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Jenkins 3 Internet Draft NSA 4 Intended Status: Informational Sean Turner 5 Expires: February 29, 2021 sn3rd 6 September 8, 2020 8 The SODP (Secure Object Delivery Protocol) Server Interfaces: 9 NSA's Profile for Delivery of Certificates, 10 CRLs, and Symmetric Keys to Clients 11 draft-turner-sodp-profile-08.txt 13 Abstract 15 This document specifies protocol interfaces profiled by the US NSA 16 (United States National Security Agency) for NSS (National Security 17 System) servers that provide public key certificates, CRLs 18 (Certificate Revocation Lists), and symmetric keys to NSS clients. 19 Servers that support these interfaces are referred to as SODP (Secure 20 Object Delivery Protocol) servers. The intended audience for this 21 profile comprises developers of client devices that will obtain key 22 management services from NSA-operated SODP servers. Interfaces 23 supported by SODP servers include: EST (Enrollment over Secure 24 Transport) and its extensions as well as CMC (Certificate Management 25 over CMS (Cryptographic Message Syntax)). 27 This profile applies to the capabilities, configuration, and 28 operation of all components of US National Security Systems (SP 800- 29 59). It is also appropriate for other US Government systems that 30 process high-value information. It is made publicly available for use 31 by developers and operators of these and any other system 32 deployments. 34 Status of this Memo 36 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 37 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 39 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 40 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 41 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 42 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 44 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 45 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 46 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 47 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 49 Copyright Notice 51 Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 52 document authors. All rights reserved. 54 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 55 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 56 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 57 publication of this document. Please review these documents 58 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 59 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 60 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 61 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 62 described in the Simplified BSD License. 64 Table of Contents 66 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 67 1.1. Documents to be Familiar With . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 68 1.2. Document Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 69 1.3. Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 70 2. Abstract Syntax Notation One . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 71 3. EST Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 72 3.1. Hypertext Transfer Protocol Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 73 3.2. Transport Layer Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 74 3.3. Eligibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 75 3.4. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 76 3.5. Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 77 3.6. EST and EST Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 78 3.6.1. /pal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 79 3.6.2. /cacerts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 80 3.6.3. /simpleenroll . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 81 3.6.4. /simplereenroll . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 82 3.6.5. /fullcmc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 83 3.6.6. /serverkeygen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 84 3.6.7. /csrattrs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 85 3.6.8. /crls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 86 3.6.9. /symmetrickeys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 87 3.6.10. /eecerts, /firmware, /tamp . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 88 4. CMC Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 89 4.1. RFC 5273 Transport Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 90 4.2. Eligibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 91 4.3. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 92 4.4. Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 93 4.5. Full PKI Requests/Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 94 5. Trust Anchor Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 95 6. Non-Self-Signed Certification Authority Certificate Profile . 