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'I-D.wkumari-deprecate-as-sets') Summary: 2 errors (**), 0 flaws (~~), 4 warnings (==), 2 comments (--). Run idnits with the --verbose option for more detailed information about the items above. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Network Working Group R. Bush 3 Internet-Draft IIJ 4 Intended status: BCP November 8, 2010 5 Expires: May 12, 2011 7 RPKI-Based Origin Validation Operations 8 draft-ymbk-rpki-origin-ops-00 10 Abstract 12 Deployment of the RPKI-based BGP origin validation has many 13 operational considerations. This document attempts to collect and 14 present them. It is expected to evolve as RPKI-based origin 15 validation is deployed and the dynamics are better understood. 17 Requirements Language 19 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", 20 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this 21 document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. 23 Status of this Memo 25 This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 26 provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. This document may not be modified, 27 and derivative works of it may not be created, and it may not be 28 published except as an Internet-Draft. 30 Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 31 Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute 32 working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- 33 Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. 35 Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 36 and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 37 time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 38 material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 40 This Internet-Draft will expire on May 12, 2011. 42 Copyright Notice 44 Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 45 document authors. All rights reserved. 47 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal 48 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents 49 (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of 50 publication of this document. Please review these documents 51 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect 52 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 53 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 54 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 55 described in the Simplified BSD License. 57 Table of Contents 59 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 60 2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 61 3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 62 4. Within a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 63 5. Routing Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 64 6. Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 65 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 66 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 67 9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 68 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 69 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 70 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 71 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 73 1. Introduction 75 RPKI-based origin validation relies on widespread propagation of the 76 Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch]. How 77 the RPKI is distributed and maintained globally is a serious concern 78 from many aspects. 80 The global RPKI has yet to be deployed, only a testbed exists, and 81 some beta testing is being done by the IANA and some RIRs. It is 82 expected to be deployed incrementally over a number of years. It is 83 thought that origin validation based on the RPKI will deploy over the 84 next year to five years. 86 Origin validation only need be done by an AS's border routers and is 87 designed so that it can be used to protect announcements which are 88 originated by large providers, upstreams and downstreams, and by 89 small stub/entetprise/edge routers. 91 Origin validation has been designed to be deployed on current routers 92 without hardware upgrade. It should be used by everyone from large 93 backbones to small stub/entetprise/edge routers. 95 RPKI-based origin validation has been designed so that, with prudent 96 local routing policies, there is no liability that normal Internet 97 routing is threatened by unprudent deployment of the global RPKI, see 98 Section 5. 100 2. Suggested Reading 102 It is assumed that the reader understands BGP, [RFC4271], the RPKI, 103 see [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch], the RPKI Repository Structure, see 104 [I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct], ROAs, see [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format], 105 the RPKI to Router Protocol, see [I-D.ymbk-rpki-rtr-protocol], and 106 RPKI-based Prefix Validation, see [I-D.pmohapat-sidr-pfx-validate]. 108 3. RPKI Distribution and Maintenance 110 The RPKI is a distributed database containing certificates, CRLs, 111 manifests, ROAs, and Ghostbuster Records as described in 112 [I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct]. Policies and considerations for RPKI 113 object generation and maintenance are discussed elsewhere. 115 A local valid cache containing all RPKI data may be gathered from the 116 global distributed database using the rsync protocol and a validation 117 tool such as rcynic. 119 Validated caches may also be created and maintained from other 120 validated caches. An operator should take maximum advantage of this 121 feature to minimize load on the global distributed RPKI database. 123 As RPKI-based origin validation relies on the availability of RPKI 124 data, operators will likely want border routers to have one or more 125 nearby caches. 