Winner to conclude that the reality of 246 technological progress has too often been a scenario where the 247 innovation has dictated change for society. Those who had the power 248 to introduce a new technology also had the power to create a consumer 249 class to use the technology, 'with new practices, relationships, and 250 identities supplanting the old, --and those who had the wherewithal 251 to implement new technologies often molded society to match the needs 252 of emerging technologies and organizations.' [Winner]. 254 4. Examples and approaches 256 5. Competition and collaboration 258 Standards exist for nearly everything: processes, technologies, 259 safety, hiring, elections, and training. Standards provide blue- 260 prints for how to accomplish a particular task in a similar way to 261 others trying to accomplish the same thing, while reducing overhead 262 and inefficiencies. Standards enhance competition by allowing 263 different entities to work from a commonly accepted baseline. And 264 they exist in many forms: there can be informal standards, that are 265 just agreed upon normal ways of interacting within a specific 266 community (i.e. the process through which greetings to a new 267 acquaintance are expressed through a bow, a handshake or similar). 268 There can be formal standards, that are normally codified in writing. 270 And there can be de facto standards: standards that arise in market 271 situations where one entity is particularly dominant, and downstream 272 competitors are therefore tied to the dominant entity's technological 273 solutions [Ahlborn]. Under EU anti-trust law, de facto standards 274 have been found to be able to restrict competition for downstream 275 services for PC software products [CJEU2007], as well as downstream 276 services dependent on health information [CJEU2004]. 278 The World Trade Organisation (WTO) recognises a difference between 279 standards and technical regulations, where standards are voluntary 280 formal codes to which products or services may conform while 281 technical regulations are mandatory requirements the fulfillment of 282 which is required for a product to be accessible on one of the WTO 283 country markets. The WTO rules have implications for how nation 284 states, at least those that have signed on to the WTO agreements, may 285 impose specific technical requirements on companies. 287 But there are many standardisation groups that were originally 288 launched by nation states or groups of nation states. ISO, BIS, 289 CNIS, NIST, ABNT and ETSI are examples of institutions that are, 290 wholly or partially, sponsored by public money in order to ensure 291 smooth development of formal standards. Even if under WTO rules 292 these organisations cannot create the equivalent of a technical 293 regulation, they have important normative functions in their 294 respective countries. 296 5.1. Standards development 298 The development of formal standards development faces a number of 299 economic and organisational challenges. The cost and difficulty of 300 organising many entities around a mutual goal, as well as the cost of 301 research and development leading up to a mutually beneficial 302 technological platform. In addition, one faces the problem of 303 deciding what the mutual goal is. 305 These problems may be described as inter-organisational costs. Even 306 after a goal is decided upon, coordination of multiple entities 307 requires time and money. One needs communication platforms, 308 processes and a commitment to mutual investment in a higher good. 309 They are not simple tasks, and the more different communities are 310 affected by a particular standardisation process, the more difficult 311 the organisational challenges become. 313 5.2. Standards development in the IETF 315 The standards enabling interoperating networks, what we think of 316 today as the Internet, were created as open, formal and voluntary 317 standards. A platform for internet standardisation, the Internet 318 Engineering Task Force (IETF), was created in 1992 to enable the 319 continuation of such standardisation work. 321 The IETF has sought to make the standards process transparent (by 322 ensuring everyone can access standards, mailing-lists and meetings), 323 predictable (by having clear procedures and reviews) and of high 324 quality (by having draft documents reviewed by members from its own 325 epistemic community). This is all aimed at increasing the 326 accountability of the process and the quality of the standard. 328 The IETF implements what has been referred to as an "informal ex ante 329 disclosure policy" for patents [Contreras], which includes the 330 possibility for participants to disclose the existence of a patent 331 relevant for the standard, royalty-terms which would apply to the 332 implementors of that standard should it enter into effect, as well as 333 other licensing terms that may be interesting for implementors to 334 know. The community ethos in the IETF seems to lead to 100% royalty- 335 free disclosures of prior patents which is a record number, even 336 among other comparable standard organisations [Contreras]. 