11 96 7. End-Entity Certificate Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 97 7.1. Source of Authority Certificate Profile . . . . . . . . . 13 98 7.2. Client Certificate Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 99 8. Relying Party Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 100 9. CRL Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 101 10. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 102 11. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 103 12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 104 12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 105 12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 106 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 108 1. Introduction 110 This document specifies protocol interfaces profiled by the US NSA 111 (United States National Security Agency) for NSS (National Security 112 System) servers that provide public key certificates, CRLs 113 (Certificate Revocation Lists), and symmetric keys to NSS clients. 114 Servers that support these interfaces are referred to as SODP (Secure 115 Object Delivery Protocol) servers. The purpose of this document is 116 to indicate options from, and requirements additional to, the base 117 specifications listed in Section 1.1 that are necessary for client 118 interoperability with NSA-operated SODP servers. Clients are always 119 devices, and need not implement all of the interfaces specified 120 herein; clients are free to choose which interfaces to implement 121 based on their operational requirements. Interfaces supported by 122 SODP servers include: 124 o EST (Enrollment over Secure Transport) [RFC7030] and its 125 extensions [RFC8295], and 126 o CMC (Certificate Management over CMS (Cryptographic Message 127 Syntax)) [RFC5274][RFC6402] for both Simple PKI (Public Key 128 Infrastructure) requests and responses (i.e., PKCS#10 requests 129 and PKCS#7 responses) and Full PKI requests and responses. 131 This profile applies to the capabilities, configuration, and 132 operation of all components of US National Security Systems [SP 800- 133 59]. It is also appropriate for other US Government systems that 134 process high-value information. It is made publicly available for use 135 by developers and operators of these and any other system 136 deployments. 138 This profile conforms to the existing requirements of NSA's 139 Commercial National Security Algorithms. As operational needs evolve 140 over time, this profile will be updated to incorporate new commercial 141 algorithms and protocols as they are developed and approved for use. 143 1.1. Documents to be Familiar With 144 Familiarity with the follow specifications is assumed: 146 o EST [RFC7030] and EST extensions [RFC8295]; 147 o PKI-related specifications [RFC2986], [RFC3739], [RFC5274], 148 [RFC5280], [RFC5912], [RFC5913], [RFC5916], [RFC5917], [RFC6010], 149 and [RFC6402]; 150 o Key-format-related specifications [RFC5915], [RFC5958], 151 [RFC5959], [RFC6031], [RFC6032], [RFC6160], [RFC6161], [RFC6162], 152 [RFC7191], [RFC7192], [RFC7292], and [RFC7906]; 153 o CMS-related (Cryptographic Message Syntax) RFCs [RFC5652], 154 [RFC6268], and; 155 o CNSA-related (Commercial National Security Algorithm) drafts 156 [RFC8603], [RFC8755], [RFC8756], and 157 [ID.cnsa-tls-profile]. 159 The requirements from RFCs apply throughout this profile and are 160 generally not repeated here. This document is purposely written 161 without [RFC2119] language. 163 1.2. Document Organization 165 The document is organized as follows: 167 o The remainder of this section describes the operational 168 environment used by clients to retrieve secure objects. 169 o Section 2 specifies the ASN.1 (Abstract Syntax Notation one) 170 version used. 171 o Section 3 specifies SODP's EST interface. 172 o Section 4 specifies SODP's CMC interfaces; one section each for 173 Simple PKI requests/responses and Full PKI requests/responses. 174 o Sections 5-9 respectively specify TA, CA, and EE certificates as 175 well as CRL. 177 1.3. Environment 179 The environment is Client-Server-based from which clients obtain 180 secure "objects" or "packages". Objects/packages vary based on the 181 SOA (Source of Authority) but all objects are "secured" minimally 182 through the use of one or more digital signatures and zero or more 183 layers of encryption, as profiled in this document. An SOA is the 184 authority for the creation of objects that the client will recognize 185 as valid. An SOA can delegate its authority to other actors; 186 delegation occurs through the issuance of certificates. An object or 187 package is the generic term for certificates, certificate status 188 information, and keys (both asymmetric and symmetric). All of the 189 objects except for the certificates and certificate status 190 information are directly encapsulated in and protected by CMS content 191 types. CMS content types that provide security are referred to as 192 CMS-protecting content types. All others are simply referred to as 193 CMS content types. All secured objects are distributed either as CMS 194 packages or as part of a CMS package. 