127 For redundancy, a router may peer with more than one cache at the 128 same time. Peering with two or more, one local and others remote, is 129 recommended. 131 If an operator or site trusts upstreams to carry their traffic, they 132 might as well trust the RPKI data those upstreams cache and feed off 133 of those caches. Note that this places an obligation on those 134 upstreams to maintain fresh and reliable caches. 136 A transit provider or a network with peers will want to validate 137 origins in announcements made by downstreams and peers. They still 138 may choose to trust the caches provided by their upstreams. 140 4. Within a Network 142 Origin validation need only be done by edge routers in a network, 143 those which border other networks/ASs. 145 A validating router will use the result of origin validation to 146 influence local policy within its network, see Section 5. In 147 deployment this policy should fit into the AS's existing policy, 148 preferences, etc. This allows a network to incrementally deploy 149 validation capable border routers. 151 eBGP speakers which face more critical peers or up/downstreams would 152 be candidates for the earliest deployment. Validating more critical 153 received announcements should be considered in partial deployment. 155 5. Routing Policy 157 Origin validation based on the RPKI merely marks a received 158 announcement as having an origin which is Validated, Unknown, or 159 Invalid. How this is used in routing is up to the router operator's 160 local policy. See [I-D.pmohapat-sidr-pfx-validate]. 162 Reasonable application of local policy should be designed eliminate 163 the threat of unroutability of prefixes due to ill-advised or 164 incorrect certification policies. 166 As origin validation will be rolled out over years coverage will be 167 spotty for a long time. Hence a normal operator's policy should not 168 be overly strict, perhaps preferring valid announcements and giving 169 very low preference, but still using, invalid announcements. 171 Some may choose to use the large Local-Preference hammer. Others 172 might choose to let AS-Path rule and set their internal metric, which 173 comes after AS-Path in the BGP decision process. 175 Certainly, routing on unknown validity state will be prevalent for a 176 long time. 178 Until the community feels comfortable relying on RPKI data, routing 179 on invalid origin validity, though at a low preference, may be 180 prevalent for a long time. 182 Announcements with valid origins SHOULD be preferred over those with 183 unknown or invalid origins. 185 Announcements with unvalidatable origins SHOULD be preferred over 186 those with invalid origins. 188 Announcements with invalid origins MAY be used, but SHOULD be less 189 preferred than those with valid or unknown. 191 6. Notes 193 Like the DNS, the global RPKI presents only a loosely consistent 194 view, depending on timing, updating, fetching, etc. Thus, one cache 195 or router may have different data about a particular prefix than 196 another cache or router. There is no 'fix' for this, it is the 197 nature of distributed data with distributed caches. 199 There is some uncertainty about the origin AS of aggregates and what, 200 if any, ROA can be used. The long range solution to this is the 201 deprecation of AS-SETs, see [I-D.wkumari-deprecate-as-sets]. 203 7. Security Considerations 205 As the BGP origin is not signed, origin validation is open to 206 malicious spoofing. It is only designed to deal with inadvertent 207 mis-advertisement. 209 Origin validation does nothing about AS-Path validation and therefore 210 is open to monkey in the middle path attacks. 212 The data plane may not follow the control plane. 214 8. IANA Considerations 216 This document has no IANA Considerations. 218 9. Acknowledgments 220 The author wishes to thank Rob Austein, Steve Bellovin, Pradosh 221 Mohapatra, Chris Morrow, Keyur Patel, Heather and Jason Schiller, 222 John Scudder, and Dave Ward. 224 10. References 226 10.1. Normative References 228 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate 229 Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. 231 [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] 232 Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support 233 Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch-11 (work in 234 progress), September 2010. 236 [I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct] 237 Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for 238 Resource Certificate Repository Structure", 239 draft-ietf-sidr-repos-struct-05 (work in progress), 240 October 2010. 242 [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format] 243 Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route 244 Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", 245 draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format-07 (work in progress), 246 July 2010. 248 [I-D.ymbk-rpki-rtr-protocol] 249 Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The RPKI/Router Protocol", 250 draft-ymbk-rpki-rtr-protocol-06 (work in progress), 251 July 2010. 253 [I-D.pmohapat-sidr-pfx-validate] 254 Mohapatra, P., Scudder, J., Ward, D., Bush, R., and R. 255 Austein, "BGP Prefix Origin Validation", 256 draft-pmohapat-sidr-pfx-validate-07 (work in progress), 257 April 2010. 259 [I-D.wkumari-deprecate-as-sets] 260 Kumari, W., "Deprecation of BGP AS_SET, AS_CONFED_SET.", 261 draft-wkumari-deprecate-as-sets-01 (work in progress), 262 September 2010. 264 10.2. Informative References 266 [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway 267 Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006. 269 Author's Address 271 Randy Bush 272 Internet Initiative Japan, Inc. 273 5147 Crystal Springs 274 Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 275 US 277 Phone: +1 206 780 0431 x1 278 Email: randy@psg.com