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(See the Legal Provisions document at https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info for more information.) -- The document date (May 2002) is 8014 days in the past. Is this intentional? Checking references for intended status: Proposed Standard ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- (See RFCs 3967 and 4897 for information about using normative references to lower-maturity documents in RFCs) == Missing Reference: 'LDAPv3' is mentioned on line 74, but not defined ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 2251 (ref. 'LDAPV3') (Obsoleted by RFC 4510, RFC 4511, RFC 4512, RFC 4513) -- Unexpected draft version: The latest known version of draft-bradner-key-words is -02, but you're referring to -03. ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 2222 (ref. 'SASL') (Obsoleted by RFC 4422, RFC 4752) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 2829 (ref. 'AUTH') (Obsoleted by RFC 4510, RFC 4513) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 2830 (ref. 'LDAPTLS') (Obsoleted by RFC 4510, RFC 4511, RFC 4513) ** Obsolete normative reference: RFC 2828 (Obsoleted by RFC 4949) Summary: 12 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 4 warnings (==), 3 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 INTERNET-DRAFT Rob Weltman 3 Intended Category: Standards Track Netscape Communications Corp. 4 May 2002 6 LDAP Proxied Authorization Control 7 draft-weltman-ldapv3-proxy-11.txt 9 Status of this Memo 11 This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with 12 all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026. 14 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Task Force 15 (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups 16 may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. 18 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 19 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 20 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet Drafts as reference 21 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 23 The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at 24 http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt 26 The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at 27 http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. 29 Abstract 31 This document defines the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol 32 (LDAP) Proxied Authorization Control. The Proxied Authorization 33 Control allows a client to request that an operation be processed 34 under a provided authorization identity [AUTH] instead of as the 35 current authorization identity associated with the connection. 37 1. Introduction 39 This document defines support for proxied authorization using the 40 Control mechanism. LDAP [LDAPV3] supports the use of SASL [SASL] for 41 authentication and for supplying an authorization identity distinct 42 from the authentication identity, where the authorization identity 43 applies to the whole LDAP session. The proposed Proxied Authorization 44 Control provides a mechanism for specifying an authorization identity 45 on a per operation basis, benefiting clients that need to efficiently 46 perform operations on behalf of multiple users. 48 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "MAY", and 49 "MAY NOT" used in this document are to be interpreted as described 50 in [KEYWORDS]. 52 2. Publishing support for the Proxied Authorization Control 54 Support for the Proxied Authorization Control is indicated by the 55 presence of the OID "2.16.840.1.113730.3.4.18" in the 56 supportedControl attribute of a server's root DSE. 58 3. Proxied Authorization Control 60 A single Proxied Authorization Control may be included in any search, 61 compare, modify, add, delete, modDN or extended operation request 62 message (with the exception of any extension that causes a change in 63 authentication, authorization, or data confidentiality [RFC 2828], 64 such as startTLS) as part of the controls field of the LDAPMessage, 65 as defined in [LDAPV3]. 67 The controlType of the proxied authorization control is 68 "2.16.840.1.113730.3.4.18". 70 The criticality MUST be present and MUST be TRUE. This requirement 71 protects clients from submitting a request that is executed with an 72 unintended authorization identity. 74 The controlValue is either an LDAPString [LDAPv3] containing an 75 authzId as defined in section 9 of [AUTH] to use as the authorization 76 identity for the request, or an empty value if the anonymous identity 77 is to be used. 79 The mechanism for determining proxy access rights is specific to the 80 server's access control policy. 82 If the requested authorization identity is recognized by the server, 83 and the client is authorized to adopt the requested authorization 84 identity, the request will be executed as if submitted by the proxied 85 authorization identity, otherwise the result code TBD is returned. 86 [Note to the IESG/IANA/RFC Editor: the value TBD is to be replaced 87 with an IANA assigned LDAP Result Code (see draft-ietf-ldapbis-iana- 88 xx.txt, Section 3.5)] 90 4. Implementation Considerations 92 The interaction of proxied authorization access control and normal 93 access control is illustrated here for the case of search requests. 94 During evaluation of a search request, an entry which would have been 95 returned for the search if submitted by the proxied authorization 96 identity directly may not be returned if the server finds that the 97 requester does not have the right to assume the requested identity 98 for searching the entry, even if the entry is within the scope of a 99 search request under a base DN which does imply such rights. This 100 means that fewer results, or no results, may be returned compared to 101 the case where the proxied authorization identity issued the request 102 directly. An example of such a case may be a system with fine-grained 103 access control, where the proxy right requester has proxy rights at 104 the top of a search tree, but not at or below a point or points 105 within the tree. 107 5. Security Considerations 109 The Proxied Authorization Control method is subject to general LDAP 110 security considerations [LDAPV3] [AUTH] [LDAPTLS]. The control may be 111 passed over a secure as well as over an insecure channel. 