196 In the following example depicted in Figure 1, there are two SOAs: 197 one for symmetric keys, as depicted by the KTA (Key Trust Anchor), 198 and one for public key certificates, as depicted by the PKI TA (Trust 199 Anchor). The KTA is responsible for the creation and distribution of 200 symmetric keys. The KTA delegates the creation and distribution 201 responsibilities to separate entities through the issuance of 202 certificates to a KSA (Key Source Authority) and a KDA (Key 203 Distribution Authority). The KSA generates the keys, digitally signs 204 the keys, and encrypts the key for the end client using CMS content 205 types for each step. The KDA distributes the KSA-generated and - 206 protected key to the client; the key may also be signed by the KDA. 207 The resulting CMS package is provided to the client through the EST 208 extension's /symmetrickey service. The PKI TA is responsible for the 209 creation, distribution, and management of public key certificates. 210 The PKI TA delegates these responsibilities to CAs (Certification 211 Authorities) and CAs in turn are responsible for creating, 212 distributing, and managing EEs (End-Entities) certificates; CAs 213 distribute PKI-related information through the /cacerts, /crls, 214 /eecerts, /fullcmc, /simpleenroll, /simplereenroll, and /csrattrs EST 215 and EST extension services. 217 +-----+ +--------+ 218 | KTA | | PKI TA | 219 +-----+ +--------+ 220 | | 221 | Signs | Signs 222 | | 223 +-------------+ V 224 | | +----+ 225 V V | CA | 226 +-----+ +-----+ +----+ 227 | KSA | | KDA | | 228 +-----+ +-----+ | Signs 229 | | | 230 | Signs & | Optionally +---------------+ 231 | Encrypts | Signs | | 232 | | V V 233 | | +-------------+ +-------------+ 234 | V | Certificate | | Certificate | 235 +---|-------------+ +-------------+ | Revocation | 236 | V | CMS Content | List | 237 | +-------------+ | Types +-------------+ 238 | | Key Package | | 239 | +-------------+ | 240 +-----------------+ 242 Figure 1 - Operating Environment (Key and PKI Sources of Authority) 244 For clients that support the CMC interface and not the EST interface, 245 the environment includes only the PKI TAs. 247 2. Abstract Syntax Notation One 249 Implementations of this specification use the '02/'08 ASN.1 (Abstract 250 Syntax Notation One) version; '02/'08 ASN.1 modules can be found in 251 [RFC5911], [RFC5912], and [RFC6268] (use RFC 6268 for the CMS syntax) 252 while other specifications already include the '02/'08 ASN.1 along 253 with the '88 ASN.1. See Section 1.1 of [RFC6268] for a discussion 254 about the differences between the '02 and '08 ASN.1 versions. 256 3. EST Interface 258 EST [RFC7030] and EST extensions [RFC8295] client options are 259 specified in this section. 261 3.1. Hypertext Transfer Protocol Layer 263 Clients that receive redirection responses (3xx status codes) will 264 terminate the connection ([RFC7030], Section 3.2.1). 266 Per Section 2.2 of [RFC8295], clients indicate the format 267 ("application/xml" or "application/json") of the PAL information 268 ([RFC8295], Section 2.1.1) via the HTTP Accept header. 270 3.2. Transport Layer Security 272 TLS implementations are configured as specified in 273 [ID.cnsa-tls-profile]; the notable exception is that only EC-based 274 algorithms are used. 276 3.3. Eligibility 278 At the EST interface, servers enroll only clients that they have a 279 prior established relationship with, established independently of 280 the EST service. To accomplish this, client owners/operators 281 interact in person with the human acting as the RA (Registration 282 Authority) to ensure the information included in the transmitted 283 certificate request, which is sometimes called a CSR (Certificate 284 Signing Request), is associated with a client. The mechanism by 285 which the owner/operator interact with the RA as well as 286 the information provided is beyond the scope of this document. The 287 information exchanged by the owner/operator might be something as 288 simple as the subject name included in the to-be sent CSR or a copy 289 of the certificate that will be used to verify the certificate 290 request, provided out-of-band. 292 3.4. Authentication 294 Mutual authentication occurs via "Certificate TLS Authentication" 295 ([RFC7030], Section 2.1). Clients provide their certificate to 296 servers in the TLS Certificate message, which is sent in response to 297 the server's TLS Certificate Request message. Both servers and 298 clients reject all attempts to authenticate based on certificates 299 that cannot be validated back to an installed TA. 301 3.5. Authorization 303 Clients always use an explicit TA database ([RFC7030], Section 304 3.6.1). At a minimum, clients support two TAs; one for the PKI and 305 one for symmetric keys. 307 Clients check that the server's certificate includes the id-kp-cmcRA 308 EKU (Extended Key Usage) value ([RFC6402], Section 2.10). 