338 In spite of a strong community ethos and transparent procedures, the 339 IETF is not immune to externalities. Sponsorship to the IETF is 340 varied, but is also of the nature that ongoing projects that are in 341 the specific interest of one or some group of corporations may be 342 given more funding than other projects (see 343 [draft-finance-thoughts]). The IETF has faced three periods of 344 decreased commitment from participants in funding its meetings in the 345 past ten years, leading, naturally, to self-scrutiny, see for 346 instance [IAOC69], [IAOC77], [IAOC99]. 348 6. More legacy, more politics? 350 Roman engineers complained about inadequate legacy standards they 351 needed to comply with, which hampered them in their engineering 352 excellence. In that sense not much has changed in the last 2100 353 years. When starting from a tabula rasa, one does not need to take 354 other systems, layers or standards into account. The need for 355 interoperability, and backward compatability makes engineering work 356 harder. And once a standard is designed, it does not automatically 357 means it will be broadly adopted at as fast pace. Examples of this 358 are IPv6, DNSSEC, DKIM, etc. The need for interoperability means 359 that a new protocol needs to take into account a much more diverse 360 environment than early protocols, and also be amendable to different 361 needs: protocols needs to relate and negotiate in a busy agora, as do 362 the protocol developers. This means that some might get priority, 363 whereas others get dropped. 365 7. Layers of politics 367 There is a competition between layers, and even contestation about 368 what the borders of different layers are. This leads to competition 369 between layers and different solutions for similar problems on 370 different layers, which in its turn leads to further ossification, 371 which leads to more contestation. 373 8. How voluntary are open standards? 375 Coordinating transnational stakeholders in a process of negotiation 376 and agreement through the development of common rules is a form of 377 global governance [Nadvi]. Standards are among the mechanisms by 378 which this governance is achieved. Conformance to certain standards 379 is often a basic condition of participation in international trade 380 and communication, so there are strong economic and political 381 incentives to conform, even in the absence of legal requirements 382 [Russell]. [RogersEden] argue: 384 "As unequal participants compete to define standards, technological 385 compromises emerge, which add complexity to standards. For instance, 386 when working group participants propose competing solutions, it may 387 be easier for them to agree on a standard that combines all the 388 proposals rather than choosing any single proposal. This shifts the 389 responsibility for selecting a solution onto those who implement the 390 standard, which can lead to complex implementations that may not be 391 interoperable. On its face this appears to be a failure of the 392 standardization process, but this outcome may benefit certain 393 participants-- for example, by allowing an implementer with large 394 market share to establish a de facto standard within the scope of the 395 documented standard." 397 9. The need for a positioning 399 It is indisputable that the Internet plays an increasingly important 400 role in the lives of individuals. The community that produces 401 standards for the Internet therefore also has an impact on society, 402 which it itself has recognised in a number of previously adopted 403 documents [RFC1958]. 405 The IETF cannot ordain what standards are to be used on the networks, 406 and it specifically does not determine the laws of regions or 407 countries where networks are being used, but it does set open 408 standards for interoperability on the Internet, and has done so since 409 the inception of the Internet. Because a standard is the blue-print 410 for how to accomplish a particular task in a similar way to others, 411 the standards adopted have a normative effect. The standardisation 412 work at the IETF will have implications on what is perceived as 413 technologically possible and useful where networking technologies are 414 being deployed, and its standards output reflect was is considered by 415 the technical community as feasible and good practice. 417 This calls for providing a methodology in the IETF community to 418 evaluate which routes forward should indeed be feasible, what 419 constitutes the "good" in "good practice" and what trade-offs between 420 different feasible features of technologies are useful and should 421 therefore be made possible. Such an analysis should take societal 422 implication into account. 