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Weiler 2 Internet-Draft SPARTA, Inc 3 Updates: [-records] [-protocol] March 7, 2005 4 (if approved) 5 Expires: September 8, 2005 7 Clarifications and Implementation Notes for DNSSECbis 8 draft-weiler-dnsext-dnssec-bis-updates-00 10 Status of this Memo 12 This document is an Internet-Draft and is subject to all provisions 13 of Section 3 of RFC 3667. By submitting this Internet-Draft, each 14 author represents that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of 15 which he or she is aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of 16 which he or she become aware will be disclosed, in accordance with 17 RFC 3668. 19 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 20 Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that 21 other groups may also distribute working documents as 22 Internet-Drafts. 24 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 25 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 26 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 27 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 29 The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at 30 http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. 32 The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at 33 http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. 35 This Internet-Draft will expire on September 8, 2005. 37 Copyright Notice 39 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). 41 Abstract 43 This document is a collection of minor technical clarifications to 44 the DNSSECbis document set. It is meant to serve as a resource to 45 implementors as well as an interim repository of possible DNSSECbis 46 errata. 48 1. Introduction and Terminology 50 This document lists some minor clarifications and corrections to 51 DNSSECbis, as described in [1], [2], and [3]. 53 It is intended to serve as a resource for implementors and as a 54 repository of items that need to be addressed when advancing the 55 DNSSECbis documents from Proposed Standard to Draft Standard. 57 In this version (-00), feedback is particularly solicited on the 58 structure of the document and about what query type(s) should be used 59 to find delegation points (see Section 4). 61 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 62 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 63 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [4]. 65 2. Unknown DS Message Digest Algorithms 67 Section 5.2 of -protocol includes rules for how to handle delegations 68 to zones that are signed with entirely unsupported algorithms, as 69 indicated by the algorithms shown in those zone's DS RRsets. It does 70 not explicitly address how to handle DS records that use unsupported 71 message digest algorithms. In brief, DS records using unknown or 72 unsupported message digest algorithms MUST be treated the same way as 73 DS records referring to DNSKEY RRs of unknown or unsupported 74 algorithms. 76 The existing text says: 78 If the validator does not support any of the algorithms listed 79 in an authenticated DS RRset, then the resolver has no supported 80 authentication path leading from the parent to the child. The 81 resolver should treat this case as it would the case of an 82 authenticated NSEC RRset proving that no DS RRset exists, as 83 described above. 85 To paraphrase the above, when determining the security status of a 86 zone, a resolver discards (for this purpose only) any DS records 87 listing unknown or unsupported algorithms. If none are left, the 88 zone is treated as if it were unsigned. 90 Modified to consider DS message digest algorithms, that text becomes: 91 a resolver discards any DS records listing unknown or unsupported 92 algorithms or using unknown or unsupported message digest algorithms. 94 3. Private Algorithms 96 As discussed above, section 5.2 of -protocol requires that validators 97 make decisions about the security status of zones based on the public 98 key algorithms shown in the DS records for those zones. In the case 99 of private algorithms, as described in -records Appendix A.1.1, the 100 eight-bit algorithm field in the DS RR is not conclusive about what 101 algorithm(s) is actually in use. 103 If no private algorithms appear in the DS set or if any supported 104 algorithm appears in the DS set, no special processing will be 105 needed. In the remaining cases, the security status of the zone 106 depends on whether or not the resolver supports any of the private 107 algorithms in use (provided that these DS records use supported hash 108 functions, as discussed in Section 2). In these cases, the resolver 109 MUST retrieve the corresponding DNSKEY for each private algorithm DS 110 record and examine the public key field to determine the algorithm in 111 use. The security-aware resolver MUST ensure that the hash of the 112 DNSKEY RR's owner name and RDATA matches the digest in the DS RR. If 113 they do not match, and no other DS establishes that the zone is 114 secure, the referral should be considered BAD data, as discussed in 115 -protocol. 117 This clarification facilitates the broader use of private algorithms, 118 as suggested by [5] . 120 4. Finding Zone Cuts 122 As explained in Section 3.1.4.1 of -protocol, security-aware name 123 servers need to apply special processing rules to handle the DS RR, 124 and in some situations the resolver may also need to apply special 125 rules to locate the name servers for the parent zone if the resolver 126 does not already have the parent's NS RRset. 128 Section 4.2 of -protocol suggests using NS queries for this purpose. 129 Appendix C.8 of -protocol suggests using DS queries. 131 *** Which is correct? Does it matter? 133 5. Clarifications on DNSKEY Usage 135 Questions of the form "can I use a different DNSKEY for signing the 136 X" have occasionally arisen. 138 The short answer is "yes, absolutely". You can even use a different 139 DNSKEY for each RRset in a zone, subject only to practical limits on 140 the size of the DNSKEY RRset. However, be aware that there is no way 141 to tell resolvers what a particularly DNSKEY is supposed to be used 142 for -- any DNSKEY in the zone's signed DNSKEY RRset may be used to 143 authenticate any RRset in the zone. For example, if a weaker or less 144 trusted DNSKEY is being used to authenticate NSEC RRsets or all 145 dynamically updated records, that same DNSKEY can also be used to 146 sign any other RRsets from the zone. 148 Futhermore, note that the SEP bit setting has no effect on how a 149 DNSKEY may be used -- the validation process is specifically 150 prohibitted from using that bit by -records section 2.1.2. It 151 possible to use a DNSKEY without the SEP bit set as the sole secure 152 entry point to the zone, yet use a DNSKEY with the SEP bit set to 153 sign all RRsets in the zone (other than the DNSKEY RRset). It's also 154 possible to use a single DNSKEY, with or without the SEP bit set, to 155 sign the entire zone, including the DNSKEY RRset itself. 157 6. IANA Considerations 159 This document specifies no IANA Actions. 161 7. Security Considerations 163 8. References 165 8.1 Normative References 167 [1] Arends, R., Austein, R., Massey, D., Larson, M. and S. Rose, 168 "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", 169 Internet-Draft draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-intro-13, October 2004. 171 [2] Arends, R., "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", 172 Internet-Draft draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-records-11, October 173 2004. 175 [3] Arends, R., "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security 176 Extensions", 177 Internet-Draft draft-ietf-dnsext-dnssec-protocol-09, October 178 2004. 180 [4] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement 181 Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 183 8.2 Informative References 185 [5] Blacka, D., "DNSSEC Experiments", 186 Internet-Draft draft-blacka-dnssec-experiments-00, December 187 2004. 189 Author's Address 191 Samuel Weiler 192 SPARTA, Inc 193 7075 Samuel Morse Drive 194 Columbia, Maryland 21046 195 US 197 Email: weiler@tislabs.com 199 Appendix A. Acknowledgments 201 The lack of specificity about handling private algorithms, as 202 described in Section 3, was discovered by David Blacka. 204 Intellectual Property Statement 206 The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any 207 Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to 208 pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in 209 this document or the extent to which any license under such rights 210 might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has 211 made any independent effort to identify any such rights. 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