310 Clients that support processing the CMS Content Constraints extension 311 [RFC6010] ensure returned CMS content is from an SOA or is from an 312 entity authorized by an SOA for that CMS content; see Section 6.0 for 313 SOA certificates. 315 3.6. EST and EST Extensions 317 This section profiles SODP's EST [RFC7030] and EST Extensions 318 [RFC8295] interfaces. 320 3.6.1. /pal 322 The PAL (Package Availability List) is limited to 32 entries, where 323 the 32nd PAL entry links to an additional PAL (i.e., is PAL Package 324 Type 0001). 326 The PAL is XML [XML]. 328 3.6.2. /cacerts 330 The CA certificates located in the explicit TA database are 331 distributed to the client when it is registered. This TA 332 distribution mechanism is out-of-scope. 334 CA certificates provided through this service are as specified in 335 Sections 5 and 6 of this document. 337 3.6.3. /simpleenroll 339 CSRs follow the specifications in Section 4.2 of [RFC8756], 340 except that the CMC-specific Change Subject Name and 341 the POP Link Witness V2 attributes do not apply. Second, only 342 EC-based algorithms are used. 344 Client certificates provided through this service are as specified in 345 Section 7 of this document. 347 The HTTP content-type of "text/plain" ([RFC2046], Section 4.1) is 348 used to return human readable errors. 350 3.6.4. /simplereenroll 352 There are no additional requirements for requests beyond those 353 specified in Sections 3.4 and 3.6.3 of this document. 355 The HTTP content-type of "text/plain" ([RFC2046], Section 4.1) is 356 used to return human readable errors. 358 3.6.5. /fullcmc 360 Requests are as specified in [RFC8756] with the notable 361 exception that only EC-based algorithms are used. 363 Additional attributes for returned CMS packages can be found in 364 [RFC7906]. 366 Certificates provided through this service are as specified in 367 Section 7 of this document. 369 3.6.6. /serverkeygen 371 PKCS#12 [RFC7292], sometimes referred to as "PFX" (Personal 372 inFormation eXchange), "P12", and "PKCS#12" files, are used to 373 provide server-generated asymmetric private keys and the associated 374 certificate to clients. This interface is a one-way interface as the 375 RA requests these from the server. 377 PFXs [RFC7292] are exchanged using both password privacy mode and 378 integrity password mode. The PRF algorithm for PBKDF2 (the KDF for 379 PBES2 and PBMAC1) is HMAC-SHA-384 and the PBES2 encryption scheme is 380 AES-256. 382 The HTTP content-type of "text/plain" ([RFC2046], Section 4.1) is 383 used to return human readable errors. 385 /serverkeygen/return is not supported at this time. 387 3.6.7. /csrattrs 389 Clients use this service to retrieve partially filled PKIRequests: 390 PKIRequests with no public key or proof-of-possession signature, 391 i.e., their values are set to zero length either a zero length BIT 392 STRING or OCTET STRING. The pKCS7PDU attribute, defined in 393 [RFC2985], includes the partially filled PKIRequest as the only 394 element in the CsrAttrs sequence. Even though the CsrAttrs syntax is 395 defined as a set, there is only ever exactly one instance of values 396 present. 398 3.6.8. /crls 400 CRLs provided through this service are as specified in Section 9 of 401 this document. 403 3.6.9. /symmetrickeys 405 Clients that claim to support SODP-interoperation will be able to 406 process the following messages from a SODP server: additional 407 encryption and origin authentication ([RFC8295], Section 5); server- 408 provided Symmetric Key Content Type [RFC6032] encapsulated in an 409 Encrypted Key Content Type using the EnvelopedData choice [RFC6033] 410 with a SOA certificate that includes the CMS Content Constraints 411 extension (see Section 7.1). 413 Client-supported algorithms to decrypt the server-returned symmetric 414 key are as follows: 416 o Message Digest: See Section 5 of [RFC8755]. 417 o Digital Signature Algorithm: See Section 6.1 of 418 [RFC8755]. 419 o Key Agreement: See Section 7.1 of [RFC8755]. 420 o Key Wrap: AES-256 Key Wrap with Padding [RFC6033] is used. AES- 421 128 Key Wrap with Padding is not used. 422 o Content Encryption: AES-256 Key Wrap with Padding [RFC6033] is 423 used. AES-128 Key Wrap with Padding is not used. 425 /symmetrickeys/return is not used at this time. 427 3.6.10. /eecerts, /firmware, /tamp 429 /eecerts, /firmware, /tamp are not used at this time. 431 4. CMC Interface 433 CMC [RFC5274][RFC6402] clients options are specified in this section. 