424 The risk of not doing this is threefold: (1) the IETF might make 425 decisions which have a political impact that was not intended by the 426 community, (2) other bodies or entities might make the decisions for 427 the IETF because the IETF does not have an explicit stance, (3) other 428 bodies that do take these issues into account might increase in 429 importance to the detriment of the influence of the IETF. 431 This does not mean the IETF does not have a position on particular 432 political issues. The policies for open and diverse participation 433 [RFC7704], the anti-harassment policy [RFC7776], as well as the 434 Guidelines for Privacy Considerations [RFC6973] are testament of 435 this. But these are all examples of positions about the IETF's work 436 processes or product. What is absent is a way for IETF participants 437 to evaluate their role with respect to the wider implications of that 438 IETF work. 440 10. The way forward 442 There are instruments that can help the IETF develop an approach to 443 address the politics of standards. Part of this can be found in 444 [RFC8280] as well as the United National Guiding Principles for 445 Business and Human Rights [UNGP]. But there is not a one-size-fits- 446 all solution. The IETF is a particular organization, with a 447 particular mandate, and even if a policy is in place, its success 448 depends on the implementation of the policy by the community. 450 Since 'de facto standardization is reliant on market forces' 451 [Hanseth] we need to live with the fact standards bodies have a 452 political nature [Webster]. This does not need to be problematic as 453 long as there are sufficient accountability and transparency 454 mechanisms in place. The importance of these mechanisms increases 455 with the importance of the standards and their implementations. The 456 complexity of the work inscribes a requirement of competence in the 457 work in the IETF, which forms an inherent barrier for end-user 458 involvement. Even though this might not be intentional, it is a 459 result of the interplay between the characteristics of the epistemic 460 community in the IETF and the nature of the standard setting process. 462 Instead of splitting hairs about whether 'standards are political' 463 [Winner] [Woolgar] we argue that we need to look at the politics of 464 individual standards and invite document authors and reviewers to 465 take these dynamics into account. 467 11. Security Considerations 469 As this draft concerns a research document, there are no security 470 considerations as described in [RFC3552], which does not mean that 471 not addressing the issues brought up in this draft will not impact 472 the security of end-users or operators. 474 12. IANA Considerations 476 This document has no actions for IANA. 478 13. Acknowledgements 480 Thanks to Andrew Sullivan, Brian Carpenter, Mark Perkins and all 481 contributors and reviewers on the hrpc mailinglist. 483 14. Research Group Information 485 The discussion list for the IRTF Human Rights Protocol Considerations 486 working group is located at the e-mail address hrpc@ietf.org [1]. 487 Information on the group and information on how to subscribe to the 488 list is at: https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc [2] 490 Archives of the list can be found at: https://www.irtf.org/mail- 491 archive/web/hrpc/current/index.html [3] 493 15. References 495 15.1. Informative References 497 [Abbate] Abbate, J., "Inventing the Internet", MIT Press , 2000, 498 . 500 [Ahlborn] Ahlborn, C., Denicolo, V., Geradin, D., and A. Padilla, 501 "Implications of the Proposed Framework and Antitrust 502 Rules for Dynamically Competitive Industries", DG Comp's 503 Discussion Paper on Article 82, DG COMP, European 504 Commission , 2006, 505 . 507 [BramanI] Braman, S., "Internationalization of the Internet by 508 design: The first decade", Global Media and Communication, 509 Vol 8, Issue 1, pp. 27 - 45 , 2012, . 512 [BramanII] 513 Braman, S., "The Framing Years: Policy Fundamentals in the 514 Internet Design Process, 1969-1979", The Information 515 Society Vol. 27, Issue 5, 2011 , 2010, . 518 [Carey] Carey, J., "Communication As Culture", p. 139 , 1992. 520 [CJEU2004] 521 Court of Justice of the European Union, ., 522 "ECLI:EU:C:2004:257, C-418/01 IMS Health", Cambridge, UK: 523 Cambridge University Press , 2004, 524 . 526 [CJEU2007] 527 Court of Justice of the European Union, ., 528 "ECLI:EU:T:2007:289, T-201/04 Microsoft Corp.", Cambridge, 529 UK: Cambridge University Press , 2007, 530 . 532 [Contreras] 533 Contreras, J., "Technical Standards and Ex Ante 534 Disclosure: Results and Analysis of an Empirical Study", 535 Jurimetrics: The Journal of Law, Science & Technology, 536 vol. 53, p. 163-211 , 2013. 538 [DeNardis] 539 Denardis, L., "The Internet Design Tension between 540 Surveillance and Security", IEEE Annals of the History of 541 Computing (volume 37-2) , 2015, . 543 [draft-finance-thoughts] 544 Arkko, J., "Thoughts on IETF Finance Arrangements", 2017, 545 . 548 [Feenberg] 549 Feenberg, A., "Critical Theory of Technology", p.5-6 , 550 1991. 552 [Hanseth] Hanseth, O. and E. Monteiro, "Insribing Behaviour in 553 Information Infrastructure Standards", Accounting, 554 Management and Infomation Technology 7 (14) p.183-211 , 555 1997. 