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Checking references for intended status: Informational ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- == Unused Reference: 'I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles' is defined on line 142, but no explicit reference was found in the text == Outdated reference: A later version (-21) exists of draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-03 == Outdated reference: A later version (-23) exists of draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-16 Summary: 1 error (**), 0 flaws (~~), 7 warnings (==), 2 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group R. Bush 3 Internet-Draft Internet Initiative Japan 4 Intended status: Informational June 2012 5 Expires: December 01, 2012 7 Responsible Grandparenting in the RPKI 8 draft-ymbk-rpki-grandparenting-01 10 Abstract 12 There are circumstances in RPKI operations where a resource holder's 13 parent may not be able to, or may not choose to, facilitate full and 14 proper registration of the holder's data. As in real life, the 15 holder may form a relationship with their grandparent who is willing 16 to aid the grandchild. This document describes simple procedures for 17 doing so. 19 Status of this Memo 21 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 22 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 24 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 25 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 26 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 27 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 29 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 30 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 31 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 32 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 34 This Internet-Draft will expire on December 01, 2012. 36 Copyright Notice 38 Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 39 document authors. All rights reserved. 41 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 42 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/ 43 license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. 44 Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights 45 and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components 46 extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text 47 as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are 48 provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. 50 This document may not be modified, and derivative works of it may not 51 be created, and it may not be published except as an Internet-Draft. 53 Table of Contents 55 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 56 2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 57 3. What to Do . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 58 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 59 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 60 6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 61 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 63 1. Introduction 65 There are circumstances in RPKI operations where a resource holder's 66 parent may not be able to, or may not choose to, facilitate full and 67 proper registration of the holder's data. As in real life, the 68 holder may form a relationship with their grandparent who is willing 69 to aid the grandchild. This document describes simple procedures for 70 doing so. 72 An example might be when provider A allowed a child, C, to move to 73 other provider(s) and keep their address space, either temporarily or 74 permanently, and C's child, G, wished to stay with provider A. 76 Certification Authorities with a large number of children, e.g. 77 RIRs, might offer documented grandparenting processes and/or 78 agreements. This might reassure grandchildren with worries about 79 irresponsible parents. 81 Other examples occur in administrative hierarchies, such as large 82 organizations or military and other government hierarchies, when A's 83 child C wishes to manage their own data but does not wish the 84 technical or administrative burden of managing their children's, Gs', 85 data. 87 2. Suggested Reading 89 It is assumed that the reader understands the RPKI, see [RFC6480], 90 ROAs, see [RFC6482], BGPSEC Router Certificates, see [I-D.ietf-sidr- 91 bgpsec-pki-profiles], and the operational guidance for origin 92 validation, [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-ops]. 94 3. What to Do 96 A hypothetical example might be that A has the rights to 10.0.0.0/8, 97 has delegated 10.42.0.0/16 to their child C, who delegated 10.42.2.0/ 98 23 to their child G. C has changed providers and kept, with A's 99 consent, 10.42.0.0/16, but G wishes to stay with A and keep 10.42.2.0 100 /23. 102 Perhaps there are also AS resources involved, and G wishes to issue 103 Router Certificates for their AS(s). 105 Managing RPKI data in such relationships is simple, but should be 106 done carefully. 108 First, using whatever administrative and/or contractual procedures 109 are appropriate in the local hierarchy, the grandparent, A, should 110 ensure their relationship to the grandchild, G, and that G has the 111 right to the resources which they wish to have registered. These are 112 local matters between A and G. 114 Although A has the rights over their child's, C's, resources, it 115 would be prudent and polite to ensure that C agrees to A forming a 116 relationship to G. Again, these are local matters between A, C, and 117 G. Often, no one outside of one of these bi-lateral relationships 118 actually knows the agreement between the parties. 120 Then, it is trivial within the RPKI for A to certify G's data, even 121 though it is a subset of the resources A delegated to C. A may 122 certify G's resources, or issue one or more EE certificates and ROAs 123 for G's resources. Which is done is a local matter between A and G. 125 4. Security Considerations 127 This operational practice presents no technical security threats 128 beyond those of the relevant RPKI specifications. 130 There are threats of social engineering by G, lying to A about their 131 relationship to and rights gained from C. 133 There are also threats of social engineering by C, attempting to 134 prevent A from giving rights to G which G legitimately deserves. 136 5. IANA Considerations 138 This document has no IANA Considerations. 140 6. References 142 [I-D.ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] 143 Reynolds, M., Turner, S. and S. Kent, "A Profile for 144 BGPSEC Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists, 145 and Certification Requests", Internet-Draft draft-ietf- 146 sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-03, April 2012. 148 [I-D.ietf-sidr-origin-ops] 149 Bush, R., "RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operation", 150 Internet-Draft draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops-16, May 2012. 152 [RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support 153 Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012. 155 [RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S. and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route 156 Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012. 158 Author's Address 159 Randy Bush 160 Internet Initiative Japan 161 5147 Crystal Springs 162 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 163 US 165 Email: randy@psg.com