435 4.1. RFC 5273 Transport Protocols 437 Clients use only the HTTPS-based transport; the TLS implementation 438 and configuration is as specified in [ID.cnsa-tls-profile]; the 439 notable exceptions are that only EC-based algorithms are used. 441 Clients that receive HTTP redirection responses (3xx status codes) 442 will terminate the connection ([RFC7030], Section 3.2.1). 444 4.2. Eligibility 446 At the CMC interface, servers enroll only clients that they have a 447 prior established relationship with, established independently of 448 the EST service. To accomplish this, client owners/operators 449 interact in person with the human acting as the RA (Registration 450 Authority) to ensure the information included in the transmitted 451 certificate request, which is sometimes called a CSR (Certificate 452 Signing Request), is associated with a client. The mechanism by 453 which the owner/operator interact with the RA as well as the 454 information provided is beyond the scope of this document. The 455 information exchanged by the owner/operator might be something as 456 simple as the subject name included in the to-be sent CSR or a copy 457 of the certificate that will be used to verify the certificate 458 request, provided out-of-band. 460 4.3. Authentication 462 Mutual authentication occurs via client and server signing of CMC 463 protocol elements, as required by [RFC8756]. All such 464 signatures must be validated against an installed TA; any that fail 465 validation are rejected. 467 4.4. Authorization 469 Clients support the simultaneous presence of as many TAs as are 470 required for all of the functions of the client, and only these TAs. 472 Clients check that the server's certificate includes the id-kp-cmcRA 473 EKU (Extended Key Usage) value [RFC6402], Section 2.10. 475 Clients that support processing the CMS Content Constraints extension 476 [RFC6010] ensure returned CMS content is from an SOA or is from an 477 entity authorized by an SOA for that CMS content; see Section 6.0 for 478 SOA certificates 480 4.5. Full PKI Requests/Responses 482 Requests are as specified in [RFC8756] with the notable 483 exception that only EC-based algorithms are used. 485 Additional attributes for returned CMC packages can be found in 486 [RFC7906]. 488 Certificates provided through this service are as specified in 489 Section 7 of this document. 491 5. Trust Anchor Profile 493 Clients are free to store the TA in format of their choosing; 494 however, servers provide TA information in the form of self-signed CA 495 certificates. This section documents requirements for self-signed 496 certificates in addition to those specified in [RFC8603], which in 497 turn specifies requirements in addition to those in [RFC5280]. 499 Only EC-based algorithms are used. 501 Issuer and subject names are composed of only the following naming 502 attributes: country name, domain component, organization name, 503 organizational unit name, common name, state or province name, 504 distinguished name qualifier, and serial number. 506 In the Subject Key Identifier extension, the keyIdentifier is the 64 507 low-order bits of the subject's subjectPublicKey field. 509 In the Key Usage extension, the nonRepudiation bit is never set. 511 6. Non-Self-Signed Certification Authority Certificate Profile 513 This section documents requirements for non-self signed CA 514 certificates in addition to those specified in [RFC8603], which in 515 turn specifies requirements in addition to those in [RFC5280]. 517 Only EC-based algorithms are used. 519 Subject names are composed of only the following naming attributes: 520 country name, domain component, organization name, organizational 521 unit name, common name, state or province name, distinguished name 522 qualifier, and serial number. 524 In the Authority Key Identifier extension, the keyIdentifier choice 525 is always used. The keyIdentifier is the 64 low-order bits of the 526 issuer's subjectPublicKey field. 528 In the Subject Key Identifier extension, the keyIdentifier is the 64 529 low-order bits of the subject's subjectPublicKey field. 531 In the Key Usage extension, the nonRepudiation bit is never set. 533 The Certificate Policies extension is always included and 534 policyQualifiers are never used. 536 Non-self-signed CA certificates can also include the following: 538 o Name Constraints: permittedSubtrees constraints are included and 539 excludedSubstree constraints are not. Of the GeneralName 540 choices, issuers support the following: rfc822Name, dNSName, 541 uniformResourceIdentifier, and iPAddress (both IPv4 and IPv6) as 542 well as hardwareModuleName, which is defined in [RFC4108]. Note 543 that rfc822Name, dNSName, and uniformResourceIdentifier are 544 defined as IA5 strings and the character sets allowed is not 545 uniform amongst these three name forms. 