113 The control allows for an additional authorization identity to be 114 passed. In some deployments, these identities may contain 115 confidential information which require privacy protection. 117 Note that the server is responsible for determining if a proxied 118 authorization request is to be honored. "Anonymous" users SHOULD NOT 119 be allowed to assume the identity of others. 121 6. Copyright 123 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (date). All Rights Reserved. 125 This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to 126 others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it 127 or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published 128 and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any 129 kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are 130 included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this 131 document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing 132 the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other 133 Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of 134 developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for 135 copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be 136 followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than 137 English. 139 The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be 140 revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. 142 This document and the information contained herein is provided on an 143 "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING 144 TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING 145 BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION 146 HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF 147 MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. 149 7. References 151 [LDAPV3] M. Wahl, T. Howes, S. Kille, "Lightweight Directory Access 152 Protocol (v3)", RFC 2251, December 1997. 154 [KEYWORDS] Bradner, Scott, "Key Words for use in RFCs to Indicate 155 Requirement Levels", draft-bradner-key-words-03.txt, January, 156 1997. 158 [SASL] J. Myers, "Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)", 159 RFC 2222, October 1997 161 [AUTH] M. Wahl, H. Alvestrand, J. Hodges, R. Morgan, "Authentication 162 Methods for LDAP", RFC 2829, May 2000 164 [LDAPTLS] J. Hodges, R. Morgan, M. Wahl, "Lightweight Directory 165 Access Protocol (v3): Extension for Transport Layer Security", 166 RFC 2830, May 2000 168 [RFC 2828] R. Shirey, "Internet Security Glossary", RFC 2828, May 169 2000 171 8. Author's Address 173 Rob Weltman 174 Netscape Communications Corp. 175 466 Ellis Street 176 Mountain View, CA 94043 177 USA 178 +1 650 937-3194 179 rweltman@netscape.com 181 9. Acknowledgements 183 Mark Smith of Netscape Communications Corp., Mark Wahl of Sun 184 Microsystems, Inc, Kurt Zeilenga of OpenLDAP Foundation, Jim 185 Sermersheim of Novell, and Steven Legg of Adacel have contributed 186 with reviews of this draft. 188 10. Revision History 190 10.1 Changes from draft-weltman-ldapv3-proxy-10.txt 192 Clarified the interaction of proxy access rights and normal access 193 control evaluation. 195 10.2 Changes from draft-weltman-ldapv3-proxy-09.txt 197 Removed description of Control mechanism from Abstract. 199 Added description of how this is different from SASL authz to the 200 Introduction. 202 Reworded description of the value of the control (no semantic 203 changes). 204 Added new result code TBD for failure to acquire proxy rights. 206 Added references to RFCs 2829 and 2830 in Security section. 208 10.3 Changes from draft-weltman-ldapv3-proxy-08.txt 210 Proxied Authorization Control 212 Clarifications: the control may not be submitted with a startTLS 213 request; an empty controlValue implies the anonymous identity; only 214 one control may be included with a request. 216 Permission to execute as proxy 218 Replaced "proxy identity" with "proxied authorization identity". 220 Security Considerations 222 Added statement that anonymous users should not be allowed to assume 223 the identity of others. 225 10.4 Changes from draft-weltman-ldapv3-proxy-07.txt 227 Proxied Authorization Control 229 Clarification: the content of the control is an LDAPString. 231 10.5 Changes from draft-weltman-ldapv3-proxy-06.txt 233 None 235 10.6 Changes from draft-weltman-ldapv3-proxy-05.txt 237 The control also applies to add and extended operations. 239 The control value is an authorization ID, not necessarily a DN. 241 Confidentiality concerns are mentioned. 243 10.7 Changes from draft-weltman-ldapv3-proxy-04.txt 245 The control does not apply to bind, unbind, or abandon operations. 247 The proxy DN is represented as a string in the control, rather than 248 embedded in a sequence. 250 Support for the control is published in the supportedControl 251 attribute of the root DSE, not in supportedExtensions. 253 The security section mentions confidentiality issues with exposing an 254 additional identity. 256 10.8 Changes from draft-weltman-ldapv3-proxy-03.txt 258 None 260 10.9 Changes from draft-weltman-ldapv3-proxy-02.txt 262 The Control is now called Proxied Authorization Control, rather than 263 Proxied Authentication Control, to reflect that no authentication 264 occurs as a consequence of processing the Control. 266 Rather than containing an LDAPDN as the Control value, the Control 267 contains a Sequence (which contains an LDAPDN). This is to provide 268 for future extensions.