557 [Heidegger] 558 Heidegger, M., "The Question Concerning Technology and 559 Other Essays", Garland: New York, 1977 , 1977, 560 . 563 [IAOC69] IAOC, ., "IAOC Report Chicago", 2007, 564 . 567 [IAOC77] IAOC, ., "IAOC Report Anaheim", 2010, 568 . 571 [IAOC99] IAOC, ., "IAOC Report Prague", 2017, 572 . 575 [Nadvi] Nadvi, K. and F. Waeltring, "Making sense of global 576 standards", In: H. Schmitz (Ed.), Local enterprises in the 577 global economy (pp. 53-94). Cheltenham, UK: Edward 578 Elgar. , 2004. 580 [Postman] Postman, N., "Technopoly: the Surrender of Culture to 581 Technology", Vintage: New York. pp. 3-20. , 1992. 583 [RFC0049] Meyer, E., "Conversations with S. Crocker (UCLA)", RFC 49, 584 DOI 10.17487/RFC0049, April 1970, 585 . 587 [RFC0101] Watson, R., "Notes on the Network Working Group meeting, 588 Urbana, Illinois, February 17, 1971", RFC 101, 589 DOI 10.17487/RFC0101, February 1971, 590 . 592 [RFC0144] Shoshani, A., "Data sharing on computer networks", 593 RFC 144, DOI 10.17487/RFC0144, April 1971, 594 . 596 [RFC0164] Heafner, J., "Minutes of Network Working Group meeting, 597 5/16 through 5/19/71", RFC 164, DOI 10.17487/RFC0164, May 598 1971, . 600 [RFC0196] Watson, R., "Mail Box Protocol", RFC 196, 601 DOI 10.17487/RFC0196, July 1971, 602 . 604 [RFC0286] Forman, E., "Network Library Information System", RFC 286, 605 DOI 10.17487/RFC0286, December 1971, 606 . 608 [RFC0313] O'Sullivan, T., "Computer based instruction", RFC 313, 609 DOI 10.17487/RFC0313, March 1972, 610 . 612 [RFC0316] McKay, D. and A. Mullery, "ARPA Network Data Management 613 Working Group", RFC 316, DOI 10.17487/RFC0316, February 614 1972, . 616 [RFC0542] Neigus, N., "File Transfer Protocol", RFC 542, 617 DOI 10.17487/RFC0542, August 1973, 618 . 620 [RFC0549] Michener, J., "Minutes of Network Graphics Group meeting, 621 15-17 July 1973", RFC 549, DOI 10.17487/RFC0549, July 622 1973, . 624 [RFC0613] McKenzie, A., "Network connectivity: A response to RFC 625 603", RFC 613, DOI 10.17487/RFC0613, January 1974, 626 . 628 [RFC1958] Carpenter, B., Ed., "Architectural Principles of the 629 Internet", RFC 1958, DOI 10.17487/RFC1958, June 1996, 630 . 632 [RFC2804] IAB and IESG, "IETF Policy on Wiretapping", RFC 2804, 633 DOI 10.17487/RFC2804, May 2000, 634 . 636 [RFC3552] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC 637 Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552, 638 DOI 10.17487/RFC3552, July 2003, 639 . 641 [RFC5218] Thaler, D. and B. Aboba, "What Makes for a Successful 642 Protocol?", RFC 5218, DOI 10.17487/RFC5218, July 2008, 643 . 645 [RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J., 646 Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy 647 Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973, 648 DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013, 649 . 651 [RFC7258] Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an 652 Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May 653 2014, . 655 [RFC7704] Crocker, D. and N. Clark, "An IETF with Much Diversity and 656 Professional Conduct", RFC 7704, DOI 10.17487/RFC7704, 657 November 2015, . 659 [RFC7776] Resnick, P. and A. Farrel, "IETF Anti-Harassment 660 Procedures", BCP 25, RFC 7776, DOI 10.17487/RFC7776, March 661 2016, . 663 [RFC8280] ten Oever, N. and C. Cath, "Research into Human Rights 664 Protocol Considerations", RFC 8280, DOI 10.17487/RFC8280, 665 October 2017, . 667 [RogersEden] 668 Rogers, M. and G. Eden, "The Snowden Disclosures, 669 Technical Standards, and the Making of Surveillance 670 Infrastructures", International Journal of Communication 671 11(2017), 802-823 , 2017, 672 . 674 [Russell] Russell, A., "Open standards and the digital age: History, 675 ideology, and networks", Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 676 University Press , 2014. 678 [UNGP] Ruggie, J. and United Nations, "United Nations Guiding 679 Principles for Business and Human Rights", 2011, 680 . 683 [Webster] Webster, J., "Networks of Collaboration or Conflict? The 684 Development of EDI", The social shaping of inter- 685 organizational IT systems and data interchange, eds: I. 686 McLougling & D. Mason, European Commission PICT/COST A4 , 687 1995. 689 [Winner] Winner, L., "Upon openig the black box and finding it 690 empty: Social constructivism and the philosophy of 691 technology", Science, Technology, and Human Values 18 (3) 692 p. 362-378 , 1993. 694 [Woolgar] Woolgar, S., "Configuring the user: the case of usability 695 trials", A sociology of monsters. Essays on power, 696 technology and dominatior, ed: J. Law, Routeledge p. 697 57-102. , 1991. 699 15.2. URIs 701 [1] mailto:hrpc@ietf.org 703 [2] https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc 705 [3] https://www.irtf.org/mail-archive/web/hrpc/current/index.html 707 Authors' Addresses 709 Niels ten Oever 710 University of Amsterdam 712 EMail: mail@nielstenoever.net 713 Amelia Andersdotter 714 ARTICLE 19 716 EMail: amelia@article19.org