547 o CRL Distribution Points: A distributionPoint is always the 548 fullName choice; the uniformResourceIdentifier GeneralName choice 549 is always included but others can also be used as long as the 550 first element in the sequence of CRLDistributionPoints is the 551 uniformResourceIdentifier choice; the reasons and CRLIssuer 552 fields are never populated. This extension is never marked 553 critical. 555 o Authority Information Access: Only one instance of 556 AccessDescription is included. accessMethod is id-caIssuers and 557 accessLocation's GeneralName is always the 558 uniformResourceIdentifier choice. 560 o Extended Key Usage: EST servers and RAs include the id-kp-cmcRA 561 EKU and the CAs include the id-kp-cmcCA, which are both specified 562 in [RFC6402]. 564 Issuers include the Authority Clearance Constraints extension 565 [RFC5913] in non-self-signed CA certificates that are issued to non- 566 SOAs; values for the CP (Certificate Policy) OID (Object IDentifier) 567 and the supported classList values are found in the Issuer's CP. 568 Criticality is determined by the issuer and a securityCategories is 569 never included. Only one instance of Clearance is generated in the 570 AuthorityClearanceConstraints sequence. 572 Issuers include a critical CMS Content Constraints extension 573 [RFC6010] in CA certificates used to issue SOA certificates; 574 this is necessary to enable enforcement of scope of the SOA 575 authority. The content types included depend on the packages the 576 SOA sources, but include key packages (i.e., Encrypted Key Packages, 577 Symmetric Key Packages, and Asymmetric Key Packages). 579 7. End-Entity Certificate Profile 581 This section documents requirements for EE signature and key 582 establishment certificates in addition to those listed in [RFC8603], 583 which in turn specifies requirements in addition to those in 584 [RFC5280]. 586 Only EC-based algorithms are used. 588 Subject names are composed of the following naming attributes: 589 country name, domain component, organization name, organizational 590 unit name, common name, state or province name, distinguished name 591 qualifier, and serial number. 593 In the Authority Key Identifier extension, the keyIdentifier choice 594 is always used. The keyIdentifier is the 64 low-order bits of the 595 issuer's subjectPublicKey field. 597 In the Subject Key Identifier extension, the keyIdentifier is the 64 598 low-order bits of the subject's subjectPublicKey field. 600 In the Key Usage extension, signature certificates only assert 601 digitalSignature and key establishment certificates only assert 602 keyAgreement. 604 The Certificate Policies extension is always included and 605 policyQualifiers are never used. 607 When included, the non-critical CRL Distribution Point extension's 608 distributionPoint is always identified by the fullName choice; the 609 uniformResourceIdentifier GeneralName choice is always included but 610 others can also be used as long as the first element in the sequence 611 of distribution points is the URI choice and it is an HTTP/HTTPS 612 scheme; the reasons and cRLIssuer fields are never populated. 614 The following subsections provide additional requirements for the 615 different types of EE certificates. 617 7.1. Source of Authority Certificate Profile 619 This section specifies the format for SOA certificates, i.e., 620 certificates issued to those entities that are authorized to create, 621 digitally sign, encrypt, and distribute key packages; these 622 certificates are issued by non-PKI TAs. 624 The Subject Alternative Name extension is always included. The 625 following choices are supported rfc822Name, dnsName, ediPartyName, 626 uniformResourceIdentifier, or ipAddress (both IPv4 and IPv6). This 627 extension is never critical. 629 A critical CMS Content Constraints extension [RFC6010] is included in 630 SOA signature certificates. The content types included depend on the 631 packages the SOA sources (e.g., Encrypted Key Packages, Symmetric Key 632 Packages, Asymmetric Key Packages). 634 7.2. Client Certificate Profile 636 This section specifies the format for certificates issued to clients. 638 A non-critical Subject Directory Attributes extension is always 639 included with the following attributes: 641 o Device Owner [RFC5916] 642 o Clearance Sponsor [RFC5917] 643 o Clearance [RFC5913] 645 The following extensions are also included at the discretion of the 646 CA: 648 o The Authority Information Access extension with only one instance 649 of the accessMethod id-caIssuers and the accessLocation's 650 GeneralName using the uniformResourceIdentifier choice. 652 o A non-critical Subject Alternative Name extension that includes 653 the hardwareModuleName form [RFC4108], rfc822Name, or 654 uniformResourceIdentifier. 656 o A critical Subject Alternative Name extension that includes: 657 dNSName, rfc822Name, ediPartyName, uniformResourceIdentifier, or 658 ipAddress (both IPv4 and IPv6). 660 8. Relying Party Applications 662 This section documents requirements for RPs (Relying Parties) in 663 addition to those listed in [RFC8603], which in turn specifies 664 requirements in addition to those in [RFC5280]. 666 Only EC-based algorithms are used. 668 RPs support the Authority Key Identifier and the Subject Key 669 Identifier extensions. 671 RPs should support the following extensions: CRL Distribution Points, 672 Authority Information Access, Subject Directory Attribute, Authority 673 Clearance Constraints, and CMS Content Constraints extensions. 675 Within the Subject Directory Attribute extension, RPs should support 676 the Clearance Sponsor, Clearance, and Device Owner attributes. 678 RPs support the id-kp-cmcRA and id-kp-cmcCA EKUs. 680 Failure to support extensions in this section might limit the 681 suitability of a device for certain applications. 683 9. CRL Profile 685 This section documents requirements for CRLs in addition to those 686 listed in [RFC8603], which in turn specifies requirements in addition 687 to those in [RFC5280]. 689 Only EC-based algorithms are used. 691 Two types of CRLs are produced: complete base CRLs and partitioned 692 base CRLs. 694 crlEntryExtensions are never included and the reasons and cRLIssuer 695 fields are never populated. 697 All CRLs include the following CRL extensions: 699 o The Authority Key Identifier extension: The keyIdentifier is the 700 64 low-order bits of the issuer's subjectPublicKey field. 702 o As per [RFC5280], the CRL Number extension. 704 The only other extension included in partitioned base CRLs is the 705 Issuing Distribution Point extension. The distributionPoint is 706 always identified by the fullName choice; the 707 uniformResourceIdenifier GeneralName choice is always included but 708 others can also be used as long as the first element in the sequence 709 of distribution points is the uniformResourceIdenifier choice and the 710 scheme is an HTTP/HTTPS scheme; all other fields are omitted. 712 10. IANA Considerations 714 None. 716 11. Security Considerations 718 This entire document is about security. This document profiles the 719 use of many protocols and services: EST, CMC, and PKCS#10/#7/#12 as 720 well as certificates, CRLs, and their extensions [RFC5280]. These 721 have been referred to throughout this document and those 722 specifications should be consulted for security considerations 723 related to implemented protocol and services. 725 12. References 727 12.1. Normative References 729 [RFC2046] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail 730 Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", RFC 2046, DOI 731 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996, . 734 [RFC2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object 735 Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985, DOI 736 10.17487/RFC2985, November 2000, . 739 [RFC2986] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification 740 Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986, DOI 741 10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000, . 744 [RFC3739] Santesson, S., Nystrom, M., and T. Polk, "Internet X.509 745 Public Key Infrastructure: Qualified Certificates Profile", 746 RFC 3739, DOI 10.17487/RFC3739, March 2004, 747 . 749 [RFC4108] Housley, R., "Using Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) to 750 Protect Firmware Packages", RFC 4108, DOI 10.17487/RFC4108, 751 August 2005, . 753 [RFC5274] Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management Messages 754 over CMS (CMC): Compliance Requirements", RFC 5274, DOI 755 10.17487/RFC5274, June 2008, . 758 [RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., 759 Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key 760 Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List 761 (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, 762 . 764 [RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70, 765 RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009, 766 . 768 [RFC5911] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for 769 Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and S/MIME", RFC 5911, 770 DOI 10.17487/RFC5911, June 2010, . 773 [RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the 774 Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912, 775 DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010, . 778 [RFC5913] Turner, S. and S. Chokhani, "Clearance Attribute and 779 Authority Clearance Constraints Certificate Extension", 780 RFC 5913, DOI 10.17487/RFC5913, June 2010, 781 . 783 [RFC5915] Turner, S. and D. Brown, "Elliptic Curve Private Key 784 Structure", RFC 5915, DOI 10.17487/RFC5915, June 2010, 785 . 787 [RFC5916] Turner, S., "Device Owner Attribute", RFC 5916, DOI 788 10.17487/RFC5916, June 2010, . 791 [RFC5917] Turner, S., "Clearance Sponsor Attribute", RFC 5917, DOI 792 10.17487/RFC5917, June 2010, . 795 [RFC5958] Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958, DOI 796 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010, . 799 [RFC5959] Turner, S., "Algorithms for Asymmetric Key Package Content 800 Type", RFC 5959, DOI 10.17487/RFC5959, August 2010, 801 . 803 [RFC6010] Housley, R., Ashmore, S., and C. Wallace, "Cryptographic 804 Message Syntax (CMS) Content Constraints Extension", 805 RFC 6010, DOI 10.17487/RFC6010, September 2010, 806 . 808 [RFC6031] Turner, S. and R. Housley, "Cryptographic Message Syntax 809 (CMS) Symmetric Key Package Content Type", RFC 6031, DOI 810 10.17487/RFC6031, December 2010, . 813 [RFC6032] Turner, S. and R. Housley, "Cryptographic Message Syntax 814 (CMS) Encrypted Key Package Content Type", RFC 6032, DOI 815 10.17487/RFC6032, December 2010, . 818 [RFC6033] Turner, S., "Algorithms for Cryptographic Message Syntax 819 (CMS) Encrypted Key Package Content Type", RFC 6033, DOI 820 10.17487/RFC6033, December 2010, . 823 [RFC6160] Turner, S., "Algorithms for Cryptographic Message Syntax 824 (CMS) Protection of Symmetric Key Package Content Types", 825 RFC 6160, DOI 10.17487/RFC6160, April 2011, 826 . 828 [RFC6161] Turner, S., "Elliptic Curve Algorithms for Cryptographic 829 Message Syntax (CMS) Encrypted Key Package Content Type", 830 RFC 6161, DOI 10.17487/RFC6161, April 2011, 831 . 833 [RFC6162] Turner, S., "Elliptic Curve Algorithms for Cryptographic 834 Message Syntax (CMS) Asymmetric Key Package Content Type", 835 RFC 6162, DOI 10.17487/RFC6162, April 2011, 836 . 838 [RFC6268] Schaad, J. and S. Turner, "Additional New ASN.1 Modules for 839 the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and the Public Key 840 Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 6268, DOI 841 10.17487/RFC6268, July 2011, . 844 [RFC6402] Schaad, J., "Certificate Management over CMS (CMC) 845 Updates", RFC 6402, DOI 10.17487/RFC6402, November 2011, 846 . 848 [RFC7030] Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed., 849 "Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030, DOI 850 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013, . 853 [RFC7191] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Key 854 Package Receipt and Error Content Types", RFC 7191, DOI 855 10.17487/RFC7191, April 2014, . 858 [RFC7192] Turner, S., "Algorithms for Cryptographic Message Syntax 859 (CMS) Key Package Receipt and Error Content Types", 860 RFC 7192, DOI 10.17487/RFC7192, April 2014, 861 . 863 [RFC7292] Moriarty, K., Ed., Nystrom, M., Parkinson, S., Rusch, A., 864 and M. Scott, "PKCS #12: Personal Information Exchange 865 Syntax v1.1", RFC 7292, DOI 10.17487/RFC7292, July 2014, 866 . 868 [RFC7906] Timmel, P., Housley, R., and S. Turner, "NSA's 869 Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Key Management 870 Attributes", RFC 7906, DOI 10.17487/RFC7906, June 2016, 871 . 873 [RFC8295] Turner, S., "EST (Enrollment over Secure Transport) 874 Extensions", RFC 8295, DOI 10.17487/RFC8295, January 2018, 875 . 877 [RFC8603] Jenkins, M. and L. Zieglar, "Commercial National Security 878 Algorithm (CNSA) Suite Certificate and Certificate 879 Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 8603, DOI 880 10.17487/RFC8603, May 2019, . 883 [RFC8755] Jenkins, M., "Using CNSA Suite Algorithms in 884 Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions(S/MIME)", 885 RFC 8755, DOI 10.17487/RFC8755, March 2020, 886 . 888 [RFC8756] Jenkins, M. and L. Zieglar, "Commercial 889 National Security Algorithm (CNSA) Suite Profile of 890 Certificate Management over CMS", RFC 8756, 891 DOI 10.17487/RFC8756, March 2020, 892 . 894 [XML] Bray, T., Paoli, J., Sperberg-McQueen, M., Maler, E., and 895 F. Yergeau, "Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0 (Fifth 896 Edition)", World Wide Web Consortium Recommendation 897 REC-xml-20081126, November 2008, 898 . 900 [SP 800-59] National Institute of Standards and Technology, 901 "Guideline for Identifying an Information System as a 902 National Security System", SP 800-59, August 2003, 903 . 906 [ID.cnsa-tls-profile] Authors, "Commercial National Security 907 Algorithm (CNSA) Suite Profile of TLS", work-in-progress, 908 . 911 12.2. Informative References 913 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 914 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 915 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . 918 Authors' Addresses 920 Michael Jenkins 921 National Security Agency 923 EMail: mjjenki@cyber.nsa.gov 925 Sean Turner 926 sn3rd 928 EMail: